Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A driver hit Britney Meux, who later died from her injuries, and fled the scene. The State charged the alleged driver, Jason Cozmanoff, with thirteen crimes, including one count of reckless homicide. A few weeks later, Meux’s Estate sued Cozmanoff for wrongful death. The Estate then served Cozmanoff with discovery requests. If Cozmanoff were to invoke the Fifth Amendment and refuse to comply with the Estate’s requests, the civil jury could infer he was liable for causing Meux’s death. But if he were to provide discovery responses, the State could use his testimony and responses against him in his criminal trial. Cozmanoff moved to stay the civil case pending the resolution of his criminal prosecution, citing his Fifth Amendment privilege. The trial court granted a limited stay of discovery but ordered him to respond to the plaintiff’s complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a stay. View "Hardiman v. Cozmanoff" on Justia Law

I.T., who admitted to conduct that would be a Class B felony child molesting if committed by an adult, was ordered by the trial court to undergo therapeutic polygraph examinations. During one of those exams, I.T. admitted to molesting two other children. Based on those statements, the State filed a new delinquency petition. I.T. moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the Juvenile Mental Health Statute, which bars a child’s statement to a mental health evaluator from being admitted into evidence to prove delinquency, barred the State’s evidence. The trial court granted the motion. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State may appeal a juvenile court order that suppresses evidence if doing so terminates the proceeding; and (2) the Statute’s limited immunity prohibits both use and derivative use of a juvenile’s statements to prove delinquency. View "State v. I.T." on Justia Law

Mother was the biological mother of fraternal twins. After Mother's parental rights to the twins were terminated (TPR judgment), the twins' foster parents (Adoptive Parents) petitioned to adopt them. None of the parties to the adoption notified Mother about the adoption proceedings because notice is not required to a parent whose rights have been terminated. The adoption was finalized when Mother's appeal was pending. Two months later, the TPR judgment against Mother was reversed by the court of appeals. Mother then petitioned to set aside the adoption. The trial court entered judgment against Mother. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the adoption decree, holding that when the TPR judgment in this case was reversed, the no-consent adoption that followed became voidable under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(7).View "In re Adoption of C.B.M. " on Justia Law

Father had two children with Mother. From 2001 onward, Father was required to pay child support. Father was also incarcerated for the majority of those years. In 2011, Mother married her boyfriend, E.J., and Mother and E.J. petitioned for E.J. to adopt the children. The trial court granted the petitions. Father subsequently filed a letter that the trial court treated as a notice of appeal. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the order of adoption, holding that sufficient evidence in the record supported the trial court’s decision. View "In re Adoption of T.L." on Justia Law

In 2005, Defendant was sentenced to seventeen years in prison. In 2010, Defendant struck a prison employee in the face. Defendant was found guilty of battery with injury and sentenced to an enhanced term of three years. The trial court ordered a consecutive sentence as statutorily required but awarded Defendant 471 days credit for time he served incarcerated prior to trial on the battery charge plus 471 days of Class I credit time for a total credit of 942 days against the battery sentence. The State subsequently filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, which the trial court denied. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to re-evaluate the award of credit time and to re-sentence Defendant, holding that the trial court erred in awarding credit time with respect to the mandatory consecutive sentence. View "State v. Lotaki" on Justia Law

On April 19, Plaintiff sent a proposed medical malpractice complaint to the Indiana Department of Insurance by way of FedEx Priority Overnight. On April 21, the Department received the proposed complaint and filed-stamped it that same day. April 21 was one day after the expiration of the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the proposed complaint was considered “filed” upon receipt rather than upon deposit with a private delivery service. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed the entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding (1) the commencement of a medical malpractice action occurs when a copy of the proposed complaint is deposited for mailing by registered or certified mail or by a designated private delivery service; and (2) Plaintiff’s action was deemed filed, and her action commenced, on April 19, which was within the applicable statute of limitations. View "Moryl v. Ransone" on Justia Law

In 2008, one-year-old E.M. and his newborn sister El.M. were adjudicated children in need of services (CHINS) based on father’s repeated domestic violence against Mother. By mid-2010, both Mother and Father had ceased receiving services from the Department of Child Services (DCS), and DSC petitioned to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. The trial court subsequently terminated Father’s parental rights, and Father appealed. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court placed too much weight on Father’s past conduct without adequately taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions at the time of the termination hearing. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals opinion, holding (1) the court of appeals contravened the standard of review by reweighing the evidence; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support termination. View "E.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs." on Justia Law

Howard Price was the Fayette County Highway Supervisor from 1991 to 2002 and again resumed the position in 2006. In 2011, the Fayette County Board of Commissioners decided not to reappoint Price as Highway Supervisor. Thereafter, Price brought this action requesting a review of the Board’s decision to terminate his continued employment. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court treated as a motion for summary judgment, asserting that its employment decision was not subject to judicial review. The trial court denied summary judgment, concluding that the Board’s decision was quasi-judicial in nature and thus subject to judicial review. The court of appeals affirmed on interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board’s employment decision with respect to Price was a ministerial decision, not a quasi-judicial one, and therefore not subject to judicial review. View "Fayette County Bd. of Comm’rs v. Price" on Justia Law

From 2002 through 2008, Respondent Kimberly J. Brown served as judge of a small claims court. In 2009, Respondent began serving as judge of the superior court. In 2013, the Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications charged Respondent with violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, and acts of willful misconduct. The charged alleged, among other things, dereliction of judicial duties on cases, creation of a hostile environment for attorneys and others working in the court, and failures to complete necessary paperwork, which resulted in delayed releases of defendants from jail. Three Special Masters appointed by the Supreme Court found that Respondent committed judicial misconduct alleged in forty-six of the forty-seven counts for which Respondent was charged. The Commission concurred in the Masters’ recommendation that Respondent be removed from office. The Supreme Court removed Respondent from the office of judge of the superior court, concluding that the Commission demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent engaged in significant judicial misconduct and that the misconduct warranted her removal from office. View "In re Brown" on Justia Law

Mary Manley was involved in a head-on automobile collision with Kimberly Zehr. Manley later learned that Zehr had several medical conditions that, combined with medications she had been prescribed by her physician. Dr. Ryan Sherer, may have contributed to the accident. Manley and her husband (Plaintiffs) later filed a proposed complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance against Dr. Sherer and his medical group (Defendants) alleging medical negligence in failing to warn Zehr not to drive while she was taking her medication. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that Plaintiffs' action was untimely brought under the two-year limitation period set forth in the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it was indiscernible whether Plaintiffs could have pursued their malpractice claim within the two-year statutory limit, or if not, whether they acted within a reasonable time as required by caselaw; and (2) genuine issues of material fact existed as to the absence of the element of causation necessary to establish liability. Remanded.View "Manley v. Sherer" on Justia Law