Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Indiana’s post-conviction rules did not allow Petitioner to bring a challenge to a statute barring him, as a serious sex offender, from school property in a post-conviction proceeding because Petitioner was challenging a collateral consequence of his conviction instead of his conviction or sentence.In 2010, Petitioner pleaded guilty to child solicitation. Petitioner’s probation conditions made schools off-limits, but Petitioner received an exception for his son’s activities. In 2015, Indiana Code 35-42-4-14 made it a Level 6 felony for a “serious sex offender” to knowingly or intentionally enter school property, which resulted in Petitioner being forced to stop attending school events. Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, arguing that the new statute was an unconstitutional ex post facto law. The post-conviction court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the post-conviction rules excluded Petitioner’s claim, but they did not foreclose a declaratory-judgment action. View "Kirby v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment for Defendants - a lawyer and his law firm - in this lawyer malpractice case, holding that Defendants failed to negate the causation element of Plaintiff’s malpractice claim.Plaintiff fell and severely fractured her legs while visiting her husband in the hospital. Plaintiff retained Defendants to represent her against the hospital, but Defendants failed to sue the hospital within the applicable statute of limitations. At issue was whether Plaintiff would have won her claim against the hospital had Defendants timely sued, thus establishing the second prong of the “trial-within-a-trial” doctrine. On appeal, both parties conceded that Plaintiff did not know of the tripping risk that she claimed caused her fall. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment for Defendants, holding that Defendants failed to establish, as a matter of law, that Plaintiff would not have succeeded in her premises-liability claim against the hospital, thus precluding summary judgment. View "Roumbos v. Samuel G. Vazanellis & Thiros and Stracci, PC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part Defendant’s sentence imposed in connection with his felony incest conviction, holding that one special sex offender probation condition imposed by the trial court was unreasonable as applied to Defendant.On appeal, Defendant argued (1) his three-year sentence was inappropriate, (2) two probation conditions (Conditions 8 and 26) were unreasonable and unconstitutional as applied to him because they created sweeping prohibitions on internet usage, and (3) one condition’s (Condition 8) prohibition on “certain web sites…frequented by children” was unconstitutionally vague. The Supreme Court held (1) Condition 8 was constitutional as applied to Defendant; but (2) Condition 26, which barred Defendant from accessing the Internet without prior approval of his probation officer, was not reasonably related to Defendant’s rehabilitation and maintaining public safety. View "Weida v. State" on Justia Law

Indiana law allows a judgment-creditor to garnish a cash bail bond the judgment-debtor posted in an unrelated criminal matter.Here, Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against Defendant in the superior court. While the judgment remained unsatisfied, Defendant was arrested in an unrelated criminal matter and posted a cash bond with the county clerk. Plaintiff attempted to garnish the cash bail bond, but the trial clerk, who was named as a garnishee-defendant in the civil case, released it to Defendant’s attorney. Plaintiff sought to hold the clerk liable. The trial court determined that the bond was not subject to garnishment and ruled against Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the clerk who holds the bond in a criminal case is an eligible garnishee-defendant in the civil case where the judgment was entered, and the bond is subject to the garnishment lien filed there; (2) the judgment-creditor may not recover on the bond until the criminal court releases it; and (3) in the instant case, the clerk was liable on the bond because she distributed its proceeds before the civil court determined Plaintiff’s right to them. View "Garner v. Kempf" on Justia Law

Under the circumstances of this case, Mother’s consent was necessary to grant the child’s stepmother’s petition to adopt the child.Here, due to her drug addiction, Mother had voluntarily agreed to modify custody. Under the agreement, Mother relinquished primary physical custody, which the trial court awarded to the child’s father. Although Mother retained legal custody with parenting time, she failed to communicate significantly with her son, and therefore, the stepmother’s petition to adopt was granted without mother’s consent. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court on the consent determination and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the totality of Mother’s circumstances justified her failure to communicate with her child and that the father and stepmother frustrated Mother’s limited ability to communicate. View "In re Adoption of E.B.F." on Justia Law

The hospital that paid out a doctor’s ownership interest after his employment as a cardiologist terminated did not breach its agreement with the doctor.Dr. Roderick Sawyer worked as a cardiologist for St. Vincent Medical Group, Inc. (the Medical Group) and was a member-owner of The Care Group Heart Hospital, LLC (the Hospital). Sawyer agreed with the Medical Group and the Hospital that upon “any termination” of employment between him and the Medical Group, his ownership interest in the Hospital must be discontinued and redeemed. After the Medical Group terminated Sawyer’s employment, the Hospital paid out Sawyer’s ownership interest. Sawyer sued the Hospital, among others, alleging breach of contract. The jury returned a verdict against the Hospital for breach of contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under the plain meaning of the contract language, the Hospital did not breach the agreement by discontinuing and redeeming Sawyer’s ownership interest; but (2) the Hospital did breach the agreement by delaying the payout, so Sawyer was entitled to interest on the delay. View "Care Group Heart Hospital, LLC v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court found that the Honorable Dean A. Young, a circuit court judge, engaged in judicial misconduct and ordered that Judge Young be suspended from office without pay for six days.The matter was before the Supreme Court on the report of the Special Masters appointed to hear evidence on the Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications’ notice of statement of charges against Judge Young. The allegations of judicial misconduct stemmed from a temporary restraining order that the judge heard and issued without adequate notice to the responding party or witnesses and while the judge had a specific interest in the matter. The Special Masters recommended, and the parties agreed, that the appropriate discipline was to suspend Judge Young for six days without pay. View "In re Honorable Dean A. Young" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed T.H.’s adjudication as a delinquent but remanded the case to the trial court to modify its records to show that T.H. committed an act that would be criminal mischief as a Class B misdemeanor.The State filed a petition alleging that T.H. committed a delinquent act that would be criminal mischief, a Class A misdemeanor, if committed by an adult. The trial court found that T.H. committed criminal mischief that caused at least $750 in loss, which would be a Class A misdemeanor, and adjudicated T.H. delinquent. The Supreme Court affirmed the adjudication but remanded the case, holding that no reasonable fact-finder could find the element of loss of at least $750 proven beyond a reasonable doubt. View "T.H. v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted residential entry and resisting law enforcement. Defendant failed to appear at his sentencing hearing. Counsel moved for a continuance of the sentencing hearing, but the trial court denied a continuance. After a hearing held in Defendant’s absence, the court sentenced Defendant. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue the sentencing hearing and that the maximum sentence on the attempted residential entry conviction was inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). The court of appeals sua sponte reversed on other grounds. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance; and (2) the sentence imposed by the trial court was not inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). View "Robinson v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was what constitutes sufficient evidence to prove a person intentionally or knowingly violated a protective order.K.G., the pastor of a small Indiana church, sought a protective order against Defendant, a parishioner. The court issued a protective order prohibiting Defendant from “harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating with” K.G. After Defendant emailed three elders at the church, she was convicted of two counts of invasion of privacy for knowingly or intentionally violating the order. The jury found Defendant guilty. Defendant appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. A majority of the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant’s intent in sending the email was not to contact K.G. but to ask the church elders to discipline or punish K.G. for alleged wrongful conduct. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding that the jury acted within its discretion in discrediting Defendant’s testimony and finding that Defendant intentionally or knowingly communicated with K.G. through her email. The court also affirmed Defendant’s sentence, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering Defendant’s criminal history as an aggravating circumstance and that Defendant’s sentence was appropriate considering her offense and character. View "Phipps v. State" on Justia Law