Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Tom Bonnell bought a strip of land from the Pulaski County Board of Commissioners, Ruby and Douglas Cotner filed this suit to quiet title, claiming that they had previously acquired ownership of a second of that land via adverse possession. The trial court (1) concluded that the prior sale of the strip by tax deed extinguished any interest the Cotners may have had, but (2) awarded the Cotners a prescriptive easement on certain outbuildings encroaching onto the strip. Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the denial of the Cotners’ adverse possession claim, holding that the tax sales of the strip defeated the Cotners’ claim of ownership by adverse possession; but (2) reversed the grant of a prescriptive easement in the Cotners’ encroaching outbuildings, holding that the sale of the strip by tax deed extinguished any and all interest the Cotners previously possessed. View "Bonnell v. Cotner" on Justia Law

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. filed a post-judgment motion to intervene in this foreclosure action to protect its interest as assignee of a mortgage on the real estate of Deborah Walton and Margaret Walton. JPMorgan filed its motion three years after a final judgment foreclosing plaintiff Claybridge Homeowners Association’s judgment lien and six years after the suit began. The trial court denied the motion to intervene as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the motion to intervene was untimely because Plaintiff’s lis pendens notice, filed the day the suit began, provided constructive notice of Plaintiff’s foreclosure action; and (2) the notice was valid because it was based on Plaintiff’s enforceable, unrecorded judgment lien and because Plaintiff’s foreclosure action was not a personal claim but an in rem real estate action to enforce a judgment lien. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Claybridge Homeowners Ass’n" on Justia Law

Junior creditor Car-X Associates Corporation sued a mortgagee to foreclose on a lien. In addition to the mortgagee, Car-X’s complaint named senior creditor Huntington National Bank as a defendant to answer as to any interest it may have in the real estate. When Huntington failed to timely respond to the complaint and summons Car-X obtained a default judgment against Huntington. Huntington moved to set aside the default judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(1) because of its excusable neglect and under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8) because such relief would be just and equitable under the circumstances. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court’s denial of Huntington’s motion to set aside the default judgment for excusable neglect; but (2) remanded to the trial court to reconsider whether equitable reasons support granting Huntington’s motion under Trial Rule 60(B)(8), especially in light of Huntington’s meritorious defense to the underlying foreclosure suit, the substantial amount of money involved, and Car-X’s lack of prejudice from the delay. View "Huntington Nat’l Bank v. Car-X Assocs. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a church, filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking to determine the boundary line between it and Defendants, homeowners, to determine ownership of its real estate, to allow it to build a fence along the boundary line, and seeking an injunction to prevent Defendants from further trespassing. The homeowners counterclaimed, arguing that they had acquired title to the disputed real estate by adverse possession as well as prescriptive easement. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on both the adverse possession and prescriptive easement claims. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court on both claims, holding that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on their claims of adverse possession and prescriptive easement. View "Celebration Worship Ctr., Inc. v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Two landowners (Landowners) each owned property served by a regional sewer district (District). Because the Landowners’ property had outstanding fees owed to the District, the District perfected liens against the properties, and the county treasurer and auditor ordered that the properties be sold at a tax sale. The Landowners petitioned the trial court requesting that the court find that their respective properties cannot be sold at a tax sale pursuant to Ind. Code 13-26-14-4. The district court ordered that both properties be removed from the tax sale because the District maintained the only lien and therefore was precluded from foreclosing on the parcels pursuant to the lien foreclosure prohibition clause in Ind. Code 13-26-14-4, which governs the collection of regional sewer district sewer liens. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the lien foreclosure prohibition of section 13-26-14-4 does not apply to collection by tax sale; and (2) because the District employed the tax sale method and did not seek collection of the Landowners’ unpaid sewer bills and penalties through the lien foreclosure method, the lien foreclosure prohibition clause did not apply. View "Twin Lakes Reg’l Sewer Dist. v. Ray" on Justia Law

Two landowners owned property served by a regional sewer district. The district had perfected liens against the properties due to the landowners’ failure to pay fees and penalties. The trial court listed the properties to be sold at a tax sale to satisfy obligations for the unpaid sewer bills. The landowners subsequently petitioned the circuit court to remove their properties from the tax sale list. The circuit court granted the petitions, concluding that because the district maintained the only lien, the district was precluded from foreclosing on the parcels pursuant to Ind. Code 13-26-14-4. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the foreclosure prohibition of Ind. Code 13-26-14-4, which governs the collection of regional sewer district sewer liens, does not apply to collection by tax sale; and (2) because the district did not seek collection of the landowners’ unpaid fees and penalties through the lien foreclosure method, but rather employed the tax sale method, the lien foreclosure prohibition clause did not apply. Remanded. View "In re Carroll County 2013 Tax Sale" on Justia Law

Buyers agreed to buy a condominium from Seller pursuant to a purchase agreement. Buyers demanded that Seller fix a minor electrical problem as a condition of purchase, which led to this protracted litigation. In the first appeal, the court of appeals concluded that Buyers breached the contract with their unreasonable demand and remanded for the trial court to determine damages. The trial court awarded Seller $93,972 in damages. Seller appealed, arguing that she reasonably mitigated her damages and that the trial court erred in calculating damages. Buyers cross-appealed. The court of appeals reversed and awarded only $117 in damages, concluding that Seller could have avoided all damages except a $117 repair bill if she had responded to Buyers’ demand to fix the electrical problem, thus preserving the agreement. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion (1) by finding that Seller could have mitigated her damages by selling her condo in 2007 rather than waiting until 2011; and (2) in refusing to find that Seller’s duty to mitigate required yielding to the Buyers’ breach. View "Fischer v. Heymann" on Justia Law

The City of Boonville passed an ordinance to annex 1,165 acres of real estate located west of the city limits. Later that year, numerous landowners opposed to the annexation filed written remonstrance and complaint for declaratory relief. The City moved to dismiss, arguing that the Landowners did not satisfy the statutory requirement that at least sixty-five percent of landowners in the annexed territory sign the remonstrance. At issue in this case was whether the sixty-five percent remonstrance threshold was to be determined by separately counting the multiple parcels acquired by the State for an adjoining public roadway or collectively as one parcel. The trial court ultimately determined that the threshold was not satisfied. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the land in this case, which comprised the portion of the public roadway included in the annexed territory, should be considered and counted as a single parcel in determining whether the remonstrating landowners comprised sixty-five percent of the owners of the annexed territory. View "Am. Cold Storage v. City of Boonville" on Justia Law

Buyers bought a home from Sellers after Sellers completed Indiana's statutory disclosure forms attesting to the home's condition. Buyers subsequently discovered costly defects in the home. Buyers sued Sellers, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation. The trial court awarded damages to Plaintiffs. At issue on appeal was whether Indiana's disclosure statutes created a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation or if the common law still applied and the principle of caveat emptor precluded recovery on the action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the legislature's adoption of the disclosure statutes abrogated the state's common law jurisprudence falling within their scope, and therefore, the disclosure statues create liability for sellers when they fail to truthfully disclose the condition of features of their property that must be disclosed to the buyer; and (2) the district court erred in finding that Sellers were liable to Buyers because the defects in the home "should have been obvious" to Sellers, as Sellers' "actual knowledge" of the defects was not established. Remanded. View "Johnson v. Wysocki" on Justia Law

Vincennes Indiana Girls, Inc. (VIG) deeded Camp Wildwood to the predecessor of Girl Scouts of Southern Illinois, Inc. (GSSI) on the condition that the property be used for scouting purposes for forty-nine years. The deed provided that ownership of the campground would revert to VIG if the scouting-use condition was breached during that time. After forty-four years, GSSI stopped using the camp as a Girl Scout facility and decided to sell. VIG sued to quiet title to Camp Wildwood and enjoin GSSI from selling the camp until the forty-nine-year period had expired. The trial court granted summary judgment quieting title in VIG. At issue on appeal was whether the forty-nine-year land use limitation was enforceable despite a subsequently enacted statute, Ind. Code 32-17-10-2, which purported to limit reversionary clauses in land transactions to a maximum of thirty years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 32-17-10-2 was unconstitutional as applied retroactively to the land-use restriction in VIG's deed to GSSI. View "Girl Scouts of S. Ill. v. Vincennes Ind. Girls, Inc." on Justia Law