Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower courts denying Appellant’s petition for post-conviction relief on the basis that his attorney provided deficient performance that prejudiced him, holding that counsel rendered ineffective assistance to Appellant by failing to properly advise him about the immigration consequences of a misdemeanor guilty plea.Appellant pleaded guilty to stealing less than twenty dollars of merchandise from Walmart without realizing that his guilty plea made him a deportable felon under federal immigration law. Appellant sought post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The lower courts denied relief. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Appellant’s attorney rendered constitutionally deficient performance as a matter of law by independently marking “N/A” next to the citizenship advisement on the standard advisement of rights from before inquiring into Appellant’s citizenship status; and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced Appellant. View "Bobadilla v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the Town of Yorktown’s Clerk-Treasurer, Beth Neff, holding that the State’s request to remove Neff did not fall within the exceptionally rare category of cases that warranted removal.Relying on Indiana Code 5-8-1-35, the Removal Statute, the State sought Neff’s removal for her alleged refusal or neglect to perform the official duties pertaining to her office. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Neff, concluding that Neff had not completely failed to carry out her duties. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) for a public official to be removed pursuant to subsection (a)(2) of the Removal Statute, the State must show that the official has generally failed to perform his or her official duties; and (2) Neff’s failures and errors did not result in such a general failure, and therefore, the removal statute did not apply. View "State v. Neff" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained after Defendant was stopped for speeding, holding that there was reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop under the circumstances.At issue was whether there was reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop where the police officer’s calibrated radar indicated that an oncoming vehicle was speeding and the officer verified the radar speed exceeded the posted speed limit but failed to document the excessive speed. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress on the basis that the officer’s stop of Defendant was based upon his observation that a traffic infraction was being committed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the traffic stop passed muster under both the United States and Indiana Constitutions. View "Marshall v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment on David Shaner’s claim for damages related to loss of consortium after his wife Laura’s death due to complications with the administration of dialysis treatments, holding that the wrongful death and survival statutes enable David’s claim to survive regardless of the existence of an heir.In his complaint, David sought two categories of damages contemplated by Indiana’s wrongful death statute: damages related to medical hospital, funeral, and burial expenses; and additional damages including loss of consortium, loss earnings and wages, and loss of additional employment benefits. David died during litigation, leaving no immediately ascertainable heirs. In moving for partial summary judgment on the loss of consortium claim, Defendants argued that any damages in excess of medical, hospital, funeral, and burial expenses would only serve to punish Defendants because the damages would pass to the State. The trial court granted the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that David’s claim for survivor damages could have survived regardless of the existence of an heir, and therefore, summary judgment on this claim was inappropriate. View "Horejs v. Milford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court terminated the disciplinary proceedings relating to the circumstances giving rise to this judicial misconduct case, holding that continued litigation would be an inefficient use of judicial resources because the court over which Respondent presided no longer existed and because Respondent consented to a prohibition on future judicial service.The Supreme Court, however, wrote in order to clarify municipal courts’ power to administer infraction cases and infraction deferral agreements and to caution judicial officers on the impropriety of assuming the prosecutor’s duties. The Court then held (1) municipal courts’ status as “special courts” does not absolve them of the duties of a separate but co-equal branch of government; and (2) municipal court judges must endeavor to maintain, preserve, and protect the independence of Indiana’s judiciary even when administering the lowest-level civil and criminal offenses. View "In re Honorable Geoff L. Robison" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Liability Administrative Law Judge (LALJ) concluding that Driver was Q.D.-A.’s employee under the Unemployment Compensation Act, holding that because Q.D.-A. proved the Act’s three part test, Driver was an independent contractor.Q.D.-A., which matches drivers with customers who need large vehicles driven to them, classified its drivers as independent contractors and did not pay unemployment taxes for them under the Act. The Act presumes a worker is an employee unless the employer proves three factors. Driver in this case filed for unemployment benefits under the Act, and the Department of Workforce Development classified Driver as an employee. The LALJ affirmed the Department’s classification. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the LAJL unreasonably concluded that Driver was Q.D.-A.’s employee when Driver was not under Q.D.-A.’s control or direction, performed a service outside Q.D.-A.’s usual course of business, and ran an independently established business. View "Q.D.-A., Inc. v. Indiana Department of Workforce Development" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether to extend the holding in Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394 (Ind. 1996) that a adult criminal defendant cannot challenge the validity of his guilty plea on direct appeal to an agreed delinquency adjudication. The Supreme Court held in this case that before Juvenile may pursue an appeal he must first seek relief from the trial court under Trial Rule 60(B).Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) juveniles cannot immediately challenge on direct appeal any errors concerning their agreed adjudication, but because juveniles are not eligible for post-conviction relief, before pursuing their constitutional right to appeal, they must first assert any claims of error concerning their agreed judgment in a request for post-judgment relief filed with the juvenile court; and (2) juveniles who seek that relief in post-judgment proceedings have a statutory right to counsel under Ind. Code 31-32. View "J.W. v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court affirming the order of the Natural Resources Commission (NRC) finding that the Indiana Department of Natural Resources’ (DNR) use of a dam on Appellants’ property was proper, holding that the trial court properly enforced the order but that Appellants could, in the course of complying with the trial court’s order, modify their dam to remove it from the DNR’s jurisdiction under the Dam Safety Act, Ind. Code 14-27-7.5.Appellants had a large pond and related dam on their property. Since the early 2000s, the DNR attempted to exercise jurisdiction over the dam on the grounds that the dam was located in, on, or along a stream. Appellants contested DNR’s findings, largely without success, in administrative tribunals and the courts below. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the DNR’s definition of the word “stream” was reasonable, and Appellants had adequate notice of what constitutes a stream for purposes of the Dam Safety Act; (2) the DNR presented substantial evidence supporting its classification of Appellants’ dam as a high-hazard dam; and (3) Appellants could modify their dam to remove it from DNR’s future jurisdiction. View "Moriarity v. Indiana Department of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

Finding this to be a rare and exceptional criminal case, the Supreme Court reduced Defendant’s sentence pursuant to Appellate Rule 7(B), holding that the sentence imposed was inappropriate in light of Defendant’s offenses and character.Defendant pled guilty to multiple drug charges and admitted to being a habitual substance offender. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an aggregate sentence of thirty years to be served in the Indiana Department of Correction. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Defendant’s petition to transfer and reduced Defendant’s sentence to the mandatory minimum of twenty-three years with the time remaining to be served in community corrections, holding that this was an exceptional case and that Defendant’s sentence was inappropriate given Defendant’s character and offenses committed. View "Livingston v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Tax Court determining that Richardson’s RV owed no Indiana sales tax because it took RVs it sold to certain out-of-state customers into Michigan before handing over the keys, holding that Richardson’s structured the Michigan deliveries solely to avoid taxes with no other legitimate business purpose.After an audit, the Department of Revenue issues proposed assessments to Richardson’s totaling nearly $250,000 in unpaid taxes and interest for the Michigan deliveries and deliveries to other states. The Tax Court granted summary judgment for Richardson’s, concluding that Indiana’s exemption statute did not apply to any of these transactions because, as a matter of law, the sales transactions at issue were not made ‘in Indiana.’” The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding (1) the Michigan deliveries were subject to sales tax because Richardson’s executed the Michigan deliveries solely to avoid paying Indiana sales tax with no other legitimate business purpose; and (2) the Tax Court must determine if the non-Michigan deliveries were taxable. View "Richardson's RV, Inc. v. Indiana Department of State Revenue" on Justia Law