Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the post-conviction court's denial of Appellant's petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that that Appellant's arguments were unpersuasive and largely unsupported by the record.Appellant was convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to death. Appellant petitioned for post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial counsel was not ineffective; (2) Appellant's guilty plea with open sentencing was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; (3) trial counsel operated under no conflict of interest, and Appellant's conflict of interest claim falls under the Strickland analysis for prejudice, not the presumption of prejudice standard under Cuyler v. Sullivan., 446 U.S. 335 (1980). View "Gibson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction for murder and felony murder and entering a revised order sentencing Defendant to life imprisonment without parole (LWOP) for his murder conviction, holding that the revised order did not rely on non-statutory aggravating circumstances to impose LWOP.On appeal, Defendant argued that the LWOP sentence must be vacated because the trial court impermissibly relied on non-statutory aggravating circumstances. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Defendant offered no evidence to suggest that the revised order relied on non-statutory aggravating circumstances to impose LWOP. View "Schuler v. State" on Justia Law

In this appeal concerning whether International Business Machines, Corp. (IBM) was entitled to post-judgment interest on its $49.5 million damages award running from the date of the original judgment or running from the judgment on remand the Supreme Court held that the post-judgment interest due to IBM runs from the judgment on remand.The State, acting on behalf of the Family and Social Services Administration, and IBM entered into a contract to improve Indiana's welfare eligibility system. The Supreme Court earlier determined that IBM materially breached the contract and remanded the matter to the trial court to determine damages and appropriate offsets. On remand, the trial court determined damages and that IBM was entitled to offsets in the amount of $49.5 million. The court of appeals determined that IBM was entitled to post-judgment interest on the $49.5 million damages award. In determining at what pointing time post-judgment interest runs the Supreme Court held that post-judgment interest due to IBM stems from the judgment on remand rather than the original judgment. View "International Business Machines Corp. v. State ex rel. Indiana Family & Social Services Administration" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of stalking, holding that a charge of stalking may be supported by conduct that is continuous in nature, even if it is a single episode.The statutory definition of stalking requires repeated or continuing harassment. Defendant's actions that led to his conviction involved following a college student's vehicle for more than two hours as she attempted to evade him. Even though Defendant's actions took place over the course of less than three hours the court of appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence, concluding that Defendant's actions amounted to repeated or continuing harassment or impermissible contact. The Supreme Court affirmed after clarifying that a charge of stalking may be supported by conduct that is purely continuous in nature, holding that Defendant's conduct met the statutory definition of "continuing" harassment, thereby supporting his conviction for stalking. View "Falls v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court making two teenagers wards of the Indiana Department of Correction, holding that the teenagers failed to show that their remote participation in their hearings resulted in fundamental error but closed this opinion with guidance so that this procedural story would not be repeated.The teenagers in this case each appeared by Skype at a hearing to decide whether their juvenile dispositional decrees should be modified to make them wards of the Department of Correction. The teenagers did not object to participating remotely, but nothing in the record indicated that they agreed to do so or that the trial court found good cause for the remote participation. Both teenagers were made wards of the Department of Correction after the hearings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Indiana Administrative Rule 14(B) governs the use of telephones and audiovisual telecommunication tools in juvenile disposition-modification hearings; but (2) because the teenagers failed to object to the court's noncompliance with Rule 14(B) and failed to demonstrate fundamental error, the teenagers waived the issue. View "C.S. v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of two counts of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to conduct a hearing regarding the possible bias of a juror who, after being selected to serve on the jury but before being sworn, submitted a note informing the trial court that one of her family members had been killed by a drunk driver.Defense counsel requested an opportunity to explore the juror's potential bias, but the trial court did not allow further questioning. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's convictions and remanded the proceedings for a new trial, holding that the information conveyed by the juror to the trial court before the jury was sworn should have resulted in a hearing to determine whether Defendant could properly have challenged the juror's service for cause. View "Easler v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court in this landlord-tenant dispute, holding that the parties' rent-to-buy agreement was not a land-sale contract but a rental agreement subject to Indiana's residential landlord-tenant statutes.Plaintiffs and Defendants entered into a purported rent-to-buy contract regarding a house. When Defendants fell behind in their payments, Plaintiffs tried to evict them. The case resulted in a small claims court order allowing Plaintiffs to retake possession. On appeal, Plaintiffs sought damages and attorney's fees, plus costs to clean and re-rent the property. Defendants asserted various counterclaims, including failure to meet landlord obligations under the residential landlord-tenant statutes. The trial court entered judgment for Defendants, concluding, inter alia, that the agreement was unlawful and unenforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the parties' agreement was subject to the protections afforded by the residential landlord-tenant statutes; and (2) Defendants' claim that Plaintiffs violated Indiana's Deceptive Consumer Sales Act was without merit. View "Rainbow Realty Group, Inc. v. Carter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals reversing in part Defendant's convictions, holding that that the court of appeals' effort to correct a double jeopardy violation misconstrued Paquette v. State, 101 N.E.3d 234 (Ind. 2018) (Paquette I).The trial court convicted Defendant of three counts of resisting law enforcement by fleeing in a vehicle causing death, a Level 3 felony, operating a vehicle with methamphetamine in his blood causing serious bodily injury, a Level 4 felony, and two Level 6 felonies. In Defendant's first appeal, the Supreme Court held, among other things, that the resisting law enforcement statute does not contemplate multiple convictions when multiple victims were killed as a result of a single incident of resisting. After the case was remanded, the court of appeals reversed in part. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals misconstrued Paquette I by vacating the Level 3 felony conviction instead of one of the three Level 4 felony convictions. The Court then remanded for the trial court to impose judgment for one count of Level 3 felony resisting law enforcement causing death, two counts of Level 4 felony operating causing death, and one count of Level 6 felony operating causing serious bodily injury and to sentence accordingly. View "Paquette v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals revising Defendant's sentence for three counts of Class A felony child molesting and revised the sentences to the original terms set by the trial court, holding that the sentence imposed by the court of appeals was wholly inadequate under the circumstances.The trial court sentenced Defendant to consecutive terms of thirty years on each count of his conviction for child molesting for an executed sentence of ninety years, with twenty years suspended. The court of appeals revised Defendant's sentence to concurrent thirty-year terms, with no time suspended, on all three counts. The Supreme Court granted vacated the court of appeals' decision and revised Defendant's sentences to the original consecutive thirty-year temps, with thirty years suspended, for an executed sentence of sixty years, holding that a thirty-year aggregate sentence was inadequate under the circumstances. View "Faith v. State" on Justia Law

In this post-conviction proceeding, the Supreme Court held that a post-conviction petition that addresses only the proceedings on remand from a federal court's grant of a new trial is not a "second" or "successive" petition under Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(12) and that such a petition may proceed without the prior authorization of the Supreme Court or the court of appeals.Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in his criminal proceedings. The post-conviction court and court of appeals denied the petition. Defendant then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the federal district court denied. The federal court of appeals vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to issue a writ of habeas corpus unless the State granted Defendant a new appeal. Defendant subsequently filed a second direct appeal, which the court of appeals denied. Defendant filed another petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his appellate attorney failed properly to argue the issues in his new direct appeal. The trial court dismissed the petition as an unauthorized successive petition under Rule 1(12). The Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings, holding that because the petition addressed only the grounds arising from the second appeal, it may proceed without prior appellate authorization. View "Shaw v. State" on Justia Law