Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court held that probation officers are state employees for purposes of Ind. Code 4-6-2-1.5, which requires the Attorney General to defend state employees, and that the statute applies to probation officers.This dispute arose from the facts that the General Assembly has granted the judiciary primary authority over probation officers' employment, that precedent has recognized that probation officers are court employees, but that counties are responsible for paying probation officers' salaries and certain expenses. At issue before the Supreme Court was how to determine which entity was responsible for defending and indemnifying probation officers in a lawsuit. The trial court ultimately concluded that the county was responsible for both the officers' representation and payment of any judgment against them. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) probation officers are state employees for purposes of the general statute requiring the Attorney General to defend state employees; and (2) that statute applies to probation officers. View "Lake County Board of Commissioners v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order denying Petitioner's motion for bond reduction or conditional pretrial release, holding that the General Assembly's recent codification of Criminal Rule 26 and the adoption of evidence-based practices in the administration of bail enhances, rather than restricts, the discretion entrusted to trial courts when executing bail.Petitioner was charged with the level-two felony offense of aiding, inducing, or causing burglary with a deadly weapon. The trial court set Petitioner's bond at $50,000 cash-only. After she was found eligible for home detention, Petitioner filed a motion for a bond reduction or conditional pretrial release. The court of appeals denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) trial courts should consider any factor relevant to the detainee's risk of nonappearance and potential danger to the community, and Indiana's recent bail reforms enhance the courts' discretion; and (2) clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court's bail determination. View "Dewees v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals dismissing in part, affirming in part, and reversing in part the judgment of the trial court in this criminal case but reversed the court of appeals' conclusion that remand for a new sentencing was unnecessary, holding that remand was necessary.Defendant was convicted of several offenses for driving his vehicle while intoxicated with his three young grandchildren in the vehicle. On appeal, Defendant argued that his multiple convictions constituted double jeopardy and that the trial court erred in sentencing. The court of appeals remanded the case in part with instructions. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed with one exception, holding that, given the multiple irregularities in Defendant's sentence, remand for resentencing was appropriate. View "McDonald v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the trial court granting dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for breach of the implied warranty of habitability and negligence as to four of the defendants, holding that the complaint included facts capable of supporting relief on Plaintiff's implied-warranty-of-habitability claims against two of the defendants.Plaintiff, a homeowners' association, sued Defendants after discovering defects at a condominium complex. Four of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that they were not subject to the implied warranty of habitability because they were not builder-vendors and that the negligence claim was barred by the economic loss doctrine. The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff alleged facts capable of supporting relief on its implied-warranty-of-habitability claims against two of the defendants; and (2) Plaintiff alleged facts capable of supporting relief on its negligence claim. View "Residences at Ivy Quad Unit Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Ivy Quad Development, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the charges brought against him and finding that Ind. Code 35-45-4-8 violated the state and federal constitutions, holding that the State alleged an offense and that the statute is constitutional.Defendant captured cell phone video of his girlfriend performing oral sex on him and then sent it to another person. Defendant was charged under section 35-45-4-8, which criminalizes the non-consensual distribution of an "intimate image." Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional on free speech grounds. The trial court granted the motion, finding the statute unconstitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State properly charged Defendant with violating section 35-45-4-8; and (2) the statute does not violate either the free interchange clause of the Indiana Constitution or the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. View "State v. Katz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court in favor of Hamilton Southeastern Schools (HSE) and dismissing WTHR-TV's complaint seeking documents in a HSE employee's personnel file, holding that HSE's factual basis for the employee's discipline was insufficient.Rick Wimmer, a teacher at an HSE high school, was disciplined for an unknown reason. WTHR requested access to and copies of the portions of Wimmer's personnel file that contained disclosable information under Ind. Code 5-14-3-4(b)(8), which requires public agencies to disclose certain information in public employee personnel files, including the "factual basis" for the disciplinary actions. HSE responded by providing a compilation of the requested information but did not provide copies of the underlying documents in the personnel file. WTHR sued, and the trial court ruled for HSE. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) WTHR was not entitled to the underlying documents because an agency may compiled the required information into a new document; and (2) a "factual basis" must be a fact-based account of what caused the discipline instead of a bald conclusion, which is what HSE provided in this case. View "WTHR-TV v. Hamilton Southeastern Schools" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs in this dispute over whether a board policy created a binding contract with the former directors of the board of a county rural electric membership cooperative (REMC), holding that there was no contract.Plaintiffs, former directors of Clark County REMC, sued Clark RMEC after the board changed a series of board policies that allowed former directors who met certain requirements to receive health-insurance benefits, alleging breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment on Plaintiffs' partial summary judgment motion on liability and resolved all other claims in a settlement agreement. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was not a contract because the policy was not an offer. View "Clark County REMC v. Reis" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this case brought by K.G.'s parent, who alleged that she suffered emotional distress as a result of the sexual abuse of K.G., holding that a narrow expansion of the common law was required to do justice in this case.K.G., who was disabled, attended a school where she received instructional and special needs services. One of the school's instructional assistants sexually abused K.G. while changing her diaper. Plaintiff brought this action against the school, alleging that she suffered emotional distress as a result of K.G.'s sexual abuse. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff's failure to satisfy either the modified-impact rule or the bystander rule precluded her from recovering for emotional distress. The Supreme Court reversed, (1) the common-law rules governing claims for the negligent infliction of emotional distress reflect a jurisprudence of incremental change; (2) in some cases of child sexual abuse, a parent or guardian need not show proximity to the tortious act to raise an emotional distress claim; and (3) because Plaintiff satisfied the elements of this new rule, summary judgment was improper. View "K.G. v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of murder and conspiracy to commit murder and sentencing her to life without parole for her murder charge and to thirty-five years' imprisonment for her conspiracy to commit murder charge, to be served concurrently, holding that there was no prejudicial error.Specifically, the Supreme Court held (1) the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's convictions for murder and conspiracy to commit murder; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Defendant committed the statutory aggravator of murder-for-hire; (3) if there was any error related to the admission or exclusion of evidence, it was harmless; and (4) Defendant's conspiracy sentence did not warrant Appellate Rule 7(B) revision. View "Hall v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court granting summary judgment for the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District and dismissing Clarence Lowe's tort claim, holding that the District is a political subdivision under the Indiana Tort Claims Act and that Lowe's notice was untimely.Lowe claimed he was injured while working for the District and brought this action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). Lowe sent a note of tort claim to the Indiana attorney general, who received the notice 263 days after Lowe's injury. The District argued that, for purposes of the Act, it was a political subdivision rather than a state agency and that because Lowe failed to serve it with a notice within 180 days after his injury, the Act barred his claim. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment against Lowe. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District was a political subdivision under the Act and that Lowe's arguments neither factually nor legally excused his failure to provide timely notice. View "Lowe v. Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District" on Justia Law