Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At age four, B.O. was diagnosed with a mild form of cerebral palsy called spastic diplegia. Subsequently, his parents filed a complaint under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act, claiming that the healthcare providers who attended B.O.'s birth were negligent. Shortly before trial, B.O.'s healthcare providers settled for a sum allowing B.O. to seek excess damages from the Indiana Patients Compensation Fund (PCF). B.O.'s parents then filed a petition for excess damages, after which the PCF disclosed five expert witnesses prepared to testify either that B.O. did not have spastic diplegia or that if he did, it did not result from the conduct of the healthcare providers at his birth. The parents then sought partial summary judgment seeking to limit the issue at trial, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the PCF was precluded from disputing the existence or cause of B.O.'s claimed injury under Ind. Code 34-18-15-3(5). View "Robertson v. B.O." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants, a doctor and hospital, for medical malpractice. Defendants filed motions for a preliminary determination requesting that the trial court dismiss the complaint due to Plaintiff's dilatory conduct. The trial court denied the request. The court of appeals (1) determined that the trial court's order was a final judgment, and (2) affirmed the trial court's order as to the hospital but reversed as to the doctor. The Supreme Court granted transfer and dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that the trial court's order was not a final appealable judgment because it did not dispose of all claims as to all parties and because the trial court's order did not contain the "magic language" of Ind. R. App. P. 2(H)(2). View "Ramsey v. Moore" on Justia Law

Following the death of their full-term baby daughter in utero during labor, Plaintiffs brought an action against the hospital, the Plaintiffs' nurse-midwife, and the nurse-midwife's alleged employer for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed the trial court, holding (1) Plaintiffs' claims were not precluded by the Indiana Child Wrongful Death Act; (2) Plaintiffs were not precluded from maintaining an action for emotional distress under the bystander rule; and (3) Plaintiffs' actions were not barred by the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. Remanded. View "Spangler v. Bechtel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the executor of a decedent's estate, settled medical malpractice claims against several medical care providers for the decedent's wrongful death. Plaintiff then initiated this action against Defendant, the Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund, for damages that exceeded the $250,000 future value of her settlement with the medical providers pursuant to the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. The trial court awarded Plaintiff the full amount. Defendant appealed, challenging the trial court's ruling that damages under the Adult Wrongful Death Statute (AWDS) included expenses of administration, contingent attorney fees, and loss of services. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that such damages may be sought under the AWDS. View "Ind. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Brown" on Justia Law

Jacob Gordon's mother sued Howard Community Hospital, alleging it committed medical malpractice while caring for her newborn son. In another count of the complaint, the mother sought separate damages for spoliation, alleging that the hospital had lost certain medical records associated with Gordon's care and that this loss made it impossible for Gordon to pursue a medical malpractice claim against one of his doctors, who was also a defendant. The trial court granted the Gordons partial summary judgment with respect to the third-party spoliation claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and reversed the grant of partial summary judgment, holding that because the Court had so far declined to recognize a count alleging spoliation as representing a separate cause of action, the hospital was entitled to summary judgment on that claim. Remanded. View "Howard Reg'l Health Sys. v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Following the death of his mother, Jeffery McCabe asserted a medical malpractice claim against his mother's medical care providers, who agreed to a settlement sufficient to allow McCabe to petition Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund for additional compensation. McCabe then filed an action pursuant to the Adult Wrongful Death Statute (AWDS), seeking additional recovery from the Fund for, inter alia, medical expenses and attorney fees. The trial granted granted partial summary judgment to the Fund, finding that the AWDS does not allow recovery of attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the entry of partial summary judgment, holding that reasonable attorney fees incurred in the prosecution of an action under the AWDS are within the damages permitted by the statute. Remanded. View "McCabe v. Comm'r, Ind. Dep't of Ins." on Justia Law

Defendant Hematology-Oncology of Indiana, a health care provider, appealed a trial court judgment awarding attorney fees and litigation expenses brought under the Adult Wrongful Death Statute (AWDS) and the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA). The trial court entered judgment against defendants for $108,509 in attorney fees and litigation expenses in addition to a $229,148 judgment on the jury verdict for damages exclusive of attorney fees and expenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer, holding (1) the trial court's award of attorney and litigation expenses was authorized by the AWDS; and (2) the total judgment, including both the jury's damage verdict and the attorney fees and expenses, exceeded the cap limiting damages against individual providers under the MMA. The Court affirmed in part and remanded to limit the provider's aggregate liability to the $250,000 cap prescribed by the MMA. View "Hematology-Oncology of Ind., P.C. v. Fruits" on Justia Law