Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this interlocutory appeal the Supreme Court declined to adopt the apex doctrine, which can prevent parties from deposing top-level corporate executives absent the requesting party making certain initial showings, holding that remand was required for the trial court to consider a motion for a protective order with the benefit of guidance set forth in this opinion.Plaintiffs sued the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) alleging that despite being aware of the consequences of repetitive head trauma, the NCAA failed to implement reasonable concussion-management protocols to protect its athletes, causing three former college football players to die from a neurodegenerative disease linked to repetitive head trauma. The NCAA moved twice for a protective order to prevent Plaintiffs from deposing three of its high-ranking executives. After the trial court denied the motions the NCAA sought discretionary interlocutory review, inviting the Supreme Court to adopt the apex doctrine. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) this appeal was properly before the Court; and (2) although the Court declines to adopt the apex doctrine, it establishes a framework that harmonizes its principles with the applicable trial rules to aid courts in determining whether good cause exists to prohibit or limit the deposition of a top-level official in a large organization. View "National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Finnerty" on Justia Law

In this case where an employee of a health-care provider improperly accessed and disclosed information from numerous patients' medical records the Supreme Court held that the health-care provider was not liable.Plaintiffs sued Community and its employee, Katrina Gray, bringing claims of respondent superior and negligent training, supervision and retention claims against Community and claims of negligence and invasion of privacy against Gray. Community filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) applied to Plaintiffs' claims and that Gray's tortious acts were committed outside the scope of her employment. The trial court denied both motions. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs' claims were not subject to the MMA; but (2) Community was entitled to summary judgment because it affirmatively negated a required element on each of the claims against it. View "Community Health Network, Inc. v. McKenzie" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Anonymous Defendant 1 - a physician group - in this vicarious liability case, holding that disputed issues of material fact existed, precluding summary judgment.In Sword v. NKC Hospitals, Inc., 417 N.E.2d 142 (Ind. 1999), the Supreme Court adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 429, holding that, through apparent or ostensible agency, a hospital may be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of an independent contractor. At issue in the instant case was whether Sword extends its vicarious liability to a physical therapist with whom it had no contractual relationship. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) the rule articulated in Sword is inapplicable on these facts; (2) under Restatement (Second) of Agency section 267 a medical provider may be held liable for the acts of an apparent agent based on the provider's manifestations of an agency relationship with the apparent agent, which causes a third party to rely on such a relationship; and (3) there existed disputed issues of fact as to whether Anonymous Defendant 1 held out Plaintiff's physical therapist as its apparent agent. View "Wilson v. Anonymous Defendant 1" on Justia Law

In this case considering Sword v. NKC Hospitals, Inc., 417 N.E.2d 142 (Ind. 1999), and the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 429's reasoning and application to a non-hospital diagnostic medical imaging center, the Supreme Court held that Sword and section 429's apparent agency principles apply to non-hospital medical entities that provide patients with health care.In Sword, the Supreme Court adopted section 429 and held that a hospital may be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of an independent contractor through apparent or ostensible agency. In the instant case, Plaintiff alleged medical malpractice related to his MRI and imaging care. Marion Open MRI moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not liable for the actions of the radiologist with whom Marion Open MRI contracted. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Marion Open MRI, finding that Indiana's appellate court have applied Sword's apparent agent principles only to hospitals and not to non-hospital medical entities. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Sword and its apparent agency rules apply to non-hospital medical entities. View "Arrendale v. Orthopaedics Northeast, P.C." on Justia Law

In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court held that the MCS-90 endorsement, which provides that if a motor vehicle is involved in an accident the insurer may be required to pay any final judgment against the insured arising out of the accident, does not apply to an accident that occurred during an intrastate trip transporting non-hazardous property.One way motor carries can comply with the financial requirements of the federal Motor Carrier Act of 1980 is by adding an MCS-90 endorsement to their insurance policy. The insurer in this case brought an action seeking a declaration that the MCS-90 endorsement creating a suretyship whereby the insurer agreed to pay a final judgment against the insured in certain negligence cases did not apply. The trial court found that the MCS-90 endorsement applied, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because the insured driver was neither engaged in interests commerce at the time of the action nor transporting hazardous property, the MCS-90 endorsement did not apply; and (2) the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify the driver. View "Progressive Southeastern Insurance Co. v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this case brought by K.G.'s parent, who alleged that she suffered emotional distress as a result of the sexual abuse of K.G., holding that a narrow expansion of the common law was required to do justice in this case.K.G., who was disabled, attended a school where she received instructional and special needs services. One of the school's instructional assistants sexually abused K.G. while changing her diaper. Plaintiff brought this action against the school, alleging that she suffered emotional distress as a result of K.G.'s sexual abuse. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff's failure to satisfy either the modified-impact rule or the bystander rule precluded her from recovering for emotional distress. The Supreme Court reversed, (1) the common-law rules governing claims for the negligent infliction of emotional distress reflect a jurisprudence of incremental change; (2) in some cases of child sexual abuse, a parent or guardian need not show proximity to the tortious act to raise an emotional distress claim; and (3) because Plaintiff satisfied the elements of this new rule, summary judgment was improper. View "K.G. v. Smith" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court granting summary judgment for the Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District and dismissing Clarence Lowe's tort claim, holding that the District is a political subdivision under the Indiana Tort Claims Act and that Lowe's notice was untimely.Lowe claimed he was injured while working for the District and brought this action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). Lowe sent a note of tort claim to the Indiana attorney general, who received the notice 263 days after Lowe's injury. The District argued that, for purposes of the Act, it was a political subdivision rather than a state agency and that because Lowe failed to serve it with a notice within 180 days after his injury, the Act barred his claim. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment against Lowe. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the District was a political subdivision under the Act and that Lowe's arguments neither factually nor legally excused his failure to provide timely notice. View "Lowe v. Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the government and dismissing Plaintiff's claim that the negligence of the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT) in designing and maintaining a highway caused his injuries, holding that the government was immune from liability.Plaintiff was traveling on a highway when he struck a pool of water, lost control of his vehicle, and struck a tree. Plaintiff and his wife sued INDOT, alleging negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of INDOT. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the evidence showed that the weather-induced condition continued to worsen at the time of the accident and because Plaintiffs failed to raise a reasonable inference to the contrary, the condition was temporary, and therefore, the government was immune from liability. View "Staat v. Indiana Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that when the government knows of an existing defect in a public thoroughfare and when it has ample opportunity to respond, immunity does not apply under the Indiana Tort Claims Act simply because the defect manifests during recurring inclement weather.Plaintiff was injured in an accident caused by flooding on a highway. Plaintiff sued the State and the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT) for negligence, alleging that INDOT's failure to post warnings of the flooded roadway and its failure to maintain proper damage resulted in her injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment for INDOT based on immunity. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the evidence showed the INDOT had known of the defect causing the highway to flood and had ample opportunity to remedy the defect but failed in its duty, summary judgment was appropriate. View "Ladra v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment for a shipper and its agent and against a commercial truck driver who sustained injuries when his cargo fell on him, holding that this Court expressly adopts the Fourth Circuit's "Savage rule."At issue was whether Defendant was negligent in packing, loading, and failing to secure the trailer's cargo. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant at issue on appeal. The Supreme Court adopted the Savage rule, which holds that carriers have the primary duty for loading and securing cargo, and if the shipper assumes a legal duty of safe loading it becomes liable for injuries resulting from any latent defect. The Court then affirmed, holding (1) given both the rule's sound policy and its consistency with Indiana law, this Court formally adopts the Savage rule; and (2) Defendant was not liable for Plaintiff's injuries under the circumstances of this case. View "Wilkes v. Celadon Group, Inc." on Justia Law