Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Continental Western Insurance Company and dismissing G&G Oil Company of Indiana's claim for losses from a ransomware attack, holding that neither party demonstrated that it was entitled to summary judgment.G&G Oil purchased an insurance policy from Continental. One provision of the policy - the "Computer Fraud" provision - covered loss "resulting directly from the use of any computer to fraudulently cause a transfer of money." G&G Oil was the target of a ransomware attack and submitted a claim for coverage of its losses under the "Commercial Crime" provision of the policy. Continental denied the claim. G&G Oil then brought this complaint. The trial court granted summary judgment for Continental. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, although G&G Oil's losses "resulted directly from the use of a computer," neither party was entitled to summary judgment. View "G&G Oil Co. of Indiana v. Continental Western Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the trial court finding that Mother's consent was not required for the adoption of her child, holding that sufficient evidence supported the trial court's determinations.The trial court granted Stepmother's petition for stepparent adoption of Child, finding that Mother's consent was unnecessary because she had failed to pay child support for more than one year, failed significantly to communicate with Child for more than one year, and had abandoned Child. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the court's findings that Mother for one year failed significantly to communicate with Child and support Child when able to do so. View "J.P. v. V.B." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court reversing the order of the City of Bloomington Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) affirming the decision of the City of Bloomington citing UJ-Eighty Corporation for a zoning violation, holding that there were not constitutional violations in this case.UJ-Eighty owned a fraternity house at Indiana University (IU) in Bloomington that was located within a district zoned by the City to permit limited residential uses. UJ-Eighty leased its house to an IU-sanctioned fraternity, but before the lease ended, IU revoked its recognition and approval of the fraternity, which meant that no one could live there. Bloomington cited UJ-Eighty for a zoning violation when two residents remained in the house. The BZA affirmed. UJ-Eighty appealed, arguing that the City impermissibly delegated its zoning authority to IJ by allowing it unilaterally to define fraternities and sororities. The trial court agreed and struck down the ordinance's definition of fraternities and sororities under the state and federal constitutions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Bloomington did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment because the ordinance was not an impermissible delegation of power or a denial of due process. View "City of Bloomington Board of Zoning Appeals v. UJ-Eighty Corp." on Justia Law

In this negligence action, The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal from the order of the trial court denying Defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the appeal was forfeited.Plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell in Defendant's restaurant. Plaintiff sued Defendant for negligence. After the trial court denied Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Defendant timely moved to certify the order for interlocutory appeal. The court of appeals accepted the interlocutory appeal, but Defendant did not timely file a notice of appeal. The court of appeals reversed the denial of the summary judgment motion without addressing the untimeliness of the notice of appeal. The Supreme Court granted transfer and dismissed the appeal, holding that the appeal was untimely and that there was no extraordinarily compelling reasons to restore the forfeited appeal. View "Cooper's Hawk Indianapolis, LLC v. Ray" on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute arising from a fatal car crash, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the trial court rejecting the argument of the decedent's estate that it was entitled to $25,000 in underinsured-motorist (UIM) coverage under the decedent's parents' policy and granting summary judgment for Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company, holding that the estate was entitled to summary judgment.Shelina Glover died in a car crash. Shelina's estranged husband was driving the vehicle in which she died. Shelina's estate (the Estate) settled its claims against the two responsible drivers, whose insurers paid policy limits. The Estate also received two settlements of $25,000 each for UIM coverage from Shelina's carrier and from that of her husband. At issue was the Estate's request for further UIM coverage of $25,000 under Shelina's parents' Allstate policy. The trial court denied the request. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that the estate was entitled to summary judgment on the issues of whether Shelina was an "insured person" and the availability of $25,000 in further UIM coverage under the parents' Allstate policy. View "Glover v. Allstate Property & Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In this termination of parental rights case, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court to admit drug reports, holding that the trial court properly found that the reports did not fit the records of a regularly conducted activity exception pursuant to Ind. R. Evid. 803(6).The Indiana Department of Child Services filed a petition to terminate Parents' parental rights to their four children. During the termination hearing and over Parents' objections, the trial court admitted drug test results for both parents. The court terminated the parents' parental rights. Parents appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting their drug test results. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the drug test results were properly admitted as records of a regularly conducted activity and that any error in their admission was harmless. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed, holding (1) the drug test records here fell under the records of a regularly conducted business activity; and (2) the trial court did not err in admitting the drug records. View "A.B. v. Indiana Department of Child Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Indiana Land Trust's motion to set aside a tax deed, holding that the LaPorte County Auditor gave adequate notice reasonably calculated to inform Indiana Land Trust Company of the impeding tax sale of the property.Taxes went unpaid on a vacant property from 2009 to 2015. The county auditor sent notice of an impending tax sale via certified letter and first-class mail to the notice listed on the deed for the property. The certified letter came back as undeliverable, and the first-class mail was not returned. Notice was eventually published in the local newspaper. The property sold, and a tax deed was issued to the purchaser. When the original owner learned of the sale it moved to set aside the tax deed due to insufficient notice. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the county auditor provided adequate notice and was not required to search its own internal records for a better tax sale notice address; and (2) the trial court properly denied Indiana Land Trust's motion to set aside the tax deed. View "Indiana Land Trust Co. v. XL Investment Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to dismiss the State's habitual-offender allegation and remanded with instructions to vacate Defendant's habitual-offender enhancement, holding Defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated by a six-plus-year delay.Defendant was serving an eighty-year sentence when the trial court vacated his thirty-year habitual-offender enhancement. More than six years passed before the State retried the habitual-offender allegation. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, but the trial court denied the motion, eventually finding Defendant to be a habitual offender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Criminal Rule 4(C) does not apply to a habitual-offender retrial; but (2) Defendant's right to a speedy trial was violated, and therefore, Defendant was entitled to relief. View "Watson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court revised the maximum 138-year sentence imposed on Defendant for crimes he committed as a juvenile, holding that the sentence was inappropriate.In 1991, seventeen-year-old Defendant and two others committed a murder and other crimes. Defendant received a total sentence of 138 years, the maximum possible term-of-years sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. In 2016, Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief, challenging the propriety of imposing the maximum term-of-years sentence on him for crimes committed as a juvenile. The post-conviction court granted the petition and imposed an aggregate sixty-eight-year sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the post-conviction court's order granting relief and revised the sentence to eighty-eight years, holding that the 138-year sentence was inappropriate. View "State v. Stidham" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated K.C.G.'s delinquency adjudication and the modification of his probation based on that adjudication, holding that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.The delinquency at issue alleged that sixteen-year-old K.C.G. committed the offense of dangerous possession of a firearm in violation of Ind. Code 35-47-10-5. The juvenile court adjudicated K.C.G. a delinquent and modified his probation. On appeal, Defendant argued that the plain terms of the dangerous-possession statute showed it could not be a delinquent act. The Supreme Court vacated the delinquency adjudication, holding that because the statute defines the offense solely in terms of a "child" with an unauthorized firearm, the dangerous-possession statute does not apply to adults, and therefore, the State's petition did not allege a jurisdictional prerequisite - that K.C.G.'s conduct was "an act that would be an offense if committed by an adult." View "K.C.G. v. State" on Justia Law