Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2010, A trial court found Father in arrears in child support in the amount of $21,337 and ordered that $15,000 in funds attached from Father’s bank be released to Mother. The State later intercepted an additional $7,025 from Father’s bank account, and the sum was distributed to Mother. In 2013, the court issued an order finding Father in indirect contempt for his willful failure to pay child support as ordered, finding him to be in arrears in the amount of $13,055. Father appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to credit him for the distribution of $7,025 to Mother. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court’s arrearage calculations did not give Father credit for the $7,025. Remanded to recalculate Father’s arrearage to provide him credit for the $7,025 payment. View "In re Paternity of D.M.Y." on Justia Law

Defendant, a teacher and coach, was charged with two counts of attempted child seduction after communicating with a sixteen-year-old student via an internet site and asking the student to sneak out of her parents house to engage in sexual conduct with him. Citing Ward v. State, Defendant moved to dismiss the charges on grounds that the online solicitation was not aimed at the “immediate commission of a crime.” The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding that the charges matched the statutory elements and were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss at this time. View "Corbin v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an abusive litigant. In this case, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, which the trial court dismissed for failure to prosecute or comply with applicable rules under Ind. Trial Rule 41(E). The court of appeals dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal with prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to file a timely brief and appendix. The Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s petition to transfer jurisdiction and refrained from imposing sanctions or restrictions. This per curiam opinion also gave guidance to the state’s courts on options when confronted with abusive and vexatious litigation practices. View "Zavodnik v. Harper" on Justia Law

Child was four months old when she was placed in foster care with Adoptive Parents. When Child was six years old, Adoptive Parents filed a petition to adopt Child. Child’s biological father (Father) refused to consent to the adoption. The trial court entered an order in favor of Adoptive Parents, concluding that Father’s consent to adoption was not required. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record not only supported the trial court’s conclusion that Father’s consent to the adoption of Child was not required but also supported the trial court’s conclusion that Adoptive Parents’ adoption of Child was in Child's best interest. View "In re Adoption of O.R." on Justia Law

The State filed a class C felony child molestation charge against Appellant, and 1,291 days elapsed before the beginning of Appellant’s trial. Appellant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to six years executed. Appellant appealed, arguing that he was entitled discharge under Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(C) and that the unduly long delay violated his right to a speedy trial under the United States and Indiana Constitutions. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant’s conviction and ordered him released from incarceration, holding that despite the trial court’s technical compliance with Rule 4(c), the delay between the filing of the charge against Appellant and the beginning of Appellant’s trial violated his right to a speedy trial under the United States and Indiana Constitutions. Remanded. View "Logan v. State" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Petitioner was convicted of class B felony criminal confinement. Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. Specifically, Petitioner contended that had counsel presented Long v. State, he would not have been convicted of class B felony confinement or his conviction would have been set aside for insufficient evidence. The post-conviction court agreed with Petitioner and ordered his conviction reduced to a class D felony. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner mischaracterized Long, and accordingly, Petitioner’s counsels did not render ineffective assistance by failing to present an incorrect interpretation of case law. View "State v. Greene" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of dealing cocaine and related offenses. The State subsequently filed civil proceedings seeking forfeiture of Defendant’s car and the cash discovered in a search incident to Defendant’s arrest, alleging that both were connected to Defendant’s dealing. The State sought summary judgment. In response, Defendant filed an affidavit denying that the cash was connected to his dealing. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the State for forfeiture of the cash. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that Defendant failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s competent affidavit contradicted the State’s designated evidence on a material fact and was therefore sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Remanded. View "Hughley v. State" on Justia Law

When Barbara and Michael Pohl divorced, they entered into a custody, support, and property settlement agreement that was incorporated into their dissolution decree. Because the original agreement did not provide for spousal maintenance, the parties filed an addendum calling for Barbara to pay Michael monthly maintenance. Barbara later filed a petition to modify her maintenance obligation. The trial court denied Barbara’s request, concluding that the agreement was not intended to be modifiable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) principles of contract finality preclude modification of a maintenance award unless the agreement is modifiable by its own terms; and (2) the parties’ agreement in this case was modifiable because they expressly made the agreed maintenance amount subject to “further order of the court,” echoing the language of the incapacity maintenance statute. Remanded. View "Pohl v. Pohl" on Justia Law

Hanover College, the beneficiary of two trusts, filed petitions requesting that the trusts be terminated. Old National Bancorp, d/b/a Old National Trust Company, as trustee for both trusts, filed responses to Hanover’s petitions. The trial court granted the petitions and ordered the two trusts dissolved and the trust assets distributed to Hanover. Rather than seek a stay of the trial court’s dissolution orders, Old National appealed. The court of appeals dismissed Old National’s appeal, concluding (1) Old National lacked standing in its representative capacity because it failed to obtain a stay of the trial court’s termination orders and was therefore no longer the trustee of the trusts; and (2) because Old National did not intervene in its individual capacity at trial it could not be an aggrieved party on appeal. The Supreme Court likewise dismissed Old National’s appeal, holding that the trustee lacked standing to pursue the appeal in its representative capacity and did not appeal in its individual capacity. View "Old Nat’l Bancorp v. Hanover College" on Justia Law

TP Orthodontics’ (TPO) board of directors formed a special litigation committee (the SLC) to investigate derivative claims filed by sibling minority shareholders. Following a lengthy investigation, the SLC produced a report. Based on recommendations contained in the report TPO filed a motion to dismiss certain derivative claims, attaching a redacted version of the report in support of its motion. The SLC report had been heavily redacted to protect attorney-client communications and attorney work product. The sibling shareholders filed a motion to compel production of the full report, seeking to access the full report in order to contest the SLC’s conclusions. The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court with directions for TPO to specifically identify privileged attorney-client communications and attorney work product contained within the report and the trial court to review in camera the revised redacted SLC report and privilege designations to determine whether the designated material was in fact privileged. View "TP Orthodontics, Inc. v. Kesling" on Justia Law