Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in this action seeking to confiscate money under Indiana's civil forfeiture statute, holding that the right to a jury trial applies in such an action.The State filed a complaint to forfeit $2,435 in cash that police officers recovered after stopping Alucious Kizer for a traffic violation, alleging that the money had been "furnished or intended to be furnished" in exchange for a crime, that it had been "used to facilitate" a crime, or that it was "traceable as proceeds" of a crime. Kizer requested a jury trial. The State moved to strike the demand, arguing that no such right existed under either the Indiana or United States Constitution. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Kizer was not entitled to trial by jury. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and affirmed the trial court, holding (1) Ind. Const. Art. I, 20 protects the right to a jury trial for in rem civil forfeitures; and (2) therefore, Kizer had a constitutional right to trial by jury. View "State v. $2,435 in U.S. Currency" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting the IU Credit Union's (IUCU) motion to compel individual arbitration and finding an enforceable agreement to arbitrate between the parties, holding that Tonia Land's silence and inaction did not amount to acceptance of the agreement.When Land, who maintained at least two checking accounts with IUCU, registered for online banking for one of her accounts she received by email a an agreement (the disclosure) permitting ICU to modify the terms and conditions to its services and send any notice to Land via email. Under the disclosure, Land was deemed to have received any such notice three days after it was sent. IUCU later sent Land an addendum, which Land claimed never to have received. Land later filed a class action complaint alleging breach of contract and other claims based on the agreement's amendment. IUCU moved to compel individual arbitration, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) IUCU provided Land with reasonable written notice of its offer to amend the agreement; (2) Land's silence and inaction did not amount to an acceptance of IUCU's offer; and (3) therefore, there was no enforceable agreement to arbitrate. View "Land v. IU Credit Union" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated Defendant's sentence of consecutive prison terms totaling forty-nine years in connection with his conviction of two counts of child molesting, holding that Defendant did not waive his right to be physically present at sentencing.Following his conviction, Defendant became sick and could not be transported to the courthouse for sentencing. Defendant's original sentencing hearing was continued to a new date, but before the new sentencing date, Defendant was hospitalized for a leg amputation. On the day of the sentencing hearing, the trial court, court reporter, prosecutor, and defense counsel traveled to the hospital and concluded that Defendant waived his right to be present at the hearing. The trial court proceeded to sentence Defendant. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing, holding that, under these circumstances, this Court could not condone a sentencing hearing at a hospital. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed Defendant's appeal of the sentence imposed in connection with his plea of guilty to four theft-related charges, holding that Defendant's written plea agreement with the State, which both he and his attorney signed, unambiguously waived his right to appeal his sentence.In exchange for a more lenient sentence, Defendant agreed to plead guilty to four theft-related charges and waive his right to appeal his conviction and sentence. The trial court accepted Defendant's plea and sentenced him to four years for burglary and thirty months for theft, ordering the sentences to run concurrently. Defendant appealed, but the court of appeals dismissed the appeals with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that this Court could not nullify Defendant's appeal waiver through direct appeal based on the claim that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary, but Defendant could still seek relief through post-conviction proceedings. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying the Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6) motion filed by James and Phyllis Crowe seeking relief from the judgment of the trial court granting Savvy IN, LLC's petition to issue tax deeds for certain properties, holding that Savvy IN's certified and first-class mailed notice letters notifying the Crowes that Savvy IN purchased their properties at a tax sale satisfied the minimum requirements under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause and Indiana law.In 2019, the Crowes received notice that their properties were sold in a tax sale due to their failure to pay 2018 property taxes. Savvy IN purchased the properties at a tax sale. When the Crowes passed the deadline to redeem the properties Savvy IN petitioned the trial court to direct the county auditor to issue tax deeds for the properties. The trial court granted the motion. The Crowes moved for relief from the judgment under Rule 60(B)(6) on the grounds that they did not receive notice letters, thus rendering the judgment and tax deeds void. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Savvy IN was entitled to the tax deeds issued by the trial court because the mailed notices satisfied the constitutional and statutory requirements. View "Crowe v. Savvy IN, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court denying T.D.'s motion for relief from judgment under Trial Rules 60(B)(6) and 60(B)(8) asserting that his juvenile adjudication should be set aside because his delinquency admission was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, holding that there was no error.T.D. agreed to admit to an auto-theft charge. Without informing T.D. of his constitutional rights or confirming that he waived those rights the court accepted T.D.'s admission and granted the delinquency petition. T.D. later filed a motion for relief from judgment, arguing that he was not "informed of a single right on the record." The trial court denied the motion, concluding that his admission was voluntary and knowingly given with adequate assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that T.D. made a prima facie showing that the trial court failed to comply with the Juvenile Waiver Statute before accepting his admission, and therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by denying T.D.'s motion for relief from judgment. View "T.D. v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on her claims against Defendant, a hospital who mailed a letter containing Plaintiff's private health matter to a third party who posted the letter to social media, holding that genuine issues of material fact remained.Plaintiff filed suit against a hospital alleging that it invaded her privacy by publicly disclosing her private information and negligently failed to maintain the confidentiality of her information. The trial court granted summary judgment for the hospital. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's privacy claim because the hospital did not negate the public-disclosure tort's publicity element; (2) Defendant was entitled to partial summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claim; and (3) genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether Plaintiff's pecuniary damages were recoverable and whether Defendant was the proximate cause of those damages. View "Z.D. v. Community Health Network, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court agreed with Plaintiffs in this declaratory judgment action, holding that Ind. Code 3-9-2-3 to -6 prohibits or otherwise limits corporate contributions to political action committees (PACs) or other entities that engage in independent campaign-related expenditures.Plaintiffs filed suit against several state officials responsible for enforcing Indiana's election laws, arguing that Ind. Code 3-9-2-4 and 3-9-2-5 were unconstitutional as applied. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of standing, concluding that Plaintiffs had not suffered an injury. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether sections 3-9-2-3 to -6 prohibit corporate contributions to Super PACs like the fund at issue. The Court of Appeals answered by holding that sections 3-9-2-3 to -6 prohibit corporate contributions to PACs earmarked for independent campaign-related expenditures. View "Indiana Right to Life Victory Fund v. Morales" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Reagan Outdoor Advertising in this appeal from the determination that Reagan's billboard had lost its legal nonconforming status, holding that the trial court correctly entered judgment for Reagan.An ordinance of the city of Noblesville bans pole signs, which are signs affixed to poles or other uprights installed in the ground. Reagan, whose billboards the city classifies as pole signs, was allowed signs to remain that pre-dated the ordinance if they were kept in good repair and not relocated. When Reagan repaired damage to one of the billboard's support posts the city issued a stop-work order before Reagan could reattach the sign's display, concluding that Reagan had relocated the sign, which therefore lost its legal nonconforming status. The zoning board of appeals affirmed, but the trial court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the ordinance's use of the word "relocate" was ambiguous and, consistent with this Court's interpretative canons, must be resolved in Reagan's favor. View "Noblesville Indiana Board of Zoning Appeals v. FMG Indianapolis, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court found that the Honorable Jason A. Cichowicz, Judge of the St. Joseph Probate Court, engaged in judicial misconduct and concluded that Judge Cichowicz shall be suspended from the office of Judge of the St. Joseph Probate Court without pay for forty-five days.The Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications filed a "Notice of the Institution of Formal Proceedings and Statement of Charges" against Judge Cichowicz arguing that the judge engaged in judicial misconduct by, among other things, continuing to serve in a fiduciary position for a non-family member after taking office and abusing his office to benefit a family member. Judge Cichowicz agreed that his conduct violated the Code of Judicial Conduct and that an appropriate sanction was a forty-five-day suspension without pay plus an assessment of costs. The Supreme Court approved the suspension, holding that the sanction was within the range imposed for similar misconduct. View "In re Honorable Cichowicz" on Justia Law