Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Medical Malpractice
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The Indiana Supreme Court dealt with a medical malpractice case where Penny Korakis sued two doctors and a hospital for injuries she sustained from an automobile accident. The central issue was whether the state's summary-judgment standard required a medical expert to expressly state the applicable standard of care in his affidavit. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the applicable standard of care may be inferred from the content of the affidavit, provided it contains substantively sufficient information. The court also insisted that the affidavit must include a statement that the treatment fell below the standard of care.To apply this new rule, the court examined an affidavit by Dr. James E. Kemmler, who had testified about the malpractice case. The court found that Dr. Kemmler's credentials and detailed judgment about the case were sufficient to infer the standard of care. Moreover, Dr. Kemmler concluded in his affidavit that the treatment received by Korakis fell below the standard of care. As a result, the court determined that his affidavit created a genuine issue of material fact about the alleged breach of the standard of care by one of the doctors, Dr. Michael R. Messmer. The court therefore reversed the summary judgment for Dr. Messmer. However, it affirmed the summary judgment for the other doctor and the hospital, concluding that they were entitled to summary judgment. View "Korakis v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend" on Justia Law

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Edward Zaragoza, an inmate suffering from hypothyroidism, filed a lawsuit against three prison physicians and their employer. Zaragoza claimed that the doctors' treatment decisions, specifically their refusal to provide alternative medication despite the severe side effects he experienced from the prescribed medication, amounted to medical malpractice and deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. The Indiana Supreme Court found that Zaragoza's expert's affidavit, which challenged the doctors' treatment decisions, was both admissible and substantively sufficient to create an issue of fact in the malpractice case. The court also found that there were disputes over whether the doctors knowingly failed to offer Zaragoza a potentially safer alternative medication. Thus, the court ruled that summary judgment was not warranted and reversed the trial court's decision, allowing Zaragoza's claims to proceed to trial. The court emphasized that summary judgment is not a summary trial and that genuine issues of material fact remained to be determined by a factfinder after a trial. View "Zaragoza v. Wexford of Indiana, LLC" on Justia Law

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In this case considering Sword v. NKC Hospitals, Inc., 417 N.E.2d 142 (Ind. 1999), and the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 429's reasoning and application to a non-hospital diagnostic medical imaging center, the Supreme Court held that Sword and section 429's apparent agency principles apply to non-hospital medical entities that provide patients with health care.In Sword, the Supreme Court adopted section 429 and held that a hospital may be held vicariously liable for the tortious conduct of an independent contractor through apparent or ostensible agency. In the instant case, Plaintiff alleged medical malpractice related to his MRI and imaging care. Marion Open MRI moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not liable for the actions of the radiologist with whom Marion Open MRI contracted. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Marion Open MRI, finding that Indiana's appellate court have applied Sword's apparent agent principles only to hospitals and not to non-hospital medical entities. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Sword and its apparent agency rules apply to non-hospital medical entities. View "Arrendale v. Orthopaedics Northeast, P.C." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that a breach of contract claim for failure to indemnify need not follow the procedures contained in the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA).While Joseph Shaughnessy was a patient at Franciscan Alliance, Inc., Lake Imaging LLC interpreted two CT scans performed on Joseph. Joseph subsequently died. Joseph's sons filed with the Department of Insurance (DOI) a proposed medical-malpractice complaint against Franciscan without naming Lake Imaging. The DOI served the proposed complaint on Franciscan, which settled with the Shaughnessys. Franciscan then filed suit against Lake Imaging, alleging breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the claim. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that because Franciscan's claim rested on Lake Imaging's alleged medical negligence, the MMA's two-year statute of limitations applied, and thus the complaint was untimely filed. See Ind. Code § 34-18- 7-1(b). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the MMA did not apply in this case, and therefore, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction and the MMA's statute of limitations did not apply. View "Lake Imaging LLC v. Franciscan Alliance, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate panel affirming the decision of the trial court to deny Appellant's request to amend her complaint alleging negligence against numerous healthcare providers to allege a violation of 42 U.S.C. 1395dd, the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), holding that EMTALA's statute of limitations did not preempt an amendment.Appellant's grandson killed her husband after receiving treatment for his mental illness and dangerous propensities. Appellant sued her grandson's healthcare providers, alleging that their negligent care and treatment of her grandson led to her husband's death. Appellant subsequent moved to amend her complaint under Indiana Trial Rule 15(C) to allege a violation of EMTALA, which has a two-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the request, and an appellate penal affirmed, concluding that the statute of limitations preempted an amendment under Rule 15(C). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that EMTALA's statute of limitations did not preempt an amendment under Trial Rule 15(C). View "Miller v. Patel" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court granting summary judgment to Defendant and dismissing Plaintiff's fraudulent concealment claim, holding that Plaintiff's claim was untimely.Plaintiff, having been misinformed of a medical diagnosis by her provider, brought this medical malpractice complaint seeking relief for her injuries on grounds of fraudulent concealment, despite expiration of the applicable limitation period. The trial court ruled for Defendant. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that Defendant's fraudulent concealment of her test results tolled the five-year limitation period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) fraudulent concealment may not extend the time in which to file a claim; and (2) even if the limitation period were subject to tolling, Defendant's constructive fraud precluded equitable relief. View "Blackford v. Welborn Clinic" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court accepted a question certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and answered that the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act applies when a plaintiff alleges that a qualified healthcare provider treated someone else negligently and that the negligent treatment injured the plaintiff.Plaintiff was the husband and father of two individuals killed in a car crash caused by Physician's patient. Plaintiff filed a civil action in federal court alleging that Physician's negligence in prescribing opiates to his patient caused the wrongful deaths of his wife and daughter. The state insurance commissioner, who administered the Patient's Compensation Fund, received permission to intervene. Plaintiff settled with Physician, who was dismissed. Plaintiff then sought excess damages from the Fund. The Fund responded that it had no liability because the underlying claim was not covered by the Act. The district court entered judgment for the Fund. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit certified to questions to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court declined to answer question one and answered question two in the affirmative, holding that the Act applies where a plaintiff alleges that a qualified healthcare provider's negligent treatment of someone else caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury. View "Cutchin v. Beard" on Justia Law

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In this negligence action, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendant, holding that a juror should have been struck for cause based on bias and that there was prejudice because Plaintiff, the party objecting to the juror, was forced to exhaust her last peremptory challenge and accept and objectionable juror.The estate of Kandace Pyles brought a negligence claim against various medical providers, including Defendant. The juror in this case stated that he did not want to serve as a juror, that he had a favorable impression of doctors, and that he would not be able to assess noneconomic damages. Plaintiff moved to strike the juror for cause, and the trial court denied the motion. Plaintiff used her final peremptory challenge on the juror. After a trial, the jury found that Defendant was not negligent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the trial court's decision to deny Plaintiff's for-cause challenge was illogical and that a new trial was appropriate. View "Clark v. Mattar" on Justia Law

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The anti-SLAPP statute was inapplicable in this medical malpractice action filed by two minors and their parents against a doctor who reported suspected medical child abuse to the Department of Child Services (DSC).The doctor here argued that the lawsuit was a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) and that her report to DCS was protected speech shielded by Indiana’s anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court agreed with the doctor and dismissed the lawsuit. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the anti-SLAPP statute was inapplicable because to be protected under the statute a person’s actions must be “in furtherance of” his or her right of petition or free speech and “in connection with a public issue” (see Ind. Code 34-7-7-5); and (2) because Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was not filed to stifle the doctor’s speech on a public issue but to recover damages for alleged medical malpractice, the suit was not the type of suit the anti-SLAPP statute was enacted to prevent. View "Gresk v. Demetris" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed a proposed malpractice complaint alleging that Defendant’s medical and surgical treatment of Plaintiff’s wife failed to meet the appropriate standard of care, resulting in her death. In addition to the complaint, Plaintiff submitted to the Medical Review Panel (MRP) his wife’s medical records and a narrative statement. The MRP found that Defendant had met the applicable standard of care. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a complaint in court. Plaintiff named as an expert a hematologist who was expected to testify that Defendant had failed to prescribe the appropriate dosage of anticoagulation medication. Defendant moved to strike the hematologist’s opinion on grounds that Plaintiff’s submission to the MRP did not allege malpractice relating to the anticoagulation medication and so Plaintiff could not pursue the claim in court. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Plaintiff was allowed to raise theories of alleged malpractice during litigation following the MRP process. The Supreme Court granted transfer and adopted and incorporated by reference the Court of Appeals opinion, holding that the Court of Appeals’ opinion was consistent with Miller v. Memorial Hospital of South Bend, Inc. View "McKeen v. Turner" on Justia Law