Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Mickey K. Weber, Judge of the Clarksville Town Court, pled guilty to criminal mischief in the second degree and operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Respondent’s conduct violated Rules 1.1 and 1.2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and was aggravated by the fact that Respondent had previous legal issues related to alcohol abuse. The Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications (Commission) brought a judicial disciplinary action against Respondent based on his conduct. The Supreme Court reprimanded Judge Weber, ordered Respondent’s resignation from the Clarksville Town, and directed that Weber shall be ineligible for future judicial service until he successfully completes an approved treatment plan and two-year monitoring agreement approved by the Indiana Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program. View "In re Hon. Mickey K. Weber" on Justia Law

N.E., the former foster parent of two minor children, filed petitions to adopt the children in Lake Superior Court 2, part of the court’s Civil Division. N.E., however, violated a local rule that all adoptions - a type of probate case - must be filed in the Juvenile Division. The trial court refused to transfer the cases to the Juvenile Division. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the local rule impermissibly expanded jurisdiction beyond statutory bounds and impermissibly impinged on the jurisdiction of the Superior Court’s “civil (including probate) division.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to transfer the adoptions to the Juvenile Division, as the local rule simply established venue and not jurisdiction and was binding on the court and litigants. View "In re Adoption of J.T.D." on Justia Law

Two landowners owned property served by a regional sewer district. The district had perfected liens against the properties due to the landowners’ failure to pay fees and penalties. The trial court listed the properties to be sold at a tax sale to satisfy obligations for the unpaid sewer bills. The landowners subsequently petitioned the circuit court to remove their properties from the tax sale list. The circuit court granted the petitions, concluding that because the district maintained the only lien, the district was precluded from foreclosing on the parcels pursuant to Ind. Code 13-26-14-4. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the foreclosure prohibition of Ind. Code 13-26-14-4, which governs the collection of regional sewer district sewer liens, does not apply to collection by tax sale; and (2) because the district did not seek collection of the landowners’ unpaid fees and penalties through the lien foreclosure method, but rather employed the tax sale method, the lien foreclosure prohibition clause did not apply. Remanded. View "In re Carroll County 2013 Tax Sale" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with Class A felony manufacturing methamphetamine - enhanced from a Class B felony because at least three grams of the drug were at issue. The State relied significantly on a liquid solvent that contained methamphetamine to support the three-gram weight enhancement. A jury found Defendant guilty of the Class A felony methamphetamine offense. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the three-gram weight enhancement. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when the State seeks to establish the weight of manufactured methamphetamine based on an intermediate mixture that contains methamphetamine, it must demonstrate how much final product that mixture would have yielded had the defendant finished the manufacturing process; (2) because the State failed to present this evidence, it could not use the intermediate mixture to establish the three-gram weight enhancement for Class A felony manufacturing methamphetamine; but (3) because the record showed that Defendant manufactured additional final product that exceeded the three-gram threshold, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction. View "Buelna v. State" on Justia Law

The Indiana Department of Insurance Commissioner reviewed the practices of First American Title Insurance Company, resulting in the generation of a report. Six weeks after the deadline for taking action regarding the report, the Commissioner called for a hearing and appointed an administrative judge. First American filed a petition seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s order. The Commissioner moved to dismiss the petition on grounds that First American failed to submit the agency record as required by the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA). The trial court denied the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss but also denied First American’s petition for judicial review on grounds that First American failed to show that it was prejudiced by the untimely order. Both parties appealed. On cross-appeal, the Commissioner argued, in part, that First American’s petition for judicial review should have been dismissed because First American did not submit an agency record. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in declining to grant the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss the petition in light of First American’s failure to file the agency record with the trial court, as a petitioner for review cannot receive consideration of its petition where the statutorily-defined agency record has not been filed. View "First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Robertson" on Justia Law

One year after the Indiana Department of Education and the Indiana State Board of Education (collectively, “DOE”) approved Teaching Our Posterity Success, Inc. (“TOPS”) as a Supplemental Educational Services provider, the DOE removed TOPS from its list of approved providers. TOPS sought administrative review of that removal. In response, DOE sent TOPS a letter declaring that TOPS will remain removed from the provider list. TOPS filed a petition for judicial review but did not file an official agency record. The trial court dismissed TOPS’ petition on the grounds of its failure to file a timely and complete agency record. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a petitioner seeking judicial review of an agency action must file with the trial court the agency record as defined by the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA); and (2) because TOPS did not file the agency record as anticipated by the AOPA, the trial court properly dismissed its petition for judicial review. View "Teaching Our Posterity Success, Inc. v. Ind. Dep’t of Educ." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, an exclusive-agency union and several of its members and officers (collectively, the Union), filed a complaint against the Attorney General and the Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Labor (collectively, the State), seeking a declaratory judgment that certain provisions of the Indiana Right to Work Law were unconstitutional. The trial court granted relief on the Union’s claim that two provisions of the Indiana Work Law violated Article 1, Section 21 of the Indiana Constitution, which provides that “[no] person’s particular services shall be demanded, without just compensation.” The first challenged provision of the Indiana Work Law prohibits employers from requiring union membership or the payment of monies as a condition of employment, and the second provision makes the knowing or intentional violation of the first provision a Class A misdemeanor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the two provisions do not violate Section 21 because the challenged provisions do not constitute a demand by the State for particular services. View "Zoeller v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of conspiracy to deal in cocaine as a class B felony and sentenced to an executed term of sixteen years. After an unsuccessful appeal, Appellant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. Still acting pro se, Appellant attempted to appeal the denial of his petition, but despite his “best efforts,” the appeal went awry. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the court of appeals’ order. After full briefing on the merits, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the post-conviction court, holding that the post-conviction court did not err in denying Appellant’s claim that counsel rendered ineffective assistance. View "Hollowell v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of attempted murder, burglary resulting in serious bodily injury, aggravated battery, and battery. Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, in part, for counsel’s failure to object to a supplemental jury instruction on the definition of “intentionally” that was given after deliberations had begun. The post-conviction court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the instruction represented a correct statement of the law, and therefore, trial counsel in this case did not render ineffective assistance in failing to object to the instruction. View "Campbell v. State" on Justia Law

A seventeen-year-old high school student with Down Syndrome choked to death during lunchtime in the school cafeteria. The parents of the child sued the school and several administrators, alleging negligence, wrongful death, and federal civil rights violations. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred by granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of Plaintiffs’ compliance with the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA) notice requirement, as material issues of fact remained as to whether Plaintiffs complied with the ITCA notice requirement; and (2) Plaintiffs’ state law claims for negligence and wrongful death were not ripe for summary judgment. View "Lyons v. Richmond Cmty. Sch. Corp." on Justia Law