Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mother informed the Department of Child Services (DCS) that her son (Son) had been molested by her twelve-year-old nephew (Nephew). During a subsequent investigation, Nephew admitted to inappropriately touching Son and one of Mother's daughters (Daughter). Mother, however, was not informed of Nephew's molestation of Daughter. Nephew was adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation, but Mother was not informed of Nephew's adjudication. Mother was later informed of Nephew's admission to the molestation of Daughter from a third party. Mother and Father (Plaintiffs) filed suit against DCS and the Evansville Police Department (EPD), alleging negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants on grounds of immunity. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed summary judgment in favor of EPD, holding that EPD was immune from Plaintiffs' claims under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (Act); but (2) reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of DCS, concluding that it was not immune under either the Act or the child abuse reporting statute. Remanded.View "F.D. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs." on Justia Law

Ruth Fulp placed her family farm in a revocable trust with trust assets going to her three children upon her death. Fulp decided to sell the farm to her son, Harold, a few years later. The proposed sale was for a low price to pay for Fulp's retirement home care and to keep the farm in the family. Ruth's daughter, Nancy, opposed the action, arguing that a bargain sale would breach Ruth's fiduciary duty to her children and deprive Nancy of her share of the trust. The trial court found that Ruth breached her fiduciary duty to the children by selling the farm at a low price. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the terms of the trust and the Indiana Trust Code, Ruth did not owe her children a fiduciary duty to sell the farm at less than fair market price and that Ruth did not effectively amend the trust by selling the farm. Remanded.View "Fulp v. Gilliland" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP). The Supreme Court affirmed in all respects, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting six crime-scene photographs into evidence, and expert witness’s reliance on the photographs was admissible; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial as a sanction for undisclosed testimony; (3) the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury; and (4) the LWOP sentence was supported by sufficient evidence, the jury was not invited to recommend LWOP based on non-stautory aggravators, and the sentence was proportionate and appropriate. View "Knapp v. State" on Justia Law

After police officers received information about a drug dealer, the officers approached a vehicle in which Appellant was a passenger, ordered her outside the car, and handcuffed her. While Appellant was being interviewed, another officer began an inventory search of the vehicle and found cocaine. Appellant was charged with two drug-related felonies. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence found during the search of her vehicle and the statements she made to the interviewing officer. The trial court denied the motion except as to the statements Appellant made before she received a Miranda warning. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress, holding (1) the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Appellant or to search her vehicle; and (2) a reasonable person in Appellant's shoes would not have understood the Miranda warning to convey a message that she retained a choice about continuing to talk, and therefore, Appellant's post-Miranda statements were inadmissible. Remanded.View "Kelly v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs’ insured vehicle was struck by a Jeep driven by a hit-and-run driver. Plaintiffs sought coverage for property damage under the uninsured motorists coverage of the family auto insurance policy issued by Erie Insurance Exchange. Erie denied the claim. The trial court granted summary judgment for Erie on the coverage issue. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that under the clear and unambiguous language of the Erie policy, the policy did not provide uninsured motorists coverage with respect to the property damage sustained by Plaintiffs’ vehicle because personal injury did not result to Plaintiffs in the accident. View "Robinson v. Erie Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

Defendant, a truck driver, was arrested after a deliberate action conducted by the state police uncovered nearly ninety pounds of cocaine in Defendant's cargo. Defendant requested a speedy trial, but the trial court was unable to bring him to trial within the time limit because of court congestion. Defendant filed a motion for discharge, which the trial court denied. Defendant also unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. Ultimately, Defendant was convicted of two counts of dealing in cocaine. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the admission of cocaine evidence at Defendant's trial and the denial of his motion for discharge, holding (1) neither the police officers' detentions of Defendant nor the collective police action constituted an unreasonable search or seizure; and (2) the trial court's decision to continue Defendant's trial beyond his seventy-day speedy trial window was not clearly erroneous.View "Austin v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant, a non-native English speaker, pleaded guilty to one count of delivery of cocaine within one thousand feet of a school. Ten years later, Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily because the court-appointed interpreted failed to accurately translate Defendant’s Boykin rights. The post-conviction court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that the advisement was defective but, nonetheless, Defendant knew at the time of the plea hearing that he was waiving his Boykin rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant was not properly advised of the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty and did not understand his constitutional rights when he purportedly waived them. View "Ponce v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a resident of the City of Logansport and a ratepayer to the municipal utility that supplied her electricity. Plaintiff filed a petition against the City of Logansport, including the City's mayor and common council, seeking a declaration that Ordinance 2013-07, which gave the mayor the authority to enter into a public-private partnership and to negotiate an agreement with an entity that could construct, operate, and maintain a public electric facility and transfer it back to the City, was invalid because the City lacked the authority to pass the ordinance. The trial court dismissed the petition for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Indiana's Public-Private Agreements Act, which authorizes and provides guidelines for the implementation of public-private partnerships, does not require a local legislative body to first adopt the statute before it may issue a request for proposals or begin contract negotiations as provided for under the statute; and (2) the City complied with the Act in every particular, and therefore, Plaintiff was not entitled to relief.View "Kitchell v. Franklin" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of resisting law enforcement, battery of a law enforcement officer resulting in injury, and disorderly conduct. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in giving only the pattern jury instruction regarding the defense of another and not his tendered jury instructions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Defendant's tendered instructions, as the Indiana Pattern Jury Instruction is a correct statement of the law and continues to serve as the primary guide for trial judges on the issues of self-defense or defense of another. Remanded to the trial court to correct the abstract of judgment.View "Washington v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and class B felony possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon (SVF). Defendant appealed, claiming (1) the trial court should have given his tendered jury instruction on self-defense, and (2) the trial court erred by not completely bifurcating the trial on his SVF charge from the trial on his murder charge. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court did not err (1) in utilizing the existing Indiana Pattern Jury Instruction on self-defense and in refusing to give Defendant's tendered jury instruction; and (2) in partially bifurcating the trial. View "Russell v. State" on Justia Law