Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In these three judicial misconduct proceedings, the Supreme Court held that three judges engaged in judicial misconduct by appearing in public in an intoxicated state and behaving in an injudicious manner and by becoming involved in a verbal altercation.The Supreme Court issued a single opinion for all three cases because the misconduct charges stemmed from the same incident. The Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications filed charges against Respondents after an evening of drinking led to a physical altercation and two judges being shot. One judge was criminally charged and convicted after the altercation. Respondents agreed that their respective conduct violated several provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Supreme Court found that Respondents engaged in judicial misconduct and ordered that each judge be suspended from the office of judge without pay for thirty days. View "In re Honorable Andrew Adams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court committing fifteen-year-old A.M. to the Department of Correction (DOC), holding that A.M. failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the circumstances of this case.After a true finding of disorderly conduct, A.M. was placed on supervised probation. But due to A.M.'s conduct, the probation department recommended his placement with the DOC. After a disposition modification hearing, the juvenile court committed A.M. to the DOC for an indeterminate period. On appeal, A.M. argued that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance during the modification hearing. At issue in this case was whether the standard for deciding the claim was founded in the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel for a criminal proceeding or in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. The Supreme Court held (1) a due process standard governs a child's claim that he received ineffective assistance in a disposition-modification hearing during his delinquency proceedings; and (2) A.M. received effective assistance of counsel during his modification hearing. View "A.M. v. State" on Justia Law

In this litigation arising from a transaction in goods governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court order denying summary judgment, holding that there remained genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.An agreement governing the sale of forty dump trucks contained a warranty and a one-year limitations period for filing a breach of contract suit. Buyers sued for breach of warranty several years later. The Supreme Court held (1) under the express terms of their agreement, the parties contracted for a future-performance warranty, and any breach of warranty claims did not accrue until the buyers knew, or should have known, of the breach; (2) under the equitable estoppel doctrine, a party's conduct may toll a contractually agreed-upon limitations period; and (3) in the instant case, genuine issues of material fact remained relating to the above two issues, precluding summary judgment. View "Kenworth of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Seventy-Seven Limited" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court terminating Mother's and Father's parental rights to seven children, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the court's termination decision.After the trial court found the seven children to be children in need of services, Parents were ordered to complete services, and Father was ordered to complete sex-offender treatment. Father, however, never completed sex-offender treatment because Father refused to admit wrongdoing. The trial court subsequently terminated Parents' parental rights. On appeal, Mother and Father argued that the trial court violated Father's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no constitutional violation because the court never ordered Father to admit to a crime and that the evidence supported the trial court's factual findings, which in turn supported its legal conclusions. View "M.H. v. Indiana Department of Child Services" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the State's civil complaint for forfeiture of Defendant's Land Rover the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court deciding that forfeiture of the vehicle would be grossly disproportional to the gravity of Defendant's dealing offense and established an analytical framework for courts to determine whether a punitive in rem forfeiture is an excessive fine.Specifically, the Court held (1) a use-based in rem fine is excessive if (a) the property was not an instrumentality of the underlying crimes, or (b) the property was an instrumentality but the harshness of the punishment would be grossly disproportional to the gravity of the underlying offenses and the owner's culpability for the property's misuse; (2) Defendant's Land Rover was an instrumentality of the underlying offense of drug dealing; and (3) the case requires a remand for the trial court to answer the question of gross disproportionality based on the framework set forth in this opinion. View "State v. Timbs" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the post-conviction court's denial of Appellant's petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that that Appellant's arguments were unpersuasive and largely unsupported by the record.Appellant was convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to death. Appellant petitioned for post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial counsel was not ineffective; (2) Appellant's guilty plea with open sentencing was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; (3) trial counsel operated under no conflict of interest, and Appellant's conflict of interest claim falls under the Strickland analysis for prejudice, not the presumption of prejudice standard under Cuyler v. Sullivan., 446 U.S. 335 (1980). View "Gibson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for murder and felony murder and entering a revised order sentencing Defendant to life imprisonment without parole (LWOP) for his murder conviction, holding that the revised order did not rely on non-statutory aggravating circumstances to impose LWOP.On appeal, Defendant argued that the LWOP sentence must be vacated because the trial court impermissibly relied on non-statutory aggravating circumstances. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Defendant offered no evidence to suggest that the revised order relied on non-statutory aggravating circumstances to impose LWOP. View "Schuler v. State" on Justia Law

In this appeal concerning whether International Business Machines, Corp. (IBM) was entitled to post-judgment interest on its $49.5 million damages award running from the date of the original judgment or running from the judgment on remand the Supreme Court held that the post-judgment interest due to IBM runs from the judgment on remand.The State, acting on behalf of the Family and Social Services Administration, and IBM entered into a contract to improve Indiana's welfare eligibility system. The Supreme Court earlier determined that IBM materially breached the contract and remanded the matter to the trial court to determine damages and appropriate offsets. On remand, the trial court determined damages and that IBM was entitled to offsets in the amount of $49.5 million. The court of appeals determined that IBM was entitled to post-judgment interest on the $49.5 million damages award. In determining at what pointing time post-judgment interest runs the Supreme Court held that post-judgment interest due to IBM stems from the judgment on remand rather than the original judgment. View "International Business Machines Corp. v. State ex rel. Indiana Family & Social Services Administration" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of stalking, holding that a charge of stalking may be supported by conduct that is continuous in nature, even if it is a single episode.The statutory definition of stalking requires repeated or continuing harassment. Defendant's actions that led to his conviction involved following a college student's vehicle for more than two hours as she attempted to evade him. Even though Defendant's actions took place over the course of less than three hours the court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, concluding that Defendant's actions amounted to repeated or continuing harassment or impermissible contact. The Supreme Court affirmed after clarifying that a charge of stalking may be supported by conduct that is purely continuous in nature, holding that Defendant's conduct met the statutory definition of "continuing" harassment, thereby supporting his conviction for stalking. View "Falls v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court making two teenagers wards of the Indiana Department of Correction, holding that the teenagers failed to show that their remote participation in their hearings resulted in fundamental error but closed this opinion with guidance so that this procedural story would not be repeated.The teenagers in this case each appeared by Skype at a hearing to decide whether their juvenile dispositional decrees should be modified to make them wards of the Department of Correction. The teenagers did not object to participating remotely, but nothing in the record indicated that they agreed to do so or that the trial court found good cause for the remote participation. Both teenagers were made wards of the Department of Correction after the hearings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Indiana Administrative Rule 14(B) governs the use of telephones and audiovisual telecommunication tools in juvenile disposition-modification hearings; but (2) because the teenagers failed to object to the court's noncompliance with Rule 14(B) and failed to demonstrate fundamental error, the teenagers waived the issue. View "C.S. v. State" on Justia Law