Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was fired from her job at the Indiana Department of Workforce Development for alleged misconduct. After it was discovered that Petitioner kept several items of state property in her possession, Petitioner was charged with theft. The charges were later dismissed. Thereafter, the State filed an ethics proceeding against Petitioner, alleging that she violated 42 Ind. Admin. Code 1-5-12. After an adjudicative hearing, the Indiana State Ethics Commission found that Petitioner did commit the alleged violation and barred her from future State executive branch employment. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision, holding (1) double jeopardy did not bar the proceeding before the Commission, and the criminal court’s probable cause determination was not binding upon the Commission; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the Commission’s determination; and (3) the sanction imposed in this case was within the Commission’s discretion. View "Ind. State Ethics Comm’n v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Defendants for fraudulently failing to disclose defects in a home on a sales disclosure form. The trial court awarded compensatory damages but not fees, costs, or exemplary damages under the Crime Victims Relief Act (CVRA). Plaintiffs moved to correct error, asserting that the court was required to award fees and costs because they had established the CVRA predicate crime of deception. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in compensating Plaintiffs for their common-law damages but refusing to award attorney fees or exemplary damages under the CVRA, as Plaintiffs’ complaint encompassed multiple alternative theories of liability not limited to the CVRA, and a court need not impose CVRA liability when it believes ordinary tort liability will do. View "Wysocki v. Johnson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the certificates of death that doctors, coroners, and funeral directors file with county health departments under Ind. Code 16-37-3 are public records that the public may freely obtain from county health departments. In 2012, Rita Ward sent a letter to the Vanderburgh County Health Department requesting certain copies of records created under Ind. Code 16-37-3-3 and maintained by the Department. The Department denied the request. The Evansville Courier & Press newspaper subsequently requested access to certain Vanderburgh County death records. The Department denied the request. Thereafter, Ward and the Courier & Press sued the Department, arguing that the death certificates were public records covered by the Indiana Access to Public Records Act. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Department. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that death certificates are public records that a county health department must provide public access to under the Act. View "Evansville Courier & Press v. Vanderburgh County Health Dep’t" on Justia Law

In 2010, A trial court found Father in arrears in child support in the amount of $21,337 and ordered that $15,000 in funds attached from Father’s bank be released to Mother. The State later intercepted an additional $7,025 from Father’s bank account, and the sum was distributed to Mother. In 2013, the court issued an order finding Father in indirect contempt for his willful failure to pay child support as ordered, finding him to be in arrears in the amount of $13,055. Father appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to credit him for the distribution of $7,025 to Mother. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court’s arrearage calculations did not give Father credit for the $7,025. Remanded to recalculate Father’s arrearage to provide him credit for the $7,025 payment. View "In re Paternity of D.M.Y." on Justia Law

Defendant, a teacher and coach, was charged with two counts of attempted child seduction after communicating with a sixteen-year-old student via an internet site and asking the student to sneak out of her parents house to engage in sexual conduct with him. Citing Ward v. State, Defendant moved to dismiss the charges on grounds that the online solicitation was not aimed at the “immediate commission of a crime.” The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding that the charges matched the statutory elements and were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss at this time. View "Corbin v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an abusive litigant. In this case, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, which the trial court dismissed for failure to prosecute or comply with applicable rules under Ind. Trial Rule 41(E). The court of appeals dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal with prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to file a timely brief and appendix. The Supreme Court denied Plaintiff’s petition to transfer jurisdiction and refrained from imposing sanctions or restrictions. This per curiam opinion also gave guidance to the state’s courts on options when confronted with abusive and vexatious litigation practices. View "Zavodnik v. Harper" on Justia Law

Child was four months old when she was placed in foster care with Adoptive Parents. When Child was six years old, Adoptive Parents filed a petition to adopt Child. Child’s biological father (Father) refused to consent to the adoption. The trial court entered an order in favor of Adoptive Parents, concluding that Father’s consent to adoption was not required. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record not only supported the trial court’s conclusion that Father’s consent to the adoption of Child was not required but also supported the trial court’s conclusion that Adoptive Parents’ adoption of Child was in Child's best interest. View "In re Adoption of O.R." on Justia Law

The State filed a class C felony child molestation charge against Appellant, and 1,291 days elapsed before the beginning of Appellant’s trial. Appellant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to six years executed. Appellant appealed, arguing that he was entitled discharge under Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(C) and that the unduly long delay violated his right to a speedy trial under the United States and Indiana Constitutions. The Supreme Court vacated Appellant’s conviction and ordered him released from incarceration, holding that despite the trial court’s technical compliance with Rule 4(c), the delay between the filing of the charge against Appellant and the beginning of Appellant’s trial violated his right to a speedy trial under the United States and Indiana Constitutions. Remanded. View "Logan v. State" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Petitioner was convicted of class B felony criminal confinement. Petitioner’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance. Specifically, Petitioner contended that had counsel presented Long v. State, he would not have been convicted of class B felony confinement or his conviction would have been set aside for insufficient evidence. The post-conviction court agreed with Petitioner and ordered his conviction reduced to a class D felony. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Petitioner mischaracterized Long, and accordingly, Petitioner’s counsels did not render ineffective assistance by failing to present an incorrect interpretation of case law. View "State v. Greene" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of dealing cocaine and related offenses. The State subsequently filed civil proceedings seeking forfeiture of Defendant’s car and the cash discovered in a search incident to Defendant’s arrest, alleging that both were connected to Defendant’s dealing. The State sought summary judgment. In response, Defendant filed an affidavit denying that the cash was connected to his dealing. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the State for forfeiture of the cash. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that Defendant failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s competent affidavit contradicted the State’s designated evidence on a material fact and was therefore sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Remanded. View "Hughley v. State" on Justia Law