Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court for CompressAir and thus rejected CompressAir's claim that a certain transfer was fraudulent and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for New Nello Operating Company, holding that continuity of ownership between two companies is necessary for an exception to the general rule that, in a typical asset purchase, the buyer acquires the seller's assets but not its liabilities.This case turned on two exceptions to the rule that with an asset purchase the buyer typically does not take on the seller's liabilities - the first of which arises when the acquisition of assets amounts to a de facto merger and the second of which arises when the buyer is a mere continuation for all of the seller's liabilities. At issue was whether New Nello Operating Company was liable for Nello Corporation's debt to CompressAir. The trial court concluded that the strict foreclosure between Old Nello and New Nello was fraudulent, amounted to a de facto merger, and that New Nello was a mere continuation of Old Nello. The court then entered judgment against New Nello. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that continuity of ownership is necessary for the de-facto-merger and mere-continuation exceptions to apply. View "New Nello Operating Co., Inc. v. CompressAir" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered in the negative a certified question as to whether a store manager can be held liable for negligence when he is not directly involved in the accident at issue.In the underlying personal injury case Plaintiff sued Wal-Mart and Wal-Mart's store manager, Jim Clark, seeking damages. Plaintiff sued in state court, but Defendants sought to remove the case to federal court and the grounds that Clark, an Indiana citizen, was added solely to defeat federal diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs sought to remand the matter back to state court, alleging that there were issues of fact precluding a conclusion that Clark, who played on personal or direct role in the alleged injury, was fraudulently joined. The United States District Court sua sponte entered an order seeking guidance in resolving the issue of whether Clark could be liable as a defendant. The Supreme Court answered by holding that when there are no allegations that a store manager controlled the premises where the harm occurred, he cannot be held liable under Indiana law. View "Branscomb v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of attempted murder, holding that the trial court did not err in not allowing Defendant's mother as a witness to stay in the courtroom during Defendant's trial.Defendant was fifteen years old when he was waived into adult criminal court and convicted. Before trial, the State listed Defendant's mother as a potential witness, and at trial, the State requested a separation of witnesses order. The court ordered Defendant's mother to leave the courtroom, and the State never called her to testify. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a child in adult criminal court may use Ind. R. Evid. 615(c) to establish that a parent is "essential" to the presentation of the defense and is thus excluded from a witness separation order; (2) Defendant did not make the requisite showing under the rule; (3) Defendant waived his argument that a juvenile defendant has a due process right to have a parent present for criminal proceedings; and (4) Defendant's challenges to his sentence were unavailing. View "Harris v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Continental Western Insurance Company and dismissing G&G Oil Company of Indiana's claim for losses from a ransomware attack, holding that neither party demonstrated that it was entitled to summary judgment.G&G Oil purchased an insurance policy from Continental. One provision of the policy - the "Computer Fraud" provision - covered loss "resulting directly from the use of any computer to fraudulently cause a transfer of money." G&G Oil was the target of a ransomware attack and submitted a claim for coverage of its losses under the "Commercial Crime" provision of the policy. Continental denied the claim. G&G Oil then brought this complaint. The trial court granted summary judgment for Continental. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, although G&G Oil's losses "resulted directly from the use of a computer," neither party was entitled to summary judgment. View "G&G Oil Co. of Indiana v. Continental Western Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court finding that Mother's consent was not required for the adoption of her child, holding that sufficient evidence supported the trial court's determinations.The trial court granted Stepmother's petition for stepparent adoption of Child, finding that Mother's consent was unnecessary because she had failed to pay child support for more than one year, failed significantly to communicate with Child for more than one year, and had abandoned Child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the court's findings that Mother for one year failed significantly to communicate with Child and support Child when able to do so. View "J.P. v. V.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court reversing the order of the City of Bloomington Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) affirming the decision of the City of Bloomington citing UJ-Eighty Corporation for a zoning violation, holding that there were not constitutional violations in this case.UJ-Eighty owned a fraternity house at Indiana University (IU) in Bloomington that was located within a district zoned by the City to permit limited residential uses. UJ-Eighty leased its house to an IU-sanctioned fraternity, but before the lease ended, IU revoked its recognition and approval of the fraternity, which meant that no one could live there. Bloomington cited UJ-Eighty for a zoning violation when two residents remained in the house. The BZA affirmed. UJ-Eighty appealed, arguing that the City impermissibly delegated its zoning authority to IJ by allowing it unilaterally to define fraternities and sororities. The trial court agreed and struck down the ordinance's definition of fraternities and sororities under the state and federal constitutions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bloomington did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because the ordinance was not an impermissible delegation of power or a denial of due process. View "City of Bloomington Board of Zoning Appeals v. UJ-Eighty Corp." on Justia Law

In this negligence action, The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal from the order of the trial court denying Defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the appeal was forfeited.Plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell in Defendant's restaurant. Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligence. After the trial court denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Defendant timely moved to certify the order for interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals accepted the interlocutory appeal, but Defendant did not timely file a notice of appeal. The court of appeals reversed the denial of the summary judgment motion without addressing the untimeliness of the notice of appeal. The Supreme Court granted transfer and dismissed the appeal, holding that the appeal was untimely and that there was no extraordinarily compelling reasons to restore the forfeited appeal. View "Cooper's Hawk Indianapolis, LLC v. Ray" on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute arising from a fatal car crash, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court rejecting the argument of the decedent's estate that it was entitled to $25,000 in underinsured-motorist (UIM) coverage under the decedent's parents' policy and granting summary judgment for Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company, holding that the estate was entitled to summary judgment.Shelina Glover died in a car crash. Shelina's estranged husband was driving the vehicle in which she died. Shelina's estate (the Estate) settled its claims against the two responsible drivers, whose insurers paid policy limits. The Estate also received two settlements of $25,000 each for UIM coverage from Shelina's carrier and from that of her husband. At issue was the Estate's request for further UIM coverage of $25,000 under Shelina's parents' Allstate policy. The trial court denied the request. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the estate was entitled to summary judgment on the issues of whether Shelina was an "insured person" and the availability of $25,000 in further UIM coverage under the parents' Allstate policy. View "Glover v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this termination of parental rights case, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court to admit drug reports, holding that the trial court properly found that the reports did not fit the records of a regularly conducted activity exception pursuant to Ind. R. Evid. 803(6).The Indiana Department of Child Services filed a petition to terminate Parents' parental rights to their four children. During the termination hearing and over Parents' objections, the trial court admitted drug test results for both parents. The court terminated the parents' parental rights. Parents appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting their drug test results. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the drug test results were properly admitted as records of a regularly conducted activity and that any error in their admission was harmless. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed, holding (1) the drug test records here fell under the records of a regularly conducted business activity; and (2) the trial court did not err in admitting the drug records. View "A.B. v. Indiana Department of Child Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Indiana Land Trust's motion to set aside a tax deed, holding that the LaPorte County Auditor gave adequate notice reasonably calculated to inform Indiana Land Trust Company of the impeding tax sale of the property.Taxes went unpaid on a vacant property from 2009 to 2015. The county auditor sent notice of an impending tax sale via certified letter and first-class mail to the notice listed on the deed for the property. The certified letter came back as undeliverable, and the first-class mail was not returned. Notice was eventually published in the local newspaper. The property sold, and a tax deed was issued to the purchaser. When the original owner learned of the sale it moved to set aside the tax deed due to insufficient notice. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the county auditor provided adequate notice and was not required to search its own internal records for a better tax sale notice address; and (2) the trial court properly denied Indiana Land Trust's motion to set aside the tax deed. View "Indiana Land Trust Co. v. XL Investment Properties, LLC" on Justia Law