Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court exercised its constitutional authority to revise Defendant's sentence, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when sentencing Defendant but that, in Defendant's circumstances, her sentence was inappropriate.Defendant pleaded guilty to several drug-related offenses. The Supreme Court sentenced Defendant to an aggregate sentence of twenty-four-and-one-half years. The Supreme Court exercised its authority under Ind. Const. art. VII, 4 to review and revise Defendant's sentence, holding that, due to Defendant's youth, her difficult childhood, and her non-violent criminal history, her aggregate sentence was inappropriate. The Court remanded the case to the trial court to issue a revised sentencing order reflecting an aggregate sentence of eighteen years. View "Mullins v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's sentence for voluntary manslaughter, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the sentence and that the sentence was not inappropriate given the nature of the offense and Defendant's character.Defendant was charged with murder. The State later added an enhancement for knowingly or intentionally using a firearm in commission of the offense. The defense petitioned the trial court to include a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court granted the petition, and the jury found Defendant guilty of voluntary manslaughter but not murder. During a bench trial on the firearm enhancement's applicability to Defendant's manslaughter conviction, the judge made multiple comments indicating he believed Defendant should have been convicted of murder. The trial court sentenced Defendant to forty-five years in prison. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge impermissibly increased his sentence based on the judge's beliefs about the case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the judge's comments disagreeing with the jury's verdict were insufficient to taint the sentencing decision; and (2) the sentence was not inappropriate in light of Defendant's character and the nature of the crime. View "McCain v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court suppressing blood test results obtained the morning of a vehicle collision, holding that the blood-draw search warrant application satisfied the filing requirement under Ind. Code 35-33-5-2(a).Defendant caused a head-on collision when he drove the wrong way on a freeway. Defendant filed a motion to suppress blood test results obtained the morning of the accident, arguing that Ind. Code 35-33-5-2 and his constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure were violated when the arresting state trooper failed properly to file a probable cause affidavit to obtain a blood-test search warrant. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that a copy of the probable cause affidavit was not properly "filed" until a few hours after it had been presented to the warrant-authorizing judge and swiftly executed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the blood-draw search warrant application satisfied the filing requirement under section 35-33-5-2(a) because (1) the warrant-authorizing judge certified that the affidavit had been properly filed with her when the search warrant was issued; and (2) even if the affidavit was filed a few hours late it was still valid under Indiana's substantial compliance filing doctrine. View "State v. Ryder" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for attempted murder and carrying a handgun without a license, holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on self-defense, and the instructional error was not harmless.During trial, Defendant asserted that he shot Derek Gilbert, who was intoxicated and aggressive, to protect his and his son's lives. The court instructed the jury that Defendant could not assert self-defense if he committed a crime that was "directly and immediately related" to his confrontation with Gilbert. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding (1) the jury instruction diluted the standard set forth in Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390 (Ind. 2001), that "there must be an immediate causal connection between the crime and the confrontation"; and (2) this instructional error was not harmless. View "Gammons v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court denying Appellant's petition to expunge a minor felony conviction that had been converted to a misdemeanor, holding that the amended statute, which took effect while Appellant's appeal was pending, should apply retroactively to Appellant.At the time Appellant filed his petition the relevant statute required him to wait five years before seeking expungement but wasn't clear on when the waiting period began. Believing the five year period hadn't elapsed, the trial court denied the petition. While Appellant's appeal was pending, the legislature amended the statute to clarify when the five-year waiting period would begin. Both parties acknowledged that, under the amended statute, Appellant would be entitled to expungement. The Supreme Court held that, under the circumstances, the amended statute should apply retroactively to Appellant. View "Gulzar v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court overruling Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search of his vehicle, holding that law enforcement officers do not violate either the state or federal constitution by searching a person's vehicle when the person drives that vehicle up to his house while officers are executing a search warrant for the house that does not address vehicles.In his motion to suppress, Defendant argued that the law enforcement in his case exceeded the scope of the search warrant by searching his vehicle, which was not mentioned in the warrant. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the general premises warrant permitting law enforcement's search of Defendant's home also supported law enforcement's search of Defendant's vehicle, and therefore, the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment; and (2) the search of Defendant's vehicle did not violate Ind. Const. art. I, 11 because it was reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances. View "Hardin v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court holding Defendant in contempt when Defendant refused to unlock her iPhone for a detective, holding that forcing Defendant to unlock her iPhone would violate her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.The State charged Defendant of several offenses. When Defendant was placed under arrest, law enforcement took her iPhone. Believing it contained incriminating evidence, a detective got a warrant ordering Defendant to unlock her iPhone. When Defendant refused, the trial court held her in contempt. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) allowing the State to force Defendant to unlock her iPhone for law enforcement would provide law enforcement with information it did not already know, which the State could use in its prosecution against her; and (2) this result is prohibited by the Fifth Amendment's protection from compelled self-incrimination. View "Seo v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court remanded this case to the court of appeals to consider the viability of each of Plaintiffs' claims presented in the pleadings, holding that the court of appeals improperly failed to address the viability of each claim.Plaintiffs, thirty-six women, filed a product liability suit against Bayer Corporation and some related entities (collectively, Bayer), alleging that Bayer violated Indiana's Product Liability act and other state and federal laws in relation to a medical device that Bayer manufactured. Bayer moved for judgment on the pleadings under Indiana Rule of Trial Procedure 12(C). The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals, however, addressed only the legal viability of one claim rather than all of Plaintiffs' claims. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to consider the viability of each of Plaintiffs' claims, holding that the court was required to address the viability of each claim presented under Rule 12(C). View "Bayer Corp. v. Leach" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court awarding attorney's fees to Defendants in this dispute over the proposed construction of seven billboards, holding that the trial court's decision to award attorney's fees was an abuse of discretion.River Ridge Development Authority (RRDA) sued Defendants seeking a declaration that seven billboards that were set to be constructed near the planned entrance of RRDA's $25 million expansion to The River Ridge Commerce Center violated the Town of Utica's zoning ordinance. During the litigation, the relevant portion of the road along which the billboards were to be constructed was approved to become a scenic byway. Thereafter, RRDA voluntarily dismissed its complaint with prejudice. Defendants filed motions to recover attorney's fees, claiming that RRDA's behavior during litigation justified such an award. The trial court granted the motions in full. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) on the record, Defendants failed to show that any exception to the American Rule requiring each party to pay its own attorney's fees applied; and (2) therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees. View "River Ridge Development Authority v. Outfront Media, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court denying Defendant's request to file a belated notice of appeal of his twelve-year sentence, holding that the general waiver of Defendant's "right to appeal" was insufficiently explicit to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of Defendant's right to appeal his sentence.Defendant pleaded guilty to Level 4 felony dealing in methamphetamine and was sentenced to the maximum term of twelve years incarceration. Defendant did not timely file a notice of appeal. Defendant later sought permission to file a belated notice of appeal, arguing that he was only recently made aware of his right to appeal his sentence. The trial court denied Defendant's request. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the general waiver of Defendant's "right to appeal," particularly when contained in the same sentence as an unenforceable waiver of post-conviction relief, was insufficient to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of Defendant's right to appeal his sentence. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law