Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of C-felony “corrupt business influence,” the formal name of the Indiana Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, for his involvement in three armed robberies during the course of a month. Defendant appealed, arguing that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction for corrupt business influence because the State failed to prove that his actions posed a threat of “continued” criminal activity. The court of appeals agreed and reversed Defendant’s corrupt business influence conviction. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed Defendant’s conviction for corrupt business influence, holding (1) continuity is not required for a corrupt business influence conviction, but continuity is relevant to whether the incidents were “not isolated,” which is an element of the definition; and (2) in this case, there was sufficient evidence that Defendant’s crimes were not isolated. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of murder, attempted murder, felony murder, and related crimes. The trial court imposed life without parole for the murder conviction and a term of years for the remaining convictions. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court’s remark to the jury regarding cell tower towers and sites deprived him of a fair trial by vouching for the credibility of the State’s evidence and thereby discrediting his alibi defense. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the judge’s comment did not amount to fundamental error requiring reversal of Defendant’s convictions and a new trial. View "Blaize v. State" on Justia Law

Police impounded Defendant’s car from a parking lot because he was arrested for driving while suspended, the car’s windshield and bumper were damaged, and the registered owner was not present. When police inventoried the car, they found a handgun inside. Defendant was ultimately convicted of carrying a handgun without a license. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s handgun conviction, holding that, as required by Fair v. State, the State failed to prove an established departmental procedure or regulation that authorized the discretionary impound under the community-caretaking function, and therefore, the State failed to prove that the impoundment was reasonable. View "Wilford v. State" on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendant was adjudicated delinquent in Texas for a sex offense. Defendant was required to register in Texas as a sex offender until 2014. In 2006, Indiana amended the Sex Offender Registry Act’s definition of sex offender to include “a person who is required to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction.” In 2009, Defendant moved to Indiana but did not register as a sex offender. Defendant was charged with failing to register as a sex offender in Indiana. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that enforcing the registry requirement would be an ex post violation because his offense occurred before the change to the definition of sex offender took effect. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant has failed to show the amended definition retroactively punished him, and therefore, there was no ex post facto law violation. View "Tyson v. State" on Justia Law

In 1992, Defendant was convicted in Michigan of a sex offense. Michigan and Indiana later enacted laws requiring convicted sex offenders to register with local law enforcement. Pursuant to Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act, Defendant was required to register as a sex offender for twenty-five years upon his release from prison in 1999. In 2006, the Indiana General Assembly amended the definition of sex offender in Indiana’s Act to include “a person who is required to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction.” In 2012, Defendant moved to Indiana, where he was required to register for the remainder of his Michigan registration period. Defendant petitioned for removal from the registry, arguing that enforcing the requirement would be an ex post facto violation as applied to him because, at the time he committed the underlying offense, neither Michigan nor Indiana had adopted Sex Offender Registration Acts. The trial court granted Defendant’s petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 2006 definitional amendment to the Michigan Act does not impose a punitive burden on Defendant beyond that which Michigan has already imposed, and therefore, there is not ex post facto violation. View "State v. Zerbe" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with battering J.M., his girlfriend. While she was being treated for her injuries, J.M. told a paramedic and forensic nurse that Defendant was the source of her injuries. J.M. was reported missing shortly after the assault and failed to appear for scheduled depositions. The State later provided notice of intent to introduce J.M.'s statement identifying Defendant as her attacker through the testimony of the paramedic and forensic nurse. The trial court granted the motion. After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of C-felony battery and A-misdemeanor domestic battery. Defendant appealed, arguing that J.M.’s statements were testimonial hearsay admitted in violation of his confrontation rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that J.M.’s hearsay statements were non-testimonial and, therefore, were properly admitted into evidence. View "Ward v. State" on Justia Law

The trial court terminated the parental rights of Mother and Father to their daughter, determining that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child’s removal will not be remedied and that termination is in the child’s best interests. Father appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) there was insufficient evidence supporting the trial court’s determinations that the conditions that led to the child’s placement outside of the home will not be remedied; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to warrant a conclusion that termination was in the child’s best interests. View "A.A. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs." on Justia Law

After Tom Bonnell bought a strip of land from the Pulaski County Board of Commissioners, Ruby and Douglas Cotner filed this suit to quiet title, claiming that they had previously acquired ownership of a second of that land via adverse possession. The trial court (1) concluded that the prior sale of the strip by tax deed extinguished any interest the Cotners may have had, but (2) awarded the Cotners a prescriptive easement on certain outbuildings encroaching onto the strip. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of the Cotners’ adverse possession claim, holding that the tax sales of the strip defeated the Cotners’ claim of ownership by adverse possession; but (2) reversed the grant of a prescriptive easement in the Cotners’ encroaching outbuildings, holding that the sale of the strip by tax deed extinguished any and all interest the Cotners previously possessed. View "Bonnell v. Cotner" on Justia Law

The Indiana State Fair Commission manages the Indiana State Fair. Since the 1990s, the Commission has utilized Mid-America Sound to provide equipment for the concerts and other events that take place at the Fair. In August 2011, on the closing night of the Fair, the Mid-America’s roof collapsed, killing seven people. The victims and families filed lawsuits, including as defendants Mid-America and the Commission. Mid-America filed a third-party lawsuit claiming that the Commission was required to indemnify it for Mid-America’s own negligence in relation to the roof collapse due to years-long course of conduct in paying invoices that had standard indemnity language on the back. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Commission. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the terms of Mid-America’s invoices to the Commission did not clearly and unequivocally provide for retroactive application, the Court will not infer such a provision from a course of dealing. View "Mid-America Sound Corp. v. Ind. State Fair Comm’n" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of Class B felony burglary, among other crimes. The burglary convictions resulted from breaking and entering into an old farmhouse. The Supreme Court reversed the two convictions for burglary as Class B felonies and remanded for the entry of two replacement convictions for burglary as Class C felonies, holding that the jury instruction’s expansion of the statutory definition of a “dwelling” for purposes of Class B felony burglary was misleading and invaded the province of the jury and was therefore erroneous. Remanded for resentencing. View "Keller v. State" on Justia Law