Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a large managed health care organization, settled certain federal multi-district litigation without admitting liability. At all times relevant to this litigation, Appellant was was its own primary and excess insurer for errors and omissions liability, with a certificate of reinsurance on its primary policy issued by one reinsurer and numerous certificates of reinsurance on its excess policies issued by additional reinsurers. Appellant sought indemnification from its reinsurers. Some of those reinsurers denied coverage, whereupon Appellant filed the instant suit claiming professional liability coverage under the policies. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the reinsurers. The Supreme Court reversed and in large part granted summary judgment for Appellant, holding that Appellant was largely entitled to coverage for defense costs under its policies with the reinsurers. View "WellPoint, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A law firm (Plaintiff) filed a quantum merit claim for part of the contingent fees earned in cases that were first handled by the law firm’s attorneys, including Defendant, and later by Defendant and his law firm after he left Plaintiff’s law firm. The trial court denied quantum merit relief, finding that Defendant was not unjustly enriched. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and (1) reversed and remanded with instructions to determine, in accordance with Galanis v. Lyons & Truitt, what proportional contributions toward the results in the cases at issue were made by attorneys working for Plaintiff, and to enter a corresponding judgment in Plaintiff’s favor; and (2) summarily affirmed the portion of the court of appeals’ opinion addressing whether Plaintiff should have sued its former clients to recover attorney fees from them. View "Cohen & Malad, LLP v. Daly" on Justia Law

In 2000, Appellant was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia. In 2004, while unprovoked, Appellant fired a shotgun several times at multiple vehicles, including a police cruiser. The jury returned verdicts of guilty but mentally ill on four counts of Class A felony attempted murder. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 120 years. The court of appeals reversed Appellant’s convictions, concluding that (1) jury clearly erred in rejecting Appellant’s insanity defense, and (2) the admission of evidence regarding Appellant’s post-arrest silence and request for counsel, and the prosecution’s closing arguments relying on those instances as evidence of sanity, violated Appellant’s constitutional due process rights. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition to transfer, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinion, and affirmed the the jury's verdict finding Appellant guilty but mentally ill, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence for a jury to draw a reasonable inference that Defendant was able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the offense; (2) there was no due process violation; and (3) Appellant’s sentence was appropriate. View "Myers v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in refusing his proposed final jury instruction regarding the presumption of innocence. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer in order to state precisely what jury instructions a criminal defendant is entitled to receive regarding the presumption of innocence and held (1) it is the right of every criminal defendant to receive the following jury instruction upon request: “The presumption of innocence continues in favor of the defendant throughout the trial. You should fit the evidence to the presumption that the defendant is innocent if you can reasonably do so[ ]”; and (2) the trial court’s failure in this case to use this precise language was not error because the jury instructions adequately encompassed these principles. View "McCowan v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of felony murder and murder. Defendant was sentenced to sixty-five years for the felony murder and life without parole for the murder. Defendant appealed, asserting that there was insufficient evidence for his convictions and that the incredible dubiosity rule should be applied because no reasonable jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt given the inconsistent testimony among three of the State’s primary witnesses. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions and sentence, holding that the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for both murders. View "Moore v. State" on Justia Law

The State filed a complaint against Defendant seeking forfeiture of her 1996 Buick Century automobile under the provisions of the Civil Forfeiture Statute, which provides in relevant part that a vehicle may be seized if it is used or is intended for use by the person in possession of it to facilitate the transportation of stolen property. On cross-motions for summary judgment the trial court deemed the vehicle forfeited and awarded the vehicle to the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State was not entitled to forfeiture of the vehicle because it failed to demonstrate that Defendant was “in possession” of the vehicle as contemplated by the Civil Forfeiture Statute. View "Sargent v. State" on Justia Law

In 2010, due to a large budget deficit, Franklin Township Community School Corporation voted to discontinue transportation services for the majority of students attending its public schools. Parents of students who attend public schools in Franklin School Corporation brought a class action suit seeking a declaratory judgment that discontinuing transportation is prohibited under the Education Clause of the Indiana Constitution. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Franklin School Corporation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Indiana Constitution does not mandate school corporations to provide transportation to and from school, and therefore, Franklin School Corporation did not violate a constitutional mandate. View "Hoagland v. Franklin Township Cmty. Sch. Corp." on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was found guilty of criminal trespass as a class A misdemeanor in violation of Ind. Code 35-43-2-2(a)(4) and was sentenced to 365 days in jail. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals opinion, and reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that the evidence in this case was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction for Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass. View "Willis v. State" on Justia Law

Debtor filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection and listed an insurance policy with Northwestern Mutual as an asset on his bankruptcy schedules. Debtor claimed the policy’s entire cash surrender value as exempt property because his son (Son) was the beneficiary. The bankruptcy Trustee objected because Son was an adult and not “dependent upon” Debtor within the meaning of Ind. Code 27-1-12-14(e). That statute exempts life insurance policies from debtors’ bankruptcy estates when the named beneficiary is the “spouse, children, or any relative dependent upon” the debtor. Because bankruptcy courts in the Northern and Southern Districts of Indiana had issued conflicting opinions about the proper interpretation of the statute, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Indiana certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether, under section 27-1-12-14(e), the phrase “dependent upon such person” modifies only “any relative” or modifies “spouse,” “children,” and “any relative.” The Court concluded that the phrase “dependent upon such person” does not modify “spouse” or “children,” but only “any relative” named as beneficiary of a life-insurance policy. View "In re Howell" on Justia Law

After a civil commitment hearing, the trial judge declared that, by clear and convincing evidence, T.K. was both dangerous and gravely disabled. The court then ordered T.K. to be involuntarily committed. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed, holding that the evidence presented at the civil commitment hearing was insufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that T.K. was either dangerous or gravely disabled, and therefore, the civil commitment of T.K. was improper. View "In re Civil Commitment of T.K." on Justia Law