Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that a breach of contract claim for failure to indemnify need not follow the procedures contained in the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA).While Joseph Shaughnessy was a patient at Franciscan Alliance, Inc., Lake Imaging LLC interpreted two CT scans performed on Joseph. Joseph subsequently died. Joseph's sons filed with the Department of Insurance (DOI) a proposed medical-malpractice complaint against Franciscan without naming Lake Imaging. The DOI served the proposed complaint on Franciscan, which settled with the Shaughnessys. Franciscan then filed suit against Lake Imaging, alleging breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the claim. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that because Franciscan's claim rested on Lake Imaging's alleged medical negligence, the MMA's two-year statute of limitations applied, and thus the complaint was untimely filed. See Ind. Code § 34-18- 7-1(b). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the MMA did not apply in this case, and therefore, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction and the MMA's statute of limitations did not apply. View "Lake Imaging LLC v. Franciscan Alliance, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal brought by Solarize Indiana, Inc. seeking judicial review of the administration decision of the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (IURC) approving two filings submitted by Vectren Energy Delivery of Indiana, Inc. under an expedited process known as the "Thirty-Day Rule," holding that Solarize lacked standing to bring this appeal.In objecting to Vectren's filings, Solarize, an organization that promotes the use of solar power in Indiana, asserted that the filings were not compliant with federal law. The IURC approved the filings, after which Solarize requested judicial review. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Solarize lacked standing because it failed to show that it was "adversely affected" by the IURC's order. View "Solarize Indiana, Inc. v. Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co." on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court held that the MCS-90 endorsement, which provides that if a motor vehicle is involved in an accident the insurer may be required to pay any final judgment against the insured arising out of the accident, does not apply to an accident that occurred during an intrastate trip transporting non-hazardous property.One way motor carries can comply with the financial requirements of the federal Motor Carrier Act of 1980 is by adding an MCS-90 endorsement to their insurance policy. The insurer in this case brought an action seeking a declaration that the MCS-90 endorsement creating a suretyship whereby the insurer agreed to pay a final judgment against the insured in certain negligence cases did not apply. The trial court found that the MCS-90 endorsement applied, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the insured driver was neither engaged in interests commerce at the time of the action nor transporting hazardous property, the MCS-90 endorsement did not apply; and (2) the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify the driver. View "Progressive Southeastern Insurance Co. v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that probation officers are state employees for purposes of Ind. Code 4-6-2-1.5, which requires the Attorney General to defend state employees, and that the statute applies to probation officers.This dispute arose from the facts that the General Assembly has granted the judiciary primary authority over probation officers' employment, that precedent has recognized that probation officers are court employees, but that counties are responsible for paying probation officers' salaries and certain expenses. At issue before the Supreme Court was how to determine which entity was responsible for defending and indemnifying probation officers in a lawsuit. The trial court ultimately concluded that the county was responsible for both the officers' representation and payment of any judgment against them. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) probation officers are state employees for purposes of the general statute requiring the Attorney General to defend state employees; and (2) that statute applies to probation officers. View "Lake County Board of Commissioners v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order denying Petitioner's motion for bond reduction or conditional pretrial release, holding that the General Assembly's recent codification of Criminal Rule 26 and the adoption of evidence-based practices in the administration of bail enhances, rather than restricts, the discretion entrusted to trial courts when executing bail.Petitioner was charged with the level-two felony offense of aiding, inducing, or causing burglary with a deadly weapon. The trial court set Petitioner's bond at $50,000 cash-only. After she was found eligible for home detention, Petitioner filed a motion for a bond reduction or conditional pretrial release. The court of appeals denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial courts should consider any factor relevant to the detainee's risk of nonappearance and potential danger to the community, and Indiana's recent bail reforms enhance the courts' discretion; and (2) clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's bail determination. View "Dewees v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals dismissing in part, affirming in part, and reversing in part the judgment of the trial court in this criminal case but reversed the court of appeals' conclusion that remand for a new sentencing was unnecessary, holding that remand was necessary.Defendant was convicted of several offenses for driving his vehicle while intoxicated with his three young grandchildren in the vehicle. On appeal, Defendant argued that his multiple convictions constituted double jeopardy and that the trial court erred in sentencing. The court of appeals remanded the case in part with instructions. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed with one exception, holding that, given the multiple irregularities in Defendant's sentence, remand for resentencing was appropriate. View "McDonald v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the trial court granting dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for breach of the implied warranty of habitability and negligence as to four of the defendants, holding that the complaint included facts capable of supporting relief on Plaintiff's implied-warranty-of-habitability claims against two of the defendants.Plaintiff, a homeowners' association, sued Defendants after discovering defects at a condominium complex. Four of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that they were not subject to the implied warranty of habitability because they were not builder-vendors and that the negligence claim was barred by the economic loss doctrine. The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff alleged facts capable of supporting relief on its implied-warranty-of-habitability claims against two of the defendants; and (2) Plaintiff alleged facts capable of supporting relief on its negligence claim. View "Residences at Ivy Quad Unit Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Ivy Quad Development, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the charges brought against him and finding that Ind. Code 35-45-4-8 violated the state and federal constitutions, holding that the State alleged an offense and that the statute is constitutional.Defendant captured cell phone video of his girlfriend performing oral sex on him and then sent it to another person. Defendant was charged under section 35-45-4-8, which criminalizes the non-consensual distribution of an "intimate image." Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional on free speech grounds. The trial court granted the motion, finding the statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State properly charged Defendant with violating section 35-45-4-8; and (2) the statute does not violate either the free interchange clause of the Indiana Constitution or the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. View "State v. Katz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court in favor of Hamilton Southeastern Schools (HSE) and dismissing WTHR-TV's complaint seeking documents in a HSE employee's personnel file, holding that HSE's factual basis for the employee's discipline was insufficient.Rick Wimmer, a teacher at an HSE high school, was disciplined for an unknown reason. WTHR requested access to and copies of the portions of Wimmer's personnel file that contained disclosable information under Ind. Code 5-14-3-4(b)(8), which requires public agencies to disclose certain information in public employee personnel files, including the "factual basis" for the disciplinary actions. HSE responded by providing a compilation of the requested information but did not provide copies of the underlying documents in the personnel file. WTHR sued, and the trial court ruled for HSE. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) WTHR was not entitled to the underlying documents because an agency may compiled the required information into a new document; and (2) a "factual basis" must be a fact-based account of what caused the discipline instead of a bald conclusion, which is what HSE provided in this case. View "WTHR-TV v. Hamilton Southeastern Schools" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs in this dispute over whether a board policy created a binding contract with the former directors of the board of a county rural electric membership cooperative (REMC), holding that there was no contract.Plaintiffs, former directors of Clark County REMC, sued Clark RMEC after the board changed a series of board policies that allowed former directors who met certain requirements to receive health-insurance benefits, alleging breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs' partial summary judgment motion on liability and resolved all other claims in a settlement agreement. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was not a contract because the policy was not an offer. View "Clark County REMC v. Reis" on Justia Law