Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of felony criminal deviate conduct in 1998, was released from prison in 2000, and began registering annually as a sex offender. Indiana later expanded its registration requirements. Defendant petitioned for relief from the additional SVP obligations, arguing that they were an unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to him. The trial court concluded in 2008 that retroactively classifying Defendant as an SVP under the expanded statutes would be unconstitutional. The State did not appeal the 2008 order, nor did the Department of Corrections (DOC) intervene to challenge it. In 2011, the State found Defendant had satisfied his registration obligations under the ten-year statute that existed at the time of his conviction. The DOC later filed a motion to correct error, arguing that Defendant's registration obligation from ten years to life was not an ex post facto violation. The trial court granted the motion and vacated the 2008 order. Defendant appealed, arguing that the 2008 order was res judicata against the DOC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if the 2008 order was erroneous, it nevertheless became res judicata against the "State" - both the prosecutor and the DOC - when the State failed to appeal it.View "Becker v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of four counts of felony attempted child exploitation for taking “upskirt” photographs of women and girls at a mall by means of a concealed shoe camera. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant did not violate the child exploitation statute, which requires that in order for a defendant to commit child exploitation, the child must “be exhibiting her uncovered genitals with the intent to satisfy someone’s sexual desires.” The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions for attempted child exploitation because, in light of the circumstantial evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Defendant intended to capture not just images of undergarments but also images of uncovered genitals. View "Delagrange v. State" on Justia Law

In 2010, the Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging that G.P. was a child in need of services (CHINS) because Mother had a history of drug abuse. At an initial hearing before the CHINS court, Mother waived her right to counsel. G.P. was found to be a CHINS. At a subsequent CHINS review hearing, Mother requested counsel. The trial court concluded that Mother was entitled to representation but did not then actually appoint counsel for Mother. After additional CHINS hearings, at which Mother remained unrepresented, DCS filed an action to terminate the parental rights (TPR) of Mother with respect to G.P. The trial court appointed counsel to represent Mother during the TPR process at Mother’s request. Mother’s parental rights were subsequently terminated, and G.P. was adopted by his paternal grandparents. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights because Mother was denied her statutory right to counsel during the course of the CHINS proceedings, and those proceedings directly influenced the TPR process. View "J.A. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. & Child Advocates, Inc." on Justia Law

An underinsured motorist collided with a city bus driven by Plaintiff. Plaintiff received a net workers’ compensation award of $71,958. Plaintiff also received $25,000 from the tortfeasor’s insurer. Plaintiff carried an underinsured (UM) policy issued by American Family Mutual Insurance Company that provided coverage up to $50,000 per person. Plaintiff submitted a UM claim to American Family, which denied coverage. Plaintiff filed a breach of contract action against American Family, asserting that he was entitled, under the terms of the policy, to $25,000 - the difference between his UM policy limit of $50,000 and the $25,000 he received from the tortfeasor’s insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment for American Family, concluding that the workers’ compensation benefits Plaintiff received operated as a setoff against the policy limit, thus reducing American Family’s liability to zero. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the policy language unambiguously provided for a setoff against the policy limit; but (2) because this particular set-off would reduce the policy limit below the statutory minimum, Plaintiff was entitled to recover the remaining $25,000 from American Family. View "Justice v. Am. Family Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated battery and sentenced to a term of years in the Department of Correction. The State sought restitution, and the trial court scheduled a restitution hearing. Before the hearing on restitution, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. The State moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the appeal was premature because there had been no resolution of whether or how much restitution would be ordered. The court of appeals subsequently dismissed the appeal as premature. The Supreme Court granted transfer and remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of the points raised in Appellant’s brief, holding that, due to confusion about appellate deadlines and in view of the delay already in this case, Appellant’s appeal should be addressed on the merits even though the issue of restitution remained unresolved. Remanded. View "Alexander v. State" on Justia Law

A driver hit Britney Meux, who later died from her injuries, and fled the scene. The State charged the alleged driver, Jason Cozmanoff, with thirteen crimes, including one count of reckless homicide. A few weeks later, Meux’s Estate sued Cozmanoff for wrongful death. The Estate then served Cozmanoff with discovery requests. If Cozmanoff were to invoke the Fifth Amendment and refuse to comply with the Estate’s requests, the civil jury could infer he was liable for causing Meux’s death. But if he were to provide discovery responses, the State could use his testimony and responses against him in his criminal trial. Cozmanoff moved to stay the civil case pending the resolution of his criminal prosecution, citing his Fifth Amendment privilege. The trial court granted a limited stay of discovery but ordered him to respond to the plaintiff’s complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a stay. View "Hardiman v. Cozmanoff" on Justia Law

I.T., who admitted to conduct that would be a Class B felony child molesting if committed by an adult, was ordered by the trial court to undergo therapeutic polygraph examinations. During one of those exams, I.T. admitted to molesting two other children. Based on those statements, the State filed a new delinquency petition. I.T. moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that the Juvenile Mental Health Statute, which bars a child’s statement to a mental health evaluator from being admitted into evidence to prove delinquency, barred the State’s evidence. The trial court granted the motion. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State may appeal a juvenile court order that suppresses evidence if doing so terminates the proceeding; and (2) the Statute’s limited immunity prohibits both use and derivative use of a juvenile’s statements to prove delinquency. View "State v. I.T." on Justia Law

Mother was the biological mother of fraternal twins. After Mother's parental rights to the twins were terminated (TPR judgment), the twins' foster parents (Adoptive Parents) petitioned to adopt them. None of the parties to the adoption notified Mother about the adoption proceedings because notice is not required to a parent whose rights have been terminated. The adoption was finalized when Mother's appeal was pending. Two months later, the TPR judgment against Mother was reversed by the court of appeals. Mother then petitioned to set aside the adoption. The trial court entered judgment against Mother. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instructions to vacate the adoption decree, holding that when the TPR judgment in this case was reversed, the no-consent adoption that followed became voidable under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(7).View "In re Adoption of C.B.M. " on Justia Law

Father had two children with Mother. From 2001 onward, Father was required to pay child support. Father was also incarcerated for the majority of those years. In 2011, Mother married her boyfriend, E.J., and Mother and E.J. petitioned for E.J. to adopt the children. The trial court granted the petitions. Father subsequently filed a letter that the trial court treated as a notice of appeal. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the order of adoption, holding that sufficient evidence in the record supported the trial court’s decision. View "In re Adoption of T.L." on Justia Law

In 2005, Defendant was sentenced to seventeen years in prison. In 2010, Defendant struck a prison employee in the face. Defendant was found guilty of battery with injury and sentenced to an enhanced term of three years. The trial court ordered a consecutive sentence as statutorily required but awarded Defendant 471 days credit for time he served incarcerated prior to trial on the battery charge plus 471 days of Class I credit time for a total credit of 942 days against the battery sentence. The State subsequently filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, which the trial court denied. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to re-evaluate the award of credit time and to re-sentence Defendant, holding that the trial court erred in awarding credit time with respect to the mandatory consecutive sentence. View "State v. Lotaki" on Justia Law