Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

When Mother and Father’s marriage was dissolved in 1994, the trial court awarded Mother primary care and custody of the parties’ daughter (Daughter) and ordered Father to pay child support. In 2011, after Daughter enrolled at Ball State University (BSU), Mother petitioned to modify child support, requesting that Father pay Daughter’s postsecondary educational expenses. Daughter withdrew from BSU in 2012 and attempted to enroll at Indian University Northwest. BSU, however, would not release Daughter’s official transcript because of her outstanding tuition bill. Mother requested to join BSU as a supplemental defendant. The trial court granted the request and ordered BSU to release the transcript. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court’s order was appealable as of right under Indiana Appellate Rule 14(A)(3); and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in granting Mother’s motion for joinder, as Mother failed to carry her burden in demonstrating that BSU was a necessary party under Trial Rule 19. View "Ball State University v. Irons" on Justia Law

Indiana Restorative Dentistry, P.C. (“IRD”) insured its dentist’s office under a policy issued by ProAssurance Indemnity Company, Inc. (“ProAssurance”) and procured through the Laven Insurance Agency, Inc. (“Laven”). After a fire destroyed the entire IRD office, IRD discovered that the contents coverage of its insurance policy was inadequate to cover its loss. IRD sued ProAssurance and Laven in tort and contract. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for ProAssurance, concluding that Laven had no duty to advise based on a special relationship, that Laven had no contractual duty to procure insurance that would have fully covered the fire losses, and that ProAssurance was not vicariously liable for the alleged acts or omissions of Laven. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) genuine issues of material fact remained regarding the existence of a special relationship between IRD and Laven and, consequently, a duty to advise; and (2) Laven had no duty to procure full coverage because there was no evidence showing a “meeting of the minds” on an implied contract requiring Laven to procure a policy that would cover all losses to office contents. View "Ind. Restorative Dentistry, P.C. v. Laven Ins. Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was found guilty of patronizing a prostitute. Defendant appealed, arguing that he had raised the entrapment defense by showing police inducement and that the State failed to offer any evidence of Defendant’s predisposition to commit the offense. The Court of Appeals agreed with Defendant and reversed. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and affirmed the trial court, holding (1) Defendant’s entrapment defense failed because a reasonable trier of fact could have found the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the police did not induce Defendant; and (2) therefore, the Court did not need to address the question of Defendant’s predisposition to commit the crime. View "Griesemer v. State" on Justia Law

Police officers asked Defendant to step out of his truck during a traffic stop and made their permission conditional on a pat-down. During the pat-down, the officers discovered marijuana on Defendant’s person. Defendant then admitted he had a pipe in his truck. Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana and possession of paraphernalia. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress the marijuana and the pipe. The Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, concluding that Defendant’s consent to the pat-down was invalid because the choice of being patted down as a condition of exiting the vehicle or else remaining in the vehicle unsearched was inherently coercive and rendered Defendant’s consent involuntary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) it is not inherently coercive for police to give conditional permission to step out of the vehicle, subject to the motorist’s consent to a pat-down; and (2) any extension of the search from Defendant’s initial consent was the product of his subsequent consent and not of improper police conduct. View "State v. Cunningham" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and felony arson resulting in serious bodily injury. The jury recommended the death penalty, and the trial court sentenced Defendant accordingly. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentence, holding (1) the trial court did not err in excluding a prison administration expert from testifying that Defendant could safely be incarcerated for the remainder of his natural life; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions; (3) the trial court did not commit reversible error in refusing to excuse twelve jurors for cause; (4) Defendant was not entitled to a mistrial after a juror placed a note in the jury room thanking jurors for their service to the deceased; (5) the district court did not err in refusing to suppress statements Defendant made to police; (6) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Defendant to death; and (7) the jury and the trial court properly considered and weighed Defendant’s offered mitigating circumstances. View "Weisheit v. State" on Justia Law

The Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications brought a judicial disciplinary action against Respondent Dianna L. Bennington, Judge of the Muncie City Court. The parties subsequently jointly tendered a statement of Circumstances and Conditional Agreement for Discipline stipulating to certain facts and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The stipulated facts and violations fell into four categories: misuse of judicial authority, failure to follow proper legal procedures in guilty plea and sentencing hearings, injudicious behavior outside of the courtroom, and noncooperation with the Commission. The Supreme Court accepted the joint submission and agreed sanction and ordered that Respondent be permanently banned from serving in any judicial capacity of any kind. As required by the Court’s order, Respondent tendered her resignation to the Governor. View "In re Hon. Dianna L. Bennington" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with four counts of robbery and six counts of criminal confinement, among other charges. The charges arose from four different bank robberies that occurred over the course of a year and a half. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all robbery counts. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the charge for Class B felony robbery relating to a March 21, 2006 robbery should be dismissed on the grounds that it was filed outside of the statute of limitations period because the statutory concealment-tolling provision under Ind. Code 35-41-4-2(h)(2) was inapplicable in his case. The Supreme Court dismissed the charge stemming from the March 21, 2006 robbery, holding (1) the application of the concealment-tolling provision requires a positive act by the defendant that is calculated to conceal the fact that a crime has been committed; (2) Defendant did not engage in any positive act calculated to conceal the fact that a robbery occurred on March 21, 2006; and (3) because the statute of limitations as to the March 21, 2006 offense was not tolled, the charge should have been dismissed. View "Study v. State" on Justia Law

Two landowners (Landowners) each owned property served by a regional sewer district (District). Because the Landowners’ property had outstanding fees owed to the District, the District perfected liens against the properties, and the county treasurer and auditor ordered that the properties be sold at a tax sale. The Landowners petitioned the trial court requesting that the court find that their respective properties cannot be sold at a tax sale pursuant to Ind. Code 13-26-14-4. The district court ordered that both properties be removed from the tax sale because the District maintained the only lien and therefore was precluded from foreclosing on the parcels pursuant to the lien foreclosure prohibition clause in Ind. Code 13-26-14-4, which governs the collection of regional sewer district sewer liens. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the lien foreclosure prohibition of section 13-26-14-4 does not apply to collection by tax sale; and (2) because the District employed the tax sale method and did not seek collection of the Landowners’ unpaid sewer bills and penalties through the lien foreclosure method, the lien foreclosure prohibition clause did not apply. View "Twin Lakes Reg’l Sewer Dist. v. Ray" on Justia Law

The operator of a wholesale greenhouse business hired a contractor to remove a large tree at its business. As a result of the work, the contractor received the wood from the removed tree, and the business paid the contractor $600. To complete the work, the contractor hired Appellant, a tree climber-cutter, to remove the trunk of the tree. Appellant was severely injured while working and rendered a paraplegic. The business brought this declaratory judgment action seeking to establish that it had no secondary liability because the value of the work by the contractor was less than $1,000. The trial court granted summary judgment for the business. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the “value” attributable to the performance of work that triggers secondary liability under Ind. Code 22-3-2-14(b) includes both direct monetary payment as well as ancillary consideration received for the work; and (2) the business was not entitled to summary judgment because it failed to designate evidence establishing that the undisputed value of the ancillary consideration it received - the wood - plus the $600 monetary payment did not exceed $1,000. View "Young v. Hood’s Gardens, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of attempted murder. At Defendant’s trial and during final instructions, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the crime of attempted murder. Although Defendant was not charged as an accomplice to attempted murder, and his attempted murder charge was not explicitly premised on a theory of accomplice liability, the trial court also instructed the jury on accomplice liability. During closing arguments, the State argued both direct liability and accomplice liability theories for the attempted murder. The verdict form also did not distinguish between Defendant’s potential direct liability or accomplice liability for the attempted murder. The jury found Defendant guilty as charged. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that it must find he had the specific intent to kill when he knowingly or intentionally aided, induced, or caused another person to attempt murder. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the trial court committed fundamental error by giving an instruction permitting the jury to convict Defendant of attempted murder as an accomplice without the specific intent to kill. View "Rosales v. State" on Justia Law