Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The trial court found Child was a Child in Need of Services. Because Father was incarcerated, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) attempted to provide services only to Mother. Ultimately, DCS filed for termination of parental rights due to Mother’s lack of progress and Father’s inability to care for Child due to his incarceration. At the termination hearing, Father maintained that upon his release he was prepared to be a better parent and to stay drug-free. The trial court ultimately terminated both Mother and Father’s parental rights. Father appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights, holding that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate a reasonable probability that Father could not remedy the conditions for removal or that Father posed a threat to Child’s well-being. View "K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs." on Justia Law

Before he died, John Markey entered into a contract with his second wife, Frances, to make and not revoke a mutual will providing that, upon the death of whomever died later, the couple’s estate would be divided equally between John’s son, David, and Frances’s granddaughter. After John died, Frances breached the contract, instead leaving everything to her own children. Approximately nine months after Frances’s death, David filed suit to enforce the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that a breach of contract regarding mutual wills is neither a “claim” in probate nor a will contest and is therefore subject to the three-month statute of limitations for suits challenging the distribution pursuant to a probated will. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain language of the statutory definition of “claim” under the Probate Code includes an action for breach of a contract to make and not revoke a will. Remanded to consider the timeliness of David’s claim, considered under the Probate Code. View "Markey v. Estate of Markey" on Justia Law

Before he died, John Markey entered into a contract with his second wife, Frances, to make and not revoke a mutual will providing that, upon the death of whomever died later, the couple’s estate would be divided equally between John’s son, David, and Frances’s granddaughter. After John died, Frances breached the contract, instead leaving everything to her own children. Approximately nine months after Frances’s death, David filed suit to enforce the contract. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that a breach of contract regarding mutual wills is neither a “claim” in probate nor a will contest and is therefore subject to the three-month statute of limitations for suits challenging the distribution pursuant to a probated will. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain language of the statutory definition of “claim” under the Probate Code includes an action for breach of a contract to make and not revoke a will. Remanded to consider the timeliness of David’s claim, considered under the Probate Code. View "Markey v. Estate of Markey" on Justia Law

The child at issue in this case (Child) had a close relationship with her maternal grandparents (Grandparents) from the day she was born. The child’s mother (Mother) passed away when Child was eight years old. In accordance with Mother’s wishes, Grandparents filed for visitation rights with Child under the Grandparent Visitation Act. After a hearing, the trial court determined that it was in Child’s best interest to have a meaningful and ongoing relationship with Grandparents. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the entirety of the trial court’s order granting grandparent visitation, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding grandparent visitation and in setting the amount of grandparent visitation. View "In re Visitation of L-A.D.W." on Justia Law

The child at issue in this case (Child) had a close relationship with her maternal grandparents (Grandparents) from the day she was born. The child’s mother (Mother) passed away when Child was eight years old. In accordance with Mother’s wishes, Grandparents filed for visitation rights with Child under the Grandparent Visitation Act. After a hearing, the trial court determined that it was in Child’s best interest to have a meaningful and ongoing relationship with Grandparents. Father appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the entirety of the trial court’s order granting grandparent visitation, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding grandparent visitation and in setting the amount of grandparent visitation. View "In re Visitation of L-A.D.W." on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Defendant was found guilty of robbery and criminal confinement. The trial court used the same evidence, namely, Defendant’s act of being armed with a deadly weapon, to enhance both of his convictions from class C to class B felonies. Defendant appealed, arguing that the two convictions violated Indiana’s constitutional ban on double jeopardy because the force used to support the robbery conviction was coextensive with the force used to support the confinement conviction. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that committing two or more separate offenses each while armed with the same deadly weapon is not within the category of rules precluding the enhancement of each offense based on “the very same behavior.” View "Sistrunk v. State" on Justia Law

After a second jury trial, Defendant was convicted of child molesting as a class C felony. On appeal, Defendant challenged, among other things, the admission of testimony by a child forensic interviewer who had conducted a forensic interview of the victim that she did not observe any signs that the victim had been coached. Because Defendant did not object to this testimony, Defendant argued that the admission of the testimony was fundamental error. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the disputed testimony was improper, as the testimony constituted impermissible indirect vouching; but (2) the error did not constitute fundamental error. View "Sampson v. State" on Justia Law

Continental Casualty Company and Twin City Fire Insurance Co. (collectively, CNA) petitioned for rehearing with respect to the Supreme Court’s opinion in this matter, Wellpoint, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., claiming that a portion of the Court’s opinion exceeded the power granted by Trial Rule 56(B), which provides that when a party has moved for summary judgment, the court may grant summary judgment for any other party upon the issues raised by the motion even where that party does not file a motion for summary judgment. CNA argued that the Court’s opinion, which reversed the trial court’s grant of CNA’s motion for summary judgment, should not have also granted summary judgment for Wellpoint, Inc. and Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc. (collectively, Anthem) as to issues not raised by CNA’s summary judgment motion. The Supreme Court concluded that rehearing should be granted to modify its opinion to address only the issues raised in the summary judgment proceeding and modified its opinion in this case accordingly. View "Wellpoint, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of class A felony child molesting. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to compel the victim’s mother to answer a deposition question about an incident in the victim’s past and in excluding from evidence the substance of a phone conversation with the victim’s mother in which she and the victim discussed the incident. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the court of appeals opinion, and affirmed, holding that the trial court’s alleged errors, even if considered violations of Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Hall v. State" on Justia Law

When Jeffrey Miller lost a job opportunity with the Indianapolis Mayor’s Office, Miller filed a complaint and multiple amended complaints, alleging that several individuals and organizations committed torts against him. Miller filed a fourth complaint adding a “JOHN DOE #8” as a defendant. The next year, Miller requested leave to file a fifth amended complaint to substitute Kristine Danz as a substitute for John Doe #8, claiming that Danz’s identity was only recently discovered during a deposition. The trial court granted Danz’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Miller’s attempt to add Danz as a named party was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Danz where the existence and identity of Danz was not unknown to Plaintiff before he commenced this action and where he waited until after expiration of the applicable statute of limitations to substitute her name for John Doe #8. View "Miller v. Danz" on Justia Law