Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Tom Bonnell bought a strip of land from the Pulaski County Board of Commissioners, Ruby and Douglas Cotner filed this suit to quiet title, claiming that they had previously acquired ownership of a second of that land via adverse possession. The trial court (1) concluded that the prior sale of the strip by tax deed extinguished any interest the Cotners may have had, but (2) awarded the Cotners a prescriptive easement on certain outbuildings encroaching onto the strip. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of the Cotners’ adverse possession claim, holding that the tax sales of the strip defeated the Cotners’ claim of ownership by adverse possession; but (2) reversed the grant of a prescriptive easement in the Cotners’ encroaching outbuildings, holding that the sale of the strip by tax deed extinguished any and all interest the Cotners previously possessed. View "Bonnell v. Cotner" on Justia Law

The Indiana State Fair Commission manages the Indiana State Fair. Since the 1990s, the Commission has utilized Mid-America Sound to provide equipment for the concerts and other events that take place at the Fair. In August 2011, on the closing night of the Fair, the Mid-America’s roof collapsed, killing seven people. The victims and families filed lawsuits, including as defendants Mid-America and the Commission. Mid-America filed a third-party lawsuit claiming that the Commission was required to indemnify it for Mid-America’s own negligence in relation to the roof collapse due to years-long course of conduct in paying invoices that had standard indemnity language on the back. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the terms of Mid-America’s invoices to the Commission did not clearly and unequivocally provide for retroactive application, the Court will not infer such a provision from a course of dealing. View "Mid-America Sound Corp. v. Ind. State Fair Comm’n" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of Class B felony burglary, among other crimes. The burglary convictions resulted from breaking and entering into an old farmhouse. The Supreme Court reversed the two convictions for burglary as Class B felonies and remanded for the entry of two replacement convictions for burglary as Class C felonies, holding that the jury instruction’s expansion of the statutory definition of a “dwelling” for purposes of Class B felony burglary was misleading and invaded the province of the jury and was therefore erroneous. Remanded for resentencing. View "Keller v. State" on Justia Law

In 2010, acting under the Government Modernization Act (GMA), the Town of Zionsville reorganized with the unincorporated areas of Eagle Township and all of Union Township. In 2013, the Town of Whitestown adopted an ordinance to annex certain territory in Perry Township. In 2014, the Perry Township adopted an ordinance proposing to reorganize with Zionsville. The Zionsville-Perry Reorganization plan was adopted by Zionsville and Perry Township in 2014. The Town of Whitestown sought judicial declarations that the Zionsville-Perry Reorganization plan was contrary to law. Zionsville counterclaimed, seeking a judicial declaration prohibiting Whitestown from pursuing its attempts to annex territory in Perry Township and Zionsville. The district court rejected the 2014 Zionsville-Perry Reorganization and approved Whitestown’s attempts to annex the territory in Perry and Zionsville, concluding that the 2014 Zionsville-Perry Reorganization was contrary to the GMA and therefore invalid. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 2014 Zionsville-Perry Reorganization was not prohibited and that Whitestown may not adopt annexation ordinances annexing territory in municipalities that are the result of completed reorganizations under the GMA. Remanded. View "Town of Zionsville v. Town of Whitestown" on Justia Law

Defendant was lawfully placed under arrest for driving without a valid driver’s license. Before the police officer placed Defendant in his police cruiser, he conducted a pat-down search of Defendant’s clothing to check for weapons. The officer discovered a pill container in Defendant’s pocket, opened the container, and found a single narcotic pill for which Defendant did not have a valid prescription. Defendant was charged with driving without a license and possession of a controlled substance. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the pill container’s contents, arguing that the officer’s opening of the pill contained was an unreasonable search. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the opening of the pill container was within the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest and reasonable under the Indiana Constitution. View "Garcia v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of the murder of James Allen and the attempted murder of Gerald Beamon. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting Beamon’s testimony that Allen told Beamon he had shot Defendant the day before Allen’s murder. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the admission of the hearsay evidence was erroneous but harmless. The Supreme Court granted transfer on this issue, vacating that portion of the opinion below, and affirmed the admission of the hearsay testimony, holding that the statements fell within the hearsay exception of Ind. R. Evid. 804(b)(3), and therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting the challenged testimony on that basis. View "Beasley v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought several claims against multiple defendants arising out of his incarceration for a probation violation that occurred after his term of probation had expired. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against all defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. Plaintiff sought transfer, contending that his claim against four individual probation officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 was incorrectly dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed dismissal of Plaintiff’s section 1983 claim against the individually-named probation officers, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint stated a claim for relief under section 1983 against these defendants. View "Thornton v. State" on Justia Law

James Armour’s employment contract with AM General LLC entitled him to payment of a long-term incentive plan (LTIP). When Armour retired, he was to receive a lump sum LTIP payment, but instead he started receiving quarterly installment payments in the form of checks. AM General attempted to make the final installment payment with a subordinate promissory note. Armour rejected the Note and requested full payment. Thereafter, AM General filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that it had not breached the LTIP portion of its agreement with Armour. Armour counterclaimed, asserting that AM General breached the employment agreement by failing to pay Armour the full LTIP payment when it was due and claiming that, by attempting to pay the remaining portion of the LTIP payment with a promissory note, AM General breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Armour. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding a genuine issue of material fact with regard to how “payment” could be made under the LTIP provision of the agreement. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the grant of summary judgment, holding that AM General breached its employment agreement with Armour because the Note did not constitute payment under the employment agreement. View "AM General LLC v. Armour" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an elementary school principal, was terminated after the school board learned that he had been involved in a sexual relationship with a teacher. Plaintiff filed a complaint against school defendants, alleging breach of contract and that the notice and procedure utilized by the school board in terminating his administrator’s contract denied him due process. The superior court granted summary judgment for the School. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the hearing process described in the teacher’s termination statute does not apply to termination of an administrator when his underlying teaching contract is not being terminated; (2) the language in Plaintiff’s form teacher’s contract referring to a hearing with the benefit of counsel and a just cause determination applies only to Plaintiff’s underlying teacher’s contract and not his administrator’s contract; and (3) under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiff received constitutional due process. View "Hewitt v. Westfield Washington Sch. Corp." on Justia Law

Davis Security Systems, LLC hired Donnell Caldwell as a security guard for the West Calumet Complex. Before his employment, Caldwell had been romantically involved with Stacy Knighten, a resident of the Complex. While on duty, Caldwell and Knighten were involved in an altercation, and Caldwell shot Knighten in the back, paralyzing her from the waist down. Knighten filed a complaint for damages against, among others, Davis Security under the theory of respondent superior. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Davis Security on all claims. The Supreme Court reversed the portion of the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Davis Security based on Knighten’s respondent superior claim, holding that the scope of Caldwell’s duties as an employee of Davis Security and the issue of whether in discharging his weapon Caldwell engaged in conduct consistent with his duties were matters that could not be resolved by summary disposition. Remanded. View "Knighten v. E. Chicago Housing Auth." on Justia Law