Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Caryl Rosen brought a negligence suit against a hospital after she tripped and fell on a large entryway mat in the hospital’s main lobby. She alleged that the mat’s condition caused her fall and resulting injuries. After the incident, hospital security preserved video footage from one camera that captured Rosen’s fall and provided it to her attorney. There were two other cameras in the area, but the hospital’s security supervisor stated that neither captured the fall. Rosen claimed that video from before the fall, as well as footage from the other cameras, might have shown the mat’s condition and supported her case.Rosen moved for spoliation sanctions in the Lake Superior Court, asserting that the hospital failed in its duty to preserve relevant evidence. The trial court denied her motions, finding that the hospital had not spoliated evidence because the additional footage did not capture the fall. The trial court also excluded mention of unpreserved video at trial and refused Rosen’s proposed jury instruction allowing an adverse inference from the absence of that evidence. The jury returned a verdict for the hospital.On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by finding no spoliation and by refusing the adverse inference instruction. The appellate court reasoned that unpreserved footage might have shown the mat’s condition. The Indiana Supreme Court, upon granting transfer and vacating the appellate opinion, held that the trial judge’s decisions were within her discretion. The Court concluded that the hospital’s evidence preservation was reasonable and that the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding the evidence and refusing the adverse inference instruction. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the hospital. View "Rosen v. Community Healthcare System" on Justia Law

A patient was hospitalized after contracting COVID-19 and, as his condition worsened, was transferred between several hospitals in Kentucky and Indiana. During his treatment, he was intubated, placed on a ventilator, and medically immobilized. While under this care, he developed a severe bed sore that progressed to necrotizing fasciitis. Despite ongoing treatment, he ultimately died, with his death certificate listing multiple causes including cardiopulmonary arrest and sepsis. His estate claimed that negligence in the treatment of the bed sore caused his death and filed a proposed medical malpractice complaint against more than eighty healthcare providers.The case began when the estate filed its complaint with the Indiana Department of Insurance, while a medical-review panel was being requested. Before the panel was constituted, the providers moved for summary judgment in Vanderburgh Superior Court, arguing they were immune from liability under Indiana’s Healthcare Immunity Act, Premises Immunity Act, and the federal PREP Act. The trial court granted summary judgment for the providers, finding that statutory immunity applied and that the court, not the medical-review panel, could decide the immunity issue. The estate appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the question of immunity required expert input from the medical-review panel, especially regarding causation.The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the Court of Appeals’ decision. It held that the trial court could make a preliminary determination on statutory immunity without waiting for a medical-review panel’s opinion, since the facts relating to the connection between the patient’s COVID-19 treatment and his injury were undisputed for summary judgment purposes. The court further held that the providers were immune from civil liability under both state and federal law, as the patient’s injuries arose from treatment provided in response to the COVID-19 emergency. The court affirmed summary judgment for the providers. View "Estate of Waggoner v. Anonymous Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

A 63-year-old man with a history of sciatica and alcohol-use disorder attempted to board a city bus in Indianapolis. Earlier that day, he had been hospitalized for intoxication but was released while still mildly intoxicated. That evening, after waiting at a bus stop, he approached a bus as it was preparing to leave. As the bus pulled away, he lost his balance and fell into the road, where he was run over and later died from his injuries. At the time of the incident, his blood-alcohol content was approximately 0.261. His mother, acting as the personal representative of his estate, filed a wrongful death suit against the public transportation corporation, alleging negligence.The Marion Superior Court presided over a jury trial in which the transportation corporation argued that the decedent was contributorily negligent, which would bar recovery. The jury viewed video footage of the incident and heard testimony regarding the decedent’s physical condition and intoxication. After deliberation, the jury found in favor of the estate and awarded damages, later reduced by statutory limits. The transportation corporation moved for judgment on the evidence and, after the verdict, for a motion to correct error, both of which the trial court denied. On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, finding the decedent contributorily negligent as a matter of law.The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and reviewed the trial court’s denial of the motion to correct error de novo. The Court held that the evidence, including the video footage and testimony, did not establish as a matter of law that the decedent was contributorily negligent. Multiple reasonable inferences could be drawn from the evidence, so the jury’s verdict was not clearly erroneous or unsupported. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion to correct error. View "Indianapolis Public Transportation Corporation v. Bush" on Justia Law

Franklyn Neter-Nu, a truck driver, visited Methodist Hospital in Gary, Indiana, complaining of nausea and vomiting. He was treated with IV fluids and medications, but the IV was twice found detached from his arm by Nurse Morgan Mittler, who then placed it in his right foot without proper training or a doctor's order. Neter-Nu later experienced pain in his foot, and despite an x-ray showing no issues, he was discharged. After traveling to Iowa, he sought emergency care for blackened toes and was eventually referred for a below-the-knee amputation.Neter-Nu filed a complaint against Dr. Zainab Abbas, Nurse Mittler, and Methodist Hospital, alleging negligence. A jury found in favor of Neter-Nu, awarding him $11,000,000, which was reduced to the statutory cap of $1,250,000. The trial court also awarded $79,993.40 in prejudgment interest. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict, citing errors in denying Methodist’s Rule 50(A) motion, jury instructions, and evidentiary rulings, and remanded for a new trial.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred in denying Methodist’s Rule 50(A) motion and in its jury instructions, but these errors did not necessitate reversing the jury verdict due to joint-and-several liability. The court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the Providers’ proposed jury instructions on superseding cause and hindsight, nor in excluding certain medical records and emails. The Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict but reversed and remanded for the trial court to grant Methodist’s Rule 50(A) motion and recalculate prejudgment interest based on the Providers’ statutory liability. View "Abbas v. Bilal Neter-Nu" on Justia Law

Connie Grabowski, a second-grade teacher for the South Bend Community School Corporation, was involved in an incident where a student, S.J., caused her to trip and fall. Grabowski filled out a worker’s compensation accident report form, naming S.J., who was the grandson of a school board member. Following this, the school conducted an investigation into Grabowski’s conduct, placed her on administrative leave, and offered her a last-chance agreement, which she declined, leading to her resignation.Grabowski filed a lawsuit for wrongful termination, alleging that the school retaliated against her for indicating an intent to file a worker’s compensation claim. The trial court denied the school’s motion for summary judgment, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury found in favor of Grabowski, awarding her $600,000 in damages. The school appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying its motions for judgment on the evidence.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that there was no evidence that the school discharged Grabowski solely to avoid workers’ compensation liability. The court emphasized that Grabowski’s own theory of the case was that the school’s actions were motivated by the desire to protect the board member’s grandson, not solely to avoid workers’ compensation liability. Therefore, the jury’s verdict could not stand, and the case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the school corporation. View "South Bend Community School Corporation v. Grabowski" on Justia Law

In April 2018, Kiera Isgrig, a college student, was injured when a window and its casing fell on her while she was studying in a room at Indiana University. There was no direct evidence explaining why the window fell. Kevin Ashley, a university carpenter, found no defects that would have caused the window to fall without warning, although two sash springs were broken. The window had been last serviced in March 2017.The Monroe Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the Trustees of Indiana University, finding that Isgrig failed to make a prima facie case of negligence under the premises liability standard. The court held that the university did not have actual or constructive knowledge of any issues with the window and that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply.The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could apply to fixtures in premises liability cases. The court determined that a window falling out of a wall without interaction is not an event that typically occurs absent negligence and that there was sufficient evidence that the university had exclusive control over the window.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can be applied to premises liability cases involving fixtures. The court found that Isgrig presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the university's negligence. The court concluded that the window was under the exclusive control of the university and that such an incident would not normally occur without negligence. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Isgrig v. Trustees of Indiana University" on Justia Law

Gerard A. Kirsch, a member of Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, Inc., was injured while building a storage barn on the church's property. Kirsch fell from a ladder and sustained a severe arm injury. He sued the church, alleging negligence for failing to provide safe equipment and proper supervision.The Vanderburgh Superior Court denied the church's motion for summary judgment, which argued that Indiana Code section 34-31-7-2 limited the church's liability. The court held that a jury must decide if the church breached any duty to Kirsch. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, interpreting the statute narrowly to apply only to parts of the premises used primarily for worship services, thus allowing Kirsch's claim to proceed.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the term "premises" in Indiana Code section 34-31-7-2 includes the entire parcel of land owned by the church, not just the areas used primarily for worship services. Since the church's entire property is used primarily for worship services, the statute applies, limiting the church's liability to warning of hidden dangers and refraining from intentional harm. Kirsch admitted the church breached neither duty, leading the court to grant summary judgment in favor of the church. View "Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, Inc. v. Kirsch" on Justia Law

A motorist struck and injured a pedestrian during rush hour. The motorist claimed the pedestrian stepped out from behind a large truck, obstructing her view. Witnesses and investigating officers corroborated the motorist's account, finding no evidence of speeding, reckless driving, or distraction. The pedestrian sued the motorist and her insurer for negligence, and the motorist raised a contributory-negligence defense.The Hamilton Superior Court initially granted the pedestrian's motion to compel the motorist to produce her iPhone for inspection, limited to the hour surrounding the accident. However, the court reversed its decision upon reconsideration, citing significant privacy concerns and lack of evidence suggesting the motorist was using her phone at the time. The court also granted a motion in limine to exclude any discussion of the phone inspection at trial. A jury found the pedestrian 90% at fault, barring recovery under Indiana's contributory-fault standard. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the burden of the proposed phone inspection outweighed its likely benefit given the motorist's privacy concerns.The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the pedestrian's discovery request lacked necessary evidentiary support and was overly broad. The court emphasized that privacy concerns are not a per se bar to discovery but must be balanced against the need for information. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel, as the pedestrian failed to show that the benefit of inspecting the motorist's phone outweighed her privacy interests. View "Jennings v. Smiley" on Justia Law

In late 2019, a hospital sent letters to over a thousand patients, including Linda Gierek, informing them of potential exposure to infectious diseases due to a technician's failure to fully sterilize surgical instruments. Gierek filed a class-action complaint against the hospital, asserting claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and medical malpractice. She sought class certification for similarly situated patients and their spouses. The trial court consolidated Gierek’s action with a similar class-action claim filed by Cheyanne Bennett.The Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund intervened, arguing that the claims sounded in ordinary negligence and thus the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA) did not apply. The hospital argued the opposite. The trial court ruled in favor of the hospital, stating the MMA applied, and denied the motion for class certification, citing lack of subject-matter jurisdiction while a proposed complaint was pending before a medical-review panel. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the MMA’s applicability but reversed the trial court’s decision on class certification jurisdiction.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the MMA covers all claims for medical malpractice, not limited to bodily injury or death. The court also held that class certification is a proper preliminary determination under the MMA. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for the trial court to consider the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. View "Gierek v. Anonymous 1" on Justia Law

A physician sexually assaulted a twelve-year-old boy during a medical examination that required touching the child's genitals. The child's parents filed a medical malpractice complaint, including a negligent-credentialing claim against the hospital employing the physician. After settling with the hospital, the family sought excess compensation from the Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that neither the sexual assault nor the hospital’s negligence fell within the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA). The trial court denied the motion.The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, granting summary judgment to the defendants. The appellate court held that the defendants could challenge the MMA’s applicability post-settlement, that a negligent-credentialing claim must be based on an underlying act of medical malpractice, and that the physician’s sexual misconduct did not constitute medical malpractice. One judge dissented, arguing that the negligent-credentialing claim need not rest on underlying medical malpractice and that the physician’s misconduct did constitute malpractice.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's denial of summary judgment. The court held that the Fund could challenge whether a claim falls within the MMA after a settlement. It also held that a negligent-credentialing claim falls within the MMA only if the credentialed physician commits an act of medical malpractice. Finally, the court concluded that claims based on sexual assault by a physician during an authorized medical examination can fall within the MMA if the misconduct stems from an inseparable part of the health care being rendered. The court found that the physician’s sexual misconduct in this case fit within this narrow category, and thus, the defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Department of Insurance v. Doe" on Justia Law