Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) approved a contract for the purchase of substitute natural gas and directed the procedure for resolving future related disputes. The court of appeals reversed the IURC's approval of the contract because a definition term in the contract deviated from the required statutory definition. The parties to the contract subsequently amended the contract to delete the language that the court of appeals found improper. The Supreme Court vacated the reversal of the IURC's order, held that the amended contract that corrected the definitional error rendered the definitional issue moot, and summarily affirmed the court of appeals as to all other claims.View "Ind. Gas Co., Inc. v. Ind. Fin. Auth." on Justia Law

Mother and Father were divorced in 1999 pursuant to a decree that approved the parties' comprehensive settlement agreement under which Mother was granted physical custody of the parties' two children. In 2011, Father sought to modify the decree. The trial court modified the prior child support order in several respects. Father appealed. The court of appeals reversed, inter alia, the trial court's determination of credits for Mother's health insurance costs and Father's Social Security benefits. The Supreme Court granted transfer and (1) affirmed the trial court on the issues of health insurance costs and Social Security benefits, holding that the trial court's approach was appropriate in this case; and (2) summarily affirmed the court of appeals in all other respects.View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of resisting law enforcement and sentenced to ninety days in jail. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. In this case, Defendant refused repeated orders to lie down on the ground and aggressively advanced, with his fists clenched, to within a few feet of the police officer issuing the orders before being tased. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant's act of aggression toward the officer was sufficient to show that Defendant forcibly resisted, obstructed, or interfered with the law enforcement officer pursuant to Ind. Code 35-44.1-3-1(a)(1). View "Walker v. State" on Justia Law

Upon responding to a call about an unsupervised toddler wandering near an apartment-complex retention pond, Defendant informed the police that he was the child’s father. Defendant consented to police entry into his apartment, and the child’s mother, the leaseholder, consented to a full search. The police officers subsequently discovered contraband in the apartment and charged Defendant with unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, neglect of a dependent, dealing marijuana, possessing marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia. Defendant pleaded guilty to the neglect and marijuana-possession counts, and the case proceeded to a trial on the remaining counts. During trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence found during law enforcement’s pat-down search and subsequent search. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant was acquitted of dealing marijuana but found guilty on the remaining charges. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, as Defendant consented to police entering the apartment, Defendant’s movements justified a pat-down, and the mother gave her consent to search the rest of the apartment. View "McIlquham v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a former independent commissioned sales representative for Mor/Ryde International, Inc., sued Mor/Ryde for unpaid commissions under a contract between the parties. One count of Plaintiff’s complaint alleged violations of the Indiana Sales Representative Act. The trial court concluded that the Sales Representative Act applied to Mor/Ryde’s contract with Plaintiff and ruled that exemplary damages under the Sales Representative Act are subject to statutory restrictions on awards of punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Punitive Damages Act applies only to discretionary common-law punitive damages awards, not statutory damage awards like the Sales Representative Act; and (2) therefore, treble damages under the Sales Representative Act are not subject to the Punitive Damages Act. View "Andrews v. Mor/Ryde Int’l, Inc." on Justia Law

Mother informed the Department of Child Services (DCS) that her son (Son) had been molested by her twelve-year-old nephew (Nephew). During a subsequent investigation, Nephew admitted to inappropriately touching Son and one of Mother's daughters (Daughter). Mother, however, was not informed of Nephew's molestation of Daughter. Nephew was adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation, but Mother was not informed of Nephew's adjudication. Mother was later informed of Nephew's admission to the molestation of Daughter from a third party. Mother and Father (Plaintiffs) filed suit against DCS and the Evansville Police Department (EPD), alleging negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment to all defendants on grounds of immunity. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed summary judgment in favor of EPD, holding that EPD was immune from Plaintiffs' claims under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (Act); but (2) reversed the grant of summary judgment in favor of DCS, concluding that it was not immune under either the Act or the child abuse reporting statute. Remanded.View "F.D. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs." on Justia Law

Ruth Fulp placed her family farm in a revocable trust with trust assets going to her three children upon her death. Fulp decided to sell the farm to her son, Harold, a few years later. The proposed sale was for a low price to pay for Fulp's retirement home care and to keep the farm in the family. Ruth's daughter, Nancy, opposed the action, arguing that a bargain sale would breach Ruth's fiduciary duty to her children and deprive Nancy of her share of the trust. The trial court found that Ruth breached her fiduciary duty to the children by selling the farm at a low price. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that under the terms of the trust and the Indiana Trust Code, Ruth did not owe her children a fiduciary duty to sell the farm at less than fair market price and that Ruth did not effectively amend the trust by selling the farm. Remanded.View "Fulp v. Gilliland" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP). The Supreme Court affirmed in all respects, holding (1) the trial court did not err in admitting six crime-scene photographs into evidence, and expert witness’s reliance on the photographs was admissible; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial as a sanction for undisclosed testimony; (3) the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury; and (4) the LWOP sentence was supported by sufficient evidence, the jury was not invited to recommend LWOP based on non-stautory aggravators, and the sentence was proportionate and appropriate. View "Knapp v. State" on Justia Law

After police officers received information about a drug dealer, the officers approached a vehicle in which Appellant was a passenger, ordered her outside the car, and handcuffed her. While Appellant was being interviewed, another officer began an inventory search of the vehicle and found cocaine. Appellant was charged with two drug-related felonies. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence found during the search of her vehicle and the statements she made to the interviewing officer. The trial court denied the motion except as to the statements Appellant made before she received a Miranda warning. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion to suppress, holding (1) the officers did not have probable cause to arrest Appellant or to search her vehicle; and (2) a reasonable person in Appellant's shoes would not have understood the Miranda warning to convey a message that she retained a choice about continuing to talk, and therefore, Appellant's post-Miranda statements were inadmissible. Remanded.View "Kelly v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs’ insured vehicle was struck by a Jeep driven by a hit-and-run driver. Plaintiffs sought coverage for property damage under the uninsured motorists coverage of the family auto insurance policy issued by Erie Insurance Exchange. Erie denied the claim. The trial court granted summary judgment for Erie on the coverage issue. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that under the clear and unambiguous language of the Erie policy, the policy did not provide uninsured motorists coverage with respect to the property damage sustained by Plaintiffs’ vehicle because personal injury did not result to Plaintiffs in the accident. View "Robinson v. Erie Ins. Exch." on Justia Law