Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the trial court concluding that Plaintiff, who purchased a gravesite and later discovered that the cemetery resold the gravesite and allowed someone else to be buried there, was not entitled to the relief provided by Indiana's wrongful burial statutes, holding that Plaintiff was entitled to correction of the wrongful burial.Three decades after purchasing five contiguous gravesites, Plaintiff learned that a stranger was buried in one of those gravesites. The cemetery refused Plaintiff's demand to move the stranger's remains. Plaintiff brought this lawsuit seeking an order for the cemetery to remove the stranger's remains from the graveside and restore it to her. The trial court concluded that Plaintiff failed to show the cemetery committed wrongful burial. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of damages and attorney's fees but otherwise reversed, holding that the trial court erred in concluding that Plaintiff failed to prove a wrongful burial and that the relief Plaintiff should receive is that the cemetery owner correct the wrongful burial by removing the stranger's remains from the gravesite and restoring it for Plaintiff's use. View "Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist Church Cemetery" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court denying Cavanaugh's Sports Bar & Eatery's motion for summary judgment as to Eric Porterfield's complaint alleging negligence after a sudden fight in the bar's parking lot at closing time left him seriously injured, holding that, under the facts of this case, Cavanaugh's owed no duty to protect Porterfield from the parking lot brawl.In his complaint, Porterfield alleged that Cavanaugh's breached its duty to protect him when Cavanaugh's had experienced criminal activity for years prior to the attack on Porterfield. Cavanaugh's filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it owed no duty to Porterfield because the incident was unforeseeable. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cavanaugh's had no duty to protect Porterfield because no evidence showed that Cavanaugh's knew the fight was impending. View "Cavanaugh's Sports Bar & Eatery, Ltd. v. Porterfield" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court awarding summary judgment in favor of Indiana State Trooper Martin Benner and dismissing Plaintiff's claim against Benner in his personal capacity after the two were involved in an accident, holding that, although there was some evidence that Trooper Benner was not in strict compliance with State Police policy at the time of the accident, this was not enough to place him "clearly outside" the scope of his employment.At the time of the accident, Trooper Benner was off duty but was operating his state issued police commission, as allowed under the State Police policy. The trial court awarded summary judgment for Benner, concluding that although Benner was off duty he was otherwise in substantial compliance with State Police policy in operating his commission and was therefore not clearly outside the scope of his employment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Benner was acting clearly outside the scope of his employment. View "Burton v. Benner" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered in the negative a question certified from the federal district court and held that Ind. Code 34-20-3-1(b) is a statute of repose that cannot be extended by a manufacturer's post-delivery repair, refurbishment, or reconstruction of a disputed product.Plaintiff was injured while working on a machine owned by his employer, who purchased the machine from Defendant eleven years before Plaintiff's injury. Plaintiff filed a product-liability suit against Defendant in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana based on the court's diversity jurisdiction. Both parties agreed that strict application of the Indiana Products Liability Act's ten-year statute of repose would bar Plaintiff's suit but acknowledged a judicially-created exception to the statute of repose according to which rebuilding or reconditioning a product might create a "new product" restarting the statutory clock. The Supreme Court accepted the federal district court's certified question and answered it in the negative, holding that the Act's statute of repose contains no exception for a product's repair, refurbishment, or reconstruction. View "Estabrook v. Mazak Corp" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his home and his father's barn, holding that the search warrants obtained in this case were invalid because the accompanying affidavits did not provide a substantial basis to support the magistrate's probable cause finding.Law enforcement obtained a warrant to plant a GPS tracking device on Defendant's vehicle. When the device stopped providing location readings, the officers discovered that the tracker was no longer attached to Defendant's car. Thereafter, an officer obtained warrants to search Defendant's home and his father's barn for evidence of "theft" of the GPS device. A magistrate issued both search warrants. During the search, officers found drugs, drug paraphernalia, and a handgun. Defendant moved to suppress the seized evidence, arguing that the initial search warrants were issued without probable cause that evidence of theft of the GPS device would be found in his home or his father's barn. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search warrants were invalid because the affidavits did not establish probable cause that the GPS device was stolen and that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. View "Heuring v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court denying Mother's motion to dismiss the petition filed by the Department of Child Services (DCS) alleging M.S. was a child in need of services (CHINS), holding that the 120-day deadline contemplated by Ind. Code 31-34-11-1(b) may be enlarged only if a party shows good cause for a continuance, and Mother showed good cause for a continuance in this case.Under section 31-34-11-1(d) a trial court must dismiss a CHINS petition if the court does not conclude a fact-finding hearing within 120 days of the State's filing of the petition. At issue int his case was whether the 120-day deadline may be enlarged under Ind. Trial Rule 53.5 if a party to the proceeding moves for a good faith continuance that results in the conclusion of fact-finding beyond the codified 120-day limit. In the instant case, Mother moved for a good faith continuance of the CHINS proceeding. The final order adjudicating M.S. a CHINS was not issued until after the 120-day deadline expired. Mother filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the 120-day time period may be extended for good cause, and because Mother showed good cause for a continuance, the trial court correctly denied Mother's motion to dismiss. View "In re M.S." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the trial court dismissing a lender's complaint seeking to recover on an accelerated promissory note, holding that, under either of two statutes of limitations, the lender can assert its claim.As explained today in Blair v. EMC Mortgage, LLC, __ N.E.3d __ (Ind. Feb. 17, 2020), two statutes of limitations apply equally to a cause of action upon a promissory note. Further explained in Blair is that the Supreme Court will not impose an additional rule of reasonableness on a mortgage lender's ability to bring an action upon a closed installment contract. In the instant case, Borrower executed a promissory note and mortgage to be paid in monthly installments over twenty-five years. After Borrower stopped making payments on the note Lender accelerated the debt, demanding payment in full. Borrower did not pay, and Lender sued. Borrower moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claim was barred by Ind. Code 34-11-2-9. The court of appeals affirmed and held that Borrower waived its argument that Ind. Code 26-1-3.1-118(a) should also apply. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Borrower did not waive its argument under section 26-1-3.1-118(a); and (2) Borrower can equally recover amounts owed under either statute of limitations. View "Collins Asset Group, LLC v. Alkhemer Alialy" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court foreclosing a mortgage but finding that Lender was entitled to recover only payments and interest that accrued after a certain date due to Indiana's six-year statute of limitations to bring an action on the note underlying a mortgage, holding that there is no need to judicially create additional time constraints on a lender's ability to bring an action upon a closed installment contract.Lawsuits to enforce obligations under closed installment contracts are subject to multiple statutes of limitations. Borrowers in this case asked the Supreme Court to impose an additional rule of reasonableness. The trial court granted partial relief. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) imposing additional, judicially-created time constraints upon a lender's ability to bring a claim on a closed installment contract is not necessary; (2) two statutes of limitations apply to a cause of action upon a promissory note; and (3) Lender sued within the applicable statutes of limitations. View "Blair v. EMC Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court entering a second two-year protective order against Respondent, holding that there was insufficient evidence showing that Respondent presented a present, credible threat to Petitioner's safety in order to support the protective order.In 2016, Petitioner filed a petition seeking a protective order against Respondent. The trial court entered a two-year protective order against Respondent. In 2018, just days before the 2016 protective order was set to expire, Petitioner petitioned for another protective order against Respondent. After a hearing, the trial court issued another two-year protective order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence that Respondent posed a present, credible threat to Petitioner to justify the 2018 protective order. View "S.H. v. D.W." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's finding that Father's consent to the adoption of his child was irrevocably implied in this contested adoption proceeding, holding that a parent's implied consent to the adoption of a child may not be based solely on the parent's failure to appear at a single hearing.Grandparents filed a petition to adopt Child, claiming that Father's consent to the adoption was unnecessary. Father contested the adoption. But when Father failed to appear the morning of the final hearing in the adoption case, the trial court entered a decree of adoption, finding that Father's consent was not necessary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where Father appeared at the initial final hearing before it was rescheduled, responded to pleadings, and maintained communication with his attorney throughout the proceedings, the trial court erred in finding that Father's consent was irrevocably implied because of his failure to attend the final hearing. View "In re Adoption of C.A.H. v. R.S.E." on Justia Law