Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A company hired an accounting firm to provide auditing services. During the years covered by the parties' agreement, an employee of the company committed fraud and theft, causing significant losses to the company. The company alleged negligence, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment against the accounting firm and demanded arbitration pursuant to the agreement. An arbitration panel found the accounting firm negligent and the company comparatively negligent. The company then filed the present suit, claiming the accounting firm committed deception because the documents the accounting firm produced during the arbitration were misleading. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the accounting firm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that issue preclusion barred the company's deception claim because the issue underlying the deception claim was the veracity of the documents produced at arbitration, which was necessarily decided by the arbitration panel. View "Nat'l Wine & Spirits, Inc. v. Ernst & Young, LLP" on Justia Law

Employer allowed Employee to take a college class during his normal work hours but informed him he would have to use his vacation, compensation, or unpaid time rather than take shorter lunches, come in early, or stay later. Employee enrolled in the class but did not follow Employer's instructions and failed properly to account for his time off. Consequently, Employee was fired and denied unemployment benefits. An ALJ overturned that decision and granted Employee unemployment benefits, concluding that the discipline was too severe for only a small amount of misreported time. The review board of the department of workforce development upheld the original denial of unemployment benefits, finding that J.M. was discharged for just cause and thus ineligible for unemployment benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed the review board's denial of benefits, holding that the findings of fact by the review board showed Employee violated his supervisor's instructions and the employee handbook, which were statutory grounds for just-cause discharge. View "J.M. v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev." on Justia Law

Shannon Barabas had two mortgages on her Madison County home. The second mortgagee foreclosed on the property without notice to the first. The first mortgagee sought to intervene and obtain relief from the foreclosure judgment, but the trial court denied its motion, finding that the first mortgagee was bound by the default judgment because its assignment of the mortgage was never properly recorded. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the first mortgagee had a right to intervene; and (2) the default judgment was void for lack of personal jurisdiction as to the first mortgagee because it had no notice of the foreclosure proceeding. View "Citimortgage, Inc. v. Barabas" on Justia Law

Associated with a toy gun business, Defendants were charged with counterfeiting, theft, and corrupt business influence arising out of their conduct concerning toy semi-automatic weapons that were look-alikes of real weapons for which a gun manufacturer allegedly owned a federally protected trademark. The trial court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to counterfeiting, on grounds that the facts alleged did not constitute an offense, but denied Defendants' motions to dismiss the theft and corrupt business influence charges. On interlocutory review, the court of appeals concluded that all charges should be dismissed on grounds that Indiana lacked jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in denying Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, as the Court could not conclude as a matter of law that Defendants engaged in no conduct nor effected any result in Indiana that was an element of either charge; (2) erred in dismissing the counterfeiting charges, as the facts alleged constituted the offense of counterfeiting; and (3) did not err in denying Defendants' motions to dismiss the theft and corrupt business influence charges. View "Yao v. State" on Justia Law

When Sean and Dee Anna Ryan divorced, they agreed to sell two properties they owned and divide the proceeds, subject to a proviso that neither party was required to accept a sale yielding net proceeds below specified minimums. When the properties could not be sold at or above the specified minimums, Dee Anna refused to waive the proviso. Sean filed a motion for relief from judgment, seeking a court order that the properties be sold at prevailing fair market value and the private agreement be declared of no further force and effect. The trial court denied Sean's request. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) general rules applicable to contract construction dictated that Dee Anna was not required to agree to sell the properties for net proceeds less than the amounts set forth in the parties' agreement; and (2) Sean was not entitled to relief under Trial Rule 60(B), under which a court may relieve a party from a judgment. View "Ryan v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff co-established Company. Plaintiff later sold his majority interest pursuant to an agreement calling for payments to Plaintiff and giving Plaintiff a security interest in Company's assets. Company subsequently applied for credit with Bank, which transaction made Plaintiff's security interest in Company's assets subordinate to Bank's. Thereafter, Company went out of business, leaving loans unpaid. Plaintiff brought claims against Bank for negligence, constructive fraud, actual fraud, and tortious interference with a contract. The trial court granted Bank's motion for judgment on the evidence on all claims, including finding that Bank owed no duty to Purcell. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling as to the issues of duty but reversed the trial court's judgment on the evidence as to Purcell's remaining claims. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding (1) there was not sufficient evidence presented in this case to withstand a motion for judgment on the evidence on Purcell's claims of fraud, deception, and tortious interference with a contract; and (2) Purcell's relationship with Bank as a subordinate creditor did not give rise to a duty of care required to prove Purcell's claims of negligence and constructive fraud. View "Purcell v. Old Nat'l Bank" on Justia Law

In this case, Plaintiff prevailed on its Access to Public Records Act (Act) claim against a public agency and an intervening private party. As required by statute, the trial court awarded Plaintiff attorney's fees. The fees were awarded against both the public agency and the intervening private party, jointly and severally. The private party argued that the Act does not contemplate the award of attorney's fees against an intervening private party and that only the public agency should be liable for the fees. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Plaintiff, holding (1) the Act, in light of the legislature's liberal-construction mandate and the statute's underlying policy, permits the award of attorney's fees against an intervening private party; and (2) in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its apportionment of liability. View "Shepherd Props. Co. v. Int'l Union of Painters & Allied Trades" on Justia Law

This case involved a property dispute between an individual church congregation, Olivet Presbyterian Church, and the denominational organization with which it was previously affiliated, the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), and the latter's subsidiary organizations, the plaintiffs in this action, the Presbytery of Ohio Valley and the Synod of Lincoln Trails of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Inc. (collectively, "Presbytery"). The trial court granted summary judgment rejecting the Presbytery's claims of express and implied trust and holding that the disputed property was solely owned by Olivet. The Presbytery appealed both the denial of its motion for summary judgment and the granting of Olivet's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact arose from the inferences flowing from the stipulated designated evidence and that neither Olivet nor the Presbytery was entitled to the full relief sought in their respective motions for summary judgment. Remanded. View "Presbytery of Ohio Valley, Inc. v. OPC, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and found to be a habitual offender. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the opinion of the court of appeals. The Supreme Court vacated the habitual-offender enhancement, holding that the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the habitual-offender allegation, as the habitual-offender enhancement to Defendant's sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF constituted an impermissible double enhancement. The Court then affirmed Defendant's conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by an SVF and his sentence for that offense. Remanded for resentencing. View "Dye v. State" on Justia Law

This case involved a seventeen-and-a-half-year-old who murdered his ten-year-old brother. Defendant confessed to the crime and pleaded guilty to murdering his brother, Conner, while he was babysitting. The trial court judge sentenced Defendant to life without parole. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, holding (1) the trial court did not err in allowing the testimony of a medical doctor who suggested that Defendant had traits of a person with psychopathy; (2) the trial court properly weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case; (3) based on the age of Conner, and the particularly heinous nature of the crime, a sentence of life without parole was appropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B); and (4) under the facts of this case, the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a person under the age of eighteen who has been convicted of murder did not violate either the United States or Indiana Constitution. View "Conley v. State" on Justia Law