Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of four counts of felony child molesting, holding that the attenuation doctrine can apply under the Indiana Constitution and that Defendant’s statements to law enforcement constituted admissible evidence against him.Defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained from an FBI search and subsequent police interviews, alleging that he had been illegally detained and searched. The trial court suppressed evidence obtained from searching Defendant’s computer and electronic equipment, finding that Defendant’s consent to the search was invalid but denied suppression of Defendant’s statements to law enforcement officers, concluding that they were sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search. The court of appeals reversed Defendant’s convictions, holding that the trial court erred in admitting Defendant’s confessions to the officers, ultimately rejecting the attenuation doctrine for Indiana. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals opinion and affirmed, holding (1) the Indiana Constitution embraces the attenuation doctrine; and (2) Defendant’s statements to law enforcement were sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search so as to be purged from the original taint and were thus admissible at trial. View "Wright v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the requirement set forth in Pirtle v. State, 323 N.E.2d 634 (Ind. 1975), that an advisement of rights be given prior to police obtaining consent to a search from a person in custody does not extend to drug recognition exams (DRE).At issue was whether police are required to advise a person in custody of his or her right to consult with counsel before obtaining consent to perform the DRE exam. The Court of Appeals concluded that without a Pirtle warning, evidence obtained through a DRE is inadmissible. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that an advisement is not necessary before police can obtain a person’s valid consent to a DRE. View "Dycus v. State" on Justia Law

Under traditional rate regulation, an energy utility must first make improvements to its infrastructure before it can recover their cost through regulator-approved rate increases to customers. The process is an expensive, onerous rate-making case, which involves a comprehensive review of the utility’s entire business operations. In 2013 the legislature authorized utilities to obtain regulatory preapproval for “designated” improvements to their infrastructure. Under the “TDSIC” Statute, a utility can seek regulatory approval of a seven-year plan that designates eligible improvements, followed by periodic petitions to adjust rates automatically as approved investments are completed. The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission preapproved approximately $20 million in infrastructure investments and authorized increases to NIPSCO’s natural-gas rates under the TDSIC mechanism. The approval referred to categories of improvements that describe broad parameters for future improvements but did not designate those improvements with specificity. The Indiana Supreme Court reversed, in part, concluding that the TDSIC Statute permits periodic rate increases only for specific projects a utility designates, and the Commission approves, in the threshold proceeding and not for multiple-unit projects using ascertainable planning criteria. A utility must specifically identify the projects or improvements at the outset in its seven-year plan and not in later proceedings involving periodic updates. Commission approval of “broad categories of unspecified projects defeats the purpose of having a plan.” View "NIPSCO Industrial Group v. Northern Indiana Public Service Co." on Justia Law

Indiana’s blocked-crossing statute bars railroads from blocking railroad-highway grade crossings for more than 10 minutes, except in circumstances outside the railroads’ control. Ind. Code 8-6-7.5-1. Violations are Class C infractions and carry a minimum $200 fine. In one year, Norfolk Southern collected 23 blocked-crossing citations for violations near its Allen County trainyard. Norfolk argued that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. 10101, and the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) expressly preempt Indiana’s statute. The trial court found that train-switching maneuvers, track congestion, and mechanical defects can all cause traffic blockages lasting more than 10 minutes, and that, to shorten blockages, Norfolk would have to run trains faster, run shorter trains, or “cut” trains into segments—an onerous process that requires more than 10 minutes of reassembly and brake tests. The court granted Norfolk summary judgment on all 23 citations. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Indiana Supreme Court reinstated the trial court decision. Indiana’s blocked-crossing statute is a remedy that directly regulates rail operations, so the ICCTA categorically preempts it. View "State of Indiana v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the determination of the trial court finding that R.R., a juvenile, violated his probation and adjudicating him a delinquent for auto theft and false informing, holding that the trial court violated R.R.’s right to be present at the fact-finding hearing by holding hearing in R.R.’s absence.On appeal, R.R. argued that juveniles have a due process right to be present at fact-finding hearings on a delinquency charge and that the trial court violated this right by holding the hearing in his absence. The Supreme Court assumed without deciding that juveniles are entitled to be present at fact-finding hearings and held (1) a juvenile can waive his right to be present at a fact-finding hearing but must do so according to the juvenile waiver-of-rights statute; (2) there was no waiver of R.R.’s right to be present, and therefore, the trial court violated that right by holding the fact-finding hearing in R.R.’s absence; and (3) the absurdity doctrine did not apply to this case. View "R.R. v. State" on Justia Law

In this case brought against two women who were sexually assaulted by two on-duty police officers, the Supreme Court held that the officers’ city employers may be liable under the scope-of-employment rule, traditionally called respondent superior, and that the rule’s common-carrier exception does not apply.Plaintiffs brought civil actions against Fort Wayne and Evansville, the city employers of the police officers. Both Plaintiffs claimed vicarious liability under the rule of responder superior and the common-carrier exception, which imposes a more stringent standard of care on certain enterprises. The trial court granted summary judgment for the cities on the common-carrier issue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a city does not, under respondent superior, escape liability as a matter of law for a sexual assault by a police officer; and (2) relationships between the cities and the women in these cases do not fall within the common-carrier exception. View "Cox v. Evansville Police Department" on Justia Law

At issue was what, if any, ability a trial court has to resentence a criminal defendant on felonies underlying a criminal gang enhancement, see Ind. Code 35-50-2-15, when an appellate court has reversed that enhancement and remanded to the trial court.Defendant was found guilty by a jury of committing several criminal offenses in connection with a criminal gang. In applying the criminal gang enhancement statute, the trial court increased Defendant’s overall sentence by thirty years. The Court of Appeals reversed the enhancement. The State and Defendant disputed here the extent of the trial court’s sentencing authority on remand. The Supreme Court held that the criminal gang enhancement statute unambiguously increases the punishment for all the felonies that underlie the enhancement and that vacating such an enhancement disturbs the punishment originally imposed. Therefore, when an appellate court reverses a criminal gang enhancement, on remand, the trial court must resentence a defendant on all surviving underlying felonies. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for Level 1 felony child molestation, holding that proof of the slightest penetration of the sex organ, including penetration of the external genitalia, is sufficient to demonstrate a person performed “other sexual misconduct” with a child under Ind. Code 35-42-4-3.Section 35-42-4-3 prohibits a person from knowingly or intentionally performing sexual intercourse or other sexual misconduct with a child under fourteen years of age. The offense is a Level 1 felony if committed by a person who is at least twenty-one years old. “Other sexual misconduct” includes “an act involving…the penetration of the sex organ or anus of a person by an object.” On appeal, Defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to prove “penetration” for purposes of section 35-42-4-3 defining other sexual misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction, holding that the evidence demonstrated that Defendant committed other sexual misconduct with a child. View "Boggs v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Honorable Ryan D. Johanningsmeier, Judge of the Knox Superior Court 2, engaged in judicial misconduct by his conduct in, and his failure to recuse from, a friend’s traffic-infraction case. Accordingly, the Court reprimanded Judge Johanningsmeier.The Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications charged that Judge Johanningsmeier’s actions violated six provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The parties agreed that the appropriate sanction under the circumstances was a public reprimand plus assessing costs of the proceeding against the judge. The Supreme Court agreed and reprimanded Judge Johanningsmeier, assessing costs of the proceeding against the judge. View "In re Honorable Ryan D. Johanningsmeier" on Justia Law

At issue was whether multiple felony convictions are authorized by Ind. Code 35-44.1-3-1 where a single act of resisting law enforcement while operating a vehicle causes the death of one person and serious bodily injuries to two other people.Defendant was convicted of multiple counts of felony resisting law enforcement. The felony convictions varied in levels - one conviction was a level three felony while two others were level five felonies. The Supreme Court reversed on two level five felony resisting law enforcement convictions and affirmed as to the remaining convictions, holding that Indiana’s resisting law enforcement statute, section 35-44.1-3-1, authorizes only one felony conviction - the highest chargeable offense - where a single act of resisting causes death and serious bodily injury. View "Edmonds v. State" on Justia Law