Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

by
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the juvenile court denying Appellant's request for relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(6), holding that the new jurisdictional rule announced in K.C.G. v. State, 156 N.E.3d 1281 (Ind. 2020), does not apply retroactively in a collateral attack to render a final delinquency adjudication void.Prior to 2021, the Juvenile Code defined a "delinquent act" only as an act committed by a child "that would be an offense if committed by an adult." In K.C.G., the Supreme Court concluded that Ind. Code 35-47-10-5 (the dangerous-possession-of-a-firearm statute) expressly applied only to child and thus could never be committed by an adult. At issue in this case was whether the jurisdictional rule announced in K.C.G. applies retroactively to collaterally attack a final delinquency adjudication as void. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court in this case denying the relief sought by Appellant under Trial Rule 60(B)(6), holding that this Court's K.C.G. decision does not apply retroactively. View "M.H. v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Juvenile Law
by
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting a motion to compel arbitration brought by Defendant Star Financial Group, Inc. in this class-action complaint alleging that Defendant collected improper overdraft fees, holding that Plaintiffs' account agreement did not allow Defendant to add an addendum to the terms and conditions of the account agreement.When Plaintiffs opened their checking account they assented to an account agreement detailing the terms and conditions of their relationship with Defendant. Before Plaintiffs brought this suit Defendant added an arbitration and no-class-action addendum to the terms and conditions of Plaintiffs' account agreement. When Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit Defendants cited the addendum and filed a motion to compel arbitration. The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiffs were not bound by the arbitration addendum to their account agreement because the account agreement's change-of-terms provision did not allow Plaintiff to add the addendum. View "Decker v. Star Financial Group Inc." on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court vacated the order of the trial court concluding that a constitutional taking of Landowners' property occurred from government-induced flooding, holding that whether the flooding's interference was substantial enough to create a taking was a question left unresolved by the trial court's findings.In 2009, the Town of Linden and Montgomery County approved a drainage-improvement plan that called for a reconstruction project that included a drainage easement on Landowners' property. After completion of the project, portions of Landowners' property flooded after any heavy rainfall, encumbering their farming enterprise. Landowners sued the Town and County for inverse condemnation. After remand, the trial court concluded that the project amounted to a taking. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court's order, holding (1) the trial court properly analyzed the government-induced flooding as a permanent physical invasion; and (2) the statutory right of entry set forth in Ind. Code Ann. 36-9-27-33 does not exempt a county from liability for a takings claim. View "Town of Linden v. Birge" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court denying a motion for summary judgment brought by a contractor in this action seeking subrogation recovery and other relief, holding that the contractor was entitled to summary judgment.The company that had a sprinkler system installed and other commercial tenants in the building that was flooded when the sprinkler system malfunctioned incurred property damages. The company's insurer sued the contractor who performed the work on the sprinkler system for subrogation recovery, and the remaining commercial tenants sued the contractor to recover damages. The contractor filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contractor, as a matter of law, owed no duty to the non-contract tenants. View "U.S. Automatic Sprinkler Corp. v. Erie Insurance Exchange" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's denial of Appellant's post-conviction petition for permission to file a belated notice of appeal, holding that the appeal should be allowed to proceed.In 1999, Appellant pleaded guilty to burglary, robbery, rape, and criminal confinement, all felonies. In 2021, Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief seeking to file a belated notice of appeal under Rule 2 and claiming that when he signed his guilty plea there was no advisement that he had the right to appeal his sentence and that he did not learn of his ability to appeal until that that year. The trial court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Appellant was not at fault in failing to file a timely notice of appeal and was diligent in pursuing his belated notice of appeal. View "Leshore v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the criminal court entering an order in limine excluding from evidence the juvenile court's order in a child in need of services (CHINS) proceedings, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the CHINS order.The Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging that E.H., who was less than fourteen years old, was a CHINS. The juvenile court denied the petition after a fact-finding hearing. After further investigation, the State charged Defendant with Level 5 felony battery resulting in bodily injury to E.H. When Defendant sought to introduce at trial the CHINS order as evidence that someone else likely injured E.H. the State filed a motion to exclude that evidence in limine. The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the CHINS order under the circumstances of this case. View "Means v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of involuntary manslaughter, holding that the trial court violated Ind. Trial Rule 47(D) by denying defense counsel the opportunity to voir dire prospective jurors directly and that the error was not harmless.As the State acknowledged at oral argument, the parties agreed at the time of this opinion, that the trial court violated Trial Rule 47(D) during voir dire when it prohibited defense counsel from questioning prospective jurors directly. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court went beyond setting reasonable limits on voir dire; and (2) the error was not harmless. View "Doroszko v. Indiana" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
The Supreme Court held that Respondent, the Honorable Jeffrey F. Meade, Judge of the Gibson Circuit Court, engaged in judicial misconduct and that his misconduct warranted a seven-day unpaid suspension from office.The Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications filed a complaint against Respondent, charging that Respondent engaged in judicial misconduct by making intemperate comments from the bench, holding an off-the-record and unrecorded child-in-need-of-services hearing, and by failing to provide all parties to the proceedings with sufficient notice and an opportunity to be heard. The Supreme Court agreed that Respondent's misconduct violated several provisions of the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct and that the misconduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice. View "In re Meade" on Justia Law

by
The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of the murder of her ten-year-old stepdaughter, S.C., and her sentence of life without parole, holding that the State sufficiently carried its evidentiary burden to disprove the existence of "sudden heat" because of a lack of adequate provocation, accompanied by a sustained cooling-off period.At issue was whether the State failed to satisfy its evidentiary burden in negating the mitigating factor of "sudden heat," the necessary condition to reduce Defendant's conviction to voluntary manslaughter. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction and life-without-parole sentence, holding that the State satisfied its evidentiary burden in negating the mitigating factor and voluntary manslaughter requirement of sudden heat. View "Carmack v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission approving Southern Indiana Gas and Electric Company's (Vectren) petition for approval of its new instantaneous netting method determining the amount of credit its customers receive for their excess distributed generation of electricity, holding that there was no error.Acting within its expertise and authority, the Commission approved Vectren's petition seeking approval of a tariff (Rider EDG) rate for the procurement of excess distributed generation. The Commission approved the Rider EDG, finding that the instantaneous netting method was consistent with Ind. Code 8-1-40-5. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission properly held that Vectren's instantaneous netting method was not contrary to law and satisfied the requirements in Ind. Code Ann. 8-1-40-5. View "Ind. Office of Utility Consumer Counselor v. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co." on Justia Law