Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Buyers agreed to buy a condominium from Seller pursuant to a purchase agreement. Buyers demanded that Seller fix a minor electrical problem as a condition of purchase, which led to this protracted litigation. In the first appeal, the court of appeals concluded that Buyers breached the contract with their unreasonable demand and remanded for the trial court to determine damages. The trial court awarded Seller $93,972 in damages. Seller appealed, arguing that she reasonably mitigated her damages and that the trial court erred in calculating damages. Buyers cross-appealed. The court of appeals reversed and awarded only $117 in damages, concluding that Seller could have avoided all damages except a $117 repair bill if she had responded to Buyers’ demand to fix the electrical problem, thus preserving the agreement. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion (1) by finding that Seller could have mitigated her damages by selling her condo in 2007 rather than waiting until 2011; and (2) in refusing to find that Seller’s duty to mitigate required yielding to the Buyers’ breach. View "Fischer v. Heymann" on Justia Law

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After K.W., a minor child, was removed from the care of Mother and Father, the Department of Child Services (DCS) sought to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. On the day of the termination hearing, Mother’s attorney sought a continuance based on Mother’s incarceration in a local jail. The trial court denied the motion and held a termination of parental rights (TPR) hearing in Mother’s absence. The court then issued an order terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father with respect to K.W. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights, holding that the trial court, under the facts of this case, abused its discretion by denying Mother’s motion to continue the TPR hearing and by proceeding without her participation. View "In re Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of K.W. and C.C." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder and of being a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Defendant to life in prison. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence and in giving the jury an erroneous limiting instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err by admitting certain photographs into evidence; (2) the trial court did not err in allowing the introduction of testimony from a state witness; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of other crimes; and (4) although the trial court erred in giving a limiting instruction directed to the testimony of a witness, the error was not fundamental.View "Halliburton v. State" on Justia Law

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After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of Public Intoxication as a class B misdemeanor. The court of appeals reversed the conviction, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Defendant had endangered himself or others, one of the statutory elements for Public Intoxication. The Supreme Court granted transfer to consider whether proof of the endangerment element can be established by reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, holding that a reasonable fact-finder could find Defendant had been intoxicated in a public place while endangering the life of himself or others beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. View "Thang v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Defendant pleaded guilty to B-felony burglary and lesser offenses as part of a combined plea agreement. The agreement conferred discretion to determine the placement of Defendant’s executed sentence but had no provision for further restrictive placement for additional suspended time as a condition of probation. The trial court sentenced Defendant to a total of fifteen years for the burglary with five suspended and two of the suspended years served on probation. The court further ordered that the first year of Defendant’s probationary period be spent through work release. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant’s plea agreement conferred discretion on the court to determine the placement of his executed sentence but did not specifically confer discretion over probation; and (2) therefore, Defendant’s one-year term in work release as a condition of probation following the maximum executed term allowing under the agreement exceeded the court’s authority. View "Berry v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Plaintiff was seriously injured when she was hit by a ball while attending a South Shore RailCats baseball game at their home stadium, the U.S. Steelyard. Plaintiff filed negligence and premises liability claims against South Shore Baseball and the Steelyard, alleging that Defendants breached their duty to her because they failed to extend protective netting far enough to protect her. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff was a mere licensee, and therefore, South Shore fulfilled its duty to warn her of latent dangers. The trial court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims. View "S. Shore Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus" on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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Appellant was charged with Resisting Law Enforcement by fleeing after being ordered to stop by a law enforcement officer. After a bench trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of the charge. On appeal, Appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the statute defining the offense of Resisting Law Enforcement by fleeing after being ordered to stop must be understood to require that a law enforcement officer’s order to stop be based on reasonable suspicion or probable cause; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, there was not sufficient evidence to prove the element that the officer’s order to stop rested on probable cause or reasonable suspicion. View "Gaddie v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Appellant was found to have violated the terms of his probation by committing Resisting Law Enforcement as a Class A misdemeanor by fleeing. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve three-and-one-half years of his previously suspended sentence. On appeal, Appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the revocation of his probation. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed based on the reasoning used in its decision in Gaddie v. State, holding that substantial evidence of probative value supported the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant committed Resisting Law Enforcement. View "Murdock v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) approved a contract for the purchase of substitute natural gas and directed the procedure for resolving future related disputes. The court of appeals reversed the IURC's approval of the contract because a definition term in the contract deviated from the required statutory definition. The parties to the contract subsequently amended the contract to delete the language that the court of appeals found improper. The Supreme Court vacated the reversal of the IURC's order, held that the amended contract that corrected the definitional error rendered the definitional issue moot, and summarily affirmed the court of appeals as to all other claims.View "Ind. Gas Co., Inc. v. Ind. Fin. Auth." on Justia Law

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Mother and Father were divorced in 1999 pursuant to a decree that approved the parties' comprehensive settlement agreement under which Mother was granted physical custody of the parties' two children. In 2011, Father sought to modify the decree. The trial court modified the prior child support order in several respects. Father appealed. The court of appeals reversed, inter alia, the trial court's determination of credits for Mother's health insurance costs and Father's Social Security benefits. The Supreme Court granted transfer and (1) affirmed the trial court on the issues of health insurance costs and Social Security benefits, holding that the trial court's approach was appropriate in this case; and (2) summarily affirmed the court of appeals in all other respects.View "Johnson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law