Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Department of Correction’s change to Indian’s lethal injection protocol, which added Brevital to the lethal injection cocktail, does not carry the effect of law, and therefore, the new three-drug protocol is not a rule and thus not subject to the Administrative Rules and Procedures Act (ARPA).In 2014, the Department announced hat it would alter the three-drug combination used for executions, replacing Sodium Thiopental with Brevital. Plaintiff, a death row inmate, filed a complaint alleging that the Department’s change to the lethal injection protocol violated his rights under the ARPA. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the Department’s execution protocol constituted a rule, and because the Department failed to follow ARPA’s requirements when adding Brevital to the three-drug combination, the changed protocol was void. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals, holding that the Department’s lethal injection protocol did not constitute a “rule” for APRA purposes. View "Ward v. Carter" on Justia Law

The Department of Correction’s change to Indian’s lethal injection protocol, which added Brevital to the lethal injection cocktail, does not carry the effect of law, and therefore, the new three-drug protocol is not a rule and thus not subject to the Administrative Rules and Procedures Act (ARPA).In 2014, the Department announced hat it would alter the three-drug combination used for executions, replacing Sodium Thiopental with Brevital. Plaintiff, a death row inmate, filed a complaint alleging that the Department’s change to the lethal injection protocol violated his rights under the ARPA. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the Department’s execution protocol constituted a rule, and because the Department failed to follow ARPA’s requirements when adding Brevital to the three-drug combination, the changed protocol was void. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals, holding that the Department’s lethal injection protocol did not constitute a “rule” for APRA purposes. View "Ward v. Carter" on Justia Law

A trial court judge is not required to recuse himself or herself from a case solely because counsel for one of the parties served as a professional reference and wrote a recommendation letter in support of the judge’s application for another judicial role.In this contested adoption case, Father alleged that because the trial judge listed adoptive parents’ counsel as a reference in his application for appointment to the Indiana Supreme Court, an appearance of impropriety was created, necessitating the trial judge’s recusal. The judge denied the motion for recusal and then dismissed Father’s motion to contest the adoption and entered a decree of adoption. The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the case, holding that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial judge was not required to recuse himself on remand. View "L.G. v. S.L." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court rejected the State’s invitation to graft new language onto Indiana’s habitual-fender statutes, which count all prior non-Indiana felonies as Level 6 felonies and do not allow a habitual-offender findings based only on two Level 6 felonies.Defendant was convicted of Level 4 felony burglary and found to be a habitual offender based on two prior Illinois convictions. On appeal, Defendant challenged the habitual-offender enhancement, arguing that two Level 6 felonies could not support the enhancement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the fact that, under Indiana’s habitual-offender statutes, all non-Indiana felonies count as Level 6 felonies is peculiar and leads to incongruous results, but separation of powers and strict construal of criminal statutes stop the court from declaring it absurd; and (2) Defendant’s two Illinois felonies count as Level 6 felonies under the habitual-offender statutes, but because a habitual-offender enhancement based on only two Level 6 felonies is not allowed, Defendant’s habitual-offender enhancement is reversed as unsupported by sufficient evidence. View "Calvin v. State" on Justia Law

At issue was the habitual offender statute in one of its recently amended forms, Ind. Code 35-50-2-8(d) (Supp. 2015), and whether each lower-level felony used for habitual offender purposes must meet the statute’s ten-year requirement.The State in this case alleged that Defendant was a habitual offender pursuant to section 35-50-2-8(d). Defendant objected, arguing that each of the underlying lower-level offenses must meet the ten-year requirement in subsection 8(d)(2). The trial court overruled Defendant’s objection to the habitual offender enhancement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain meaning of the 2015 version of subsection 8(d) required that each lower-level felony the State uses to establish subsection 8(d)(1) must meet the ten-year requirement found in subsection 8(d)(2). View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice under Trial Rule 12(B)(6).Plaintiff brought an inverse-condemnation action against Defendant. The trial court found the statute of limitations had expired and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(B)(6). The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Indiana’s discovery rule tolled the running of the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the court of appeals’ opinion, and reversed the trial court’s dismissal, albeit on different grounds, holding that the dismissal was premature because the face of the complaint did not establish that the asserted claim was time-barred. View "Bellwether Properties, LLC v. Duke Energy Indiana, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, rendered after a jury trial, for six thefts, burglary, and attempted robbery and conspiracy to rob a gas station. The trial court merged the attempt and conspiracy convictions and sentenced Defendant to an aggregate seventeen-year term. On appeal, Defendant challenged only the attempt and conspiracy convictions. Specifically, Defendant claimed that he had abandoned his attempt and conspiracy to rob the gas station. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) abandonment is an available defense for both attempt and conspiracy charges; but (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts and the jury’s finding that the State disproved Defendant’s abandonment defense in at least one way. View "Jones v. State" on Justia Law

Here, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the longstanding principle that direct production involves a process that includes those steps essential and integral to transforming tangible personal property into a distinct marketable good.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Tax Court affirming the decision of the Department of State Revenue partially denying refund claims submitted by Petitioner for sales tax paid on blast freezing equipment and the electricity used in operating that equipment. Petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court for review, arguing that it qualified for exemptions under the relevant statutes because it engages in “direct production” when it blast freezes another company’s food product and that it engages in its own production process in producing the new, distinct marketable goods. In reversing, the Supreme Court held (1) Petitioner’s blast freezing process constitutes direct production because it represents the crucial final step in creating a distinct marketable good; and (2) the relevant statutes and regulations do not impose a requirement that Petitioner’s blast-freezing procedure be its own, separate production process. View "Merchandise Warehouse Co. v. Indiana Department of State Revenue" on Justia Law

Because this appeal was not from a final judgment, the Supreme Court, for judicial economy under this case’s particular circumstances, elected to stay this appeal’s consideration and remanded the case to the trial court.After the Town of Ellettsville’s Plan Commission approved the request of Richland Convenience Store Partners, LLC to amend a subdivision plat so Richland could move a utility easement on its property, Joseph DeSpirito, Richland’s neighbor whose property the easement benefitted, sued for judicial review, declaratory relief and associated damages and preliminary and permanent injunctive relief. An order on judicial review granted DeSpirito’s motion for summary judgment, but the order was silent on DeSpirito’s request for damages and a permanent injunction. Richland and the Commission (collectively, Appellants) filed notices of appeal. The court of appeals reversed the trial court and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment for Appellants. The Supreme Court granted transfer. The court held that the record on appeal showed no final judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to decide whether to expressly direct entry of judgment under Trial Rule 54(B) or Under Trial Rule 56(C). View "Town of Ellettsville v. DeSpirito" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of murder and conspiracy to commit murder but revised his sentence from life without parole (LWOP) to an aggregate eighty-year term.Defendant was seventeen years old when he committed murder. At sentencing, the jury was specifically directed to consider Defendant’s age as a mitigating factor. The jury recommended a LWOP sentence. The Supreme Court held (1) the State’s references to Defendant as “Looney the Shooter” did not lead to fundamental error; (2) the State’s amendment to Defendant’s conspiracy charge was not untimely; (3) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conspiracy to commit murder conviction; and (4) Defendant’s character and the nature of his offense did not warrant making him “Indiana’s fifth juvenile sentenced to a guaranteed death in prison.” View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law