Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State brought this civil action against Consumer Attorney Services, P.A., The McCann Law Group, LLP, and Brenda McCann (collectively, Defendants), alleging that Defendants’ conduct violated four Indiana consumer protection statutes: the Credit Services Organizations Act (CSOA), the Mortgage Rescue Protection Fraud Act (MRPFA), the Home Loan Practices Act (HLPA), and the Deceptive Consumer Sales Act (DCSA). Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that they were statutorily exempted from liability. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that neither the CSOA, the MRPFA, the HLPA, nor the DCSA provides an exemption for law firms. View "Consumer Attorney Services, P.A. v. State" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with dealing in marijuana and maintaining a common nuisance. At some point, the State informed Defendant that it had a video recording of a controlled buy between him and a confidential informant (CI). The State offered Defendant’s public defender the opportunity to review the recording but would not allow Defendant himself to see the video. After Defendant unsuccessfully requested a copy of the recording, his counsel filed a motion to compel, arguing that Defendant’s personal review of the video was fundamental to preparing a defense. In response, the State claimed that the informer’s privilege allowed withholding the identity of the CI. The trial court denied the motion to compel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State failed to make the threshold showing that the informer’s privilege applied in the first instance because it was unclear whether the video would actually reveal the informant’s identity; and (2) even if the State had made the threshold showing, Defendant carried his burden of proving an exception to the privilege because his review of the video was “relevant and helpful to his defense or [was] necessary for a fair trial.” View "Beville v. State" on Justia Law

CitiMortgage, Inc. obtained a judgment of foreclosure against the family homestead of Homeowners - husband and wife. Homeowners attempted to appeal without legal representation. The Court of Appeals dismissed the attempted appeal with prejudice because of defects in Homeowners’ filings. Homeowners filed a petition to transfer, which the Supreme Court initially denied. On reconsideration, the Court vacated the order denying transfer and assumed jurisdiction over this appeal. The Court then affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that, under the facts presented in this case, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of CitiMortgage. View "McCullough v. CitiMortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

The owner of real property executed a warranty deed to three grantees, two of whom (Husband and Wife) were married. A dozen years later, in a separate case, the circuit court entered a damages judgment against Husband and the third grantee (Underwood) and in favor of Underwood’s former employer (Demming). The Demming judgment subsequently became a lien on the property. Husband subsequently denied. Thereafter, Underwood brought this action seeking to partition and sell the property and distribute the proceeds, arguing that she, Husband, and Wife owned the property as tenants in common and that she no longer wanted to own the property in common with Wife and Husband’s Estate. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Estate and Demming. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that Husband’s interest in the property passed directly to Wife upon his death and not to his Estate. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed, holding that Indiana’s legal presumption that spouses owning real property hold their interests as tenants by the entirety is rebutted on the record in this case because the deed conveying the property specifies that the tree grantees shall take the property “all as Tenants-in-Common.” Remanded. View "Underwood v. Bunger" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a field sobriety checkpoint and was asked if he had been drinking. Defendant admitted that he had. The officer administered some field sobriety tests and ultimately arrested Defendant. Defendant was charged with operating while intoxicated and operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration of at least .08 but less than .15 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. During trial, Defendant’s counsel objected to the officer’s testimony about him asking Defendant if he had been drinking and Defendant’s response based on a Miranda violation. In response, the State argued that a Miranda warning was not necessary. The trial court then entered an order suppressing any statements made by Defendant, as well as any evidence obtained thereafter. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, dismissed the appeal, ruling that the State had no statutory authority to appeal because Defendant never filed a written motion to suppress and because the order suppressing the evidence was issued during trial. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed the trial court’s suppression order, holding (1) the State may appeal from the trial court’s order granting Defendant’s motion to suppress; and (2) Miranda warnings are not required in circumstances such as these, where a defendant is briefly detained at a public sobriety checkpoint. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications brought this judicial disciplinary action against T. Edward Page, Senior Judge (Respondent), asserting that because Respondent was arrested and convicted for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, Respondent violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. Respondent immediately self-reported his misconduct, was compliant with the requests of the Judges and Lawyers Assistance Program, was cooperative with the Commission throughout its investigation, and was remorseful for his conduct. Respondent and the Commission agreed that, under the circumstances, the appropriate sanction was a public reprimand. The Supreme Court agreed with the parties and reprimanded Respondent. View "In re Hon. T. Edward Page" on Justia Law

The first required element a termination petition must allege establishes three waiting periods to give parents a time to reunify with their children and bars the Department of Child Services (DCS) from seeking termination until one of those three periods has passed. Here, DCS petitioned for termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to their two daughters. DCS’s petitions alleged that two of the three waiting periods had passed. The trial court granted DCS’s terminations, finding that DCS proved both the six-month and fifteen-month waiting periods. Father and Mother appealed the termination of their rights as to their daughters. The court of appeals affirmed, determining that neither of the waiting period allegations in the petitions were true but finding the error harmless. Father sought transfer. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thus vacating the court of appeals opinion, and reversed, holding (1) DCS failed to prove the waiting periods it alleged and failed to allege the waiting period it could have proved; and (2) therefore, the trial court erred in terminating Father’s parental rights, and the error was not harmless. View "D.B. v. Indiana Department of Child Services" on Justia Law

In Pfenning v. Lineman, the Supreme Court established that Indiana courts do not referee disputes arising from ordinary sports activity. The Court further held that, as a matter of law, when a sports participant injuries someone while engaging in conduct ordinary in the sport, and without intent or recklessness, the participant does not breach a duty. In this case, during a karate class drill, Defendant jump-kicked a bag, injuring Plaintiff, who was holding the bag. Plaintiff sued, alleging that Defendant negligently, recklessly, and unreasonably injured her. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that, under Pfenning, Defendant breached no duty as a matter of law because the jump kick was “ordinary behavior” within the sport of karate generally. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the decision of the court of appeals, and affirmed summary judgment, holding (1) under Pfenning, ordinary conduct in the sport turns on the sport generally, not the specific activity; and (2) because Defendant’s jump kick was ordinary conduct in the sport of karate generally and no evidence showed intent or recklessness, there was no breach as a matter of law. View "Megenity v. Dunn" on Justia Law

J.D.M. was adjudicated a delinquent for committing child molestation which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a Class C felony. The juvenile court ordered placement of J.D.M. at the Wernle Youth and Family Treatment Center. Prior to J.D.M.’s release from Wernle, the juvenile court issued an order that required J.D.M. to register as a sex offender. J.D.M. appealed, arguing that the statutory prerequisites for placing a juvenile on the sex offender registry were not met. The Supreme Court reversed the order requiring J.D.M. to register as a sex offender, holding that the juvenile court could not order J.D.M. to register as a sex or violent offender prior to his discharge from Wernle. Remanded. View "J.D.M. v. State" on Justia Law

In 2009, Carlton Curry was appointed as superintendent of Lawrence Utilities, the City of Lawrence’s municipally owned water and sewer utility. Just over two years later, Dean Jessup was elected as mayor of the City in the general election. Mayor Jessup terminated Curry after their differences in policy became apparent. Curry filed a complaint against the City, claiming he was wrongfully discharged under the utility superintendent statute, he was owned unpaid wages under the Wage Payment Statute, and the mayor tortiously interfered with his employment contract. The trial court (1) granted summary judgment in favor of Curry on the wrongful discharge claim, (2) granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the Wage Payment Statute claim, and (3) denied summary judgment on the tortious interference claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all respects, holding (1) Mayor Jessup lacked authority to remove Curry as the utility service board superintendent; (2) Curry was not entitled to wages under the Wage Payment Statute; and (3) a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding Curry’s claim for intentional interference with an employment relationship. View "City of Lawrence Utilites Service Board v. Curry" on Justia Law