Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant, R.L. Turner Corporation, filed suit against Appellee, the Town of Brownsburg. The court subsequently granted Appellee's petition for attorneys' fees. The court of appeals affirmed. Appellant appealed, contending, principally, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order on fees because entering a final judgment terminates a trial court's jurisdiction and the order granting Appellee's motion to dismiss constituted a final judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in awarding the petition, and noting that jurisdictional concepts were the wrong analytical tool for determining whether an Indiana trial court's post-judgment action was a valid exercise of its authority. View "R.L. Turner Corp. v. Town of Brownsburg" on Justia Law

The City of Kokomo terminated the employment of Mark Thatcher, a police officer, after Thatcher sustained a knee injury in the line of duty. Thatcher was a member of the 1977 Fund, a disability and pension fund for police officers. Thatcher began receiving disability benefits subsequent to his injury. After Thatcher's knee was repaired, he sought reinstatement to active duty. The City decided not to reinstate Thatcher, who was fifty years of age and had completed four years of service in the police department, based on Ind. Code 36-8-4-7(a). Thatcher brought claims in federal district court against the City and Kokomo Police Department (KPD) under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Americans with Disabilities Act. The Supreme Court accepted certification and held that the City correctly determined that Thatcher was statutorily prohibited from returning to the KPD, as (1) section 36-8-4-7(a) applies to a member of the 1977 Fund who is receiving disability benefits and who has been determined to have been recovered; and (2) the time period during which a person receives disability benefits does not count toward "years of service" as that term is used in section 36-8-4-7(a). View "Thatcher v. City of Kokomo " on Justia Law

While driving a sedan, Carol Shipley rear-ended Reginald Person's eighteen-wheeler. Person sued Shipley for injuries that he claimed he had sustained in the accident. During trial, the trial court admitted testimony of two experts retained by Shipley that opined that it was unlikely the accident caused Person's injuries. The jury later returned a defense verdict in favor of Shipley and awarded no damages to Person. Person appealed, contending that the trial court erred when it permitted Shipley's experts to testify that Person's lower-back injury was not likely caused by the rear-ending accident because the impact on Person's truck was minimal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the experts' testimony under Ind. R. Evid. 702 and in finding (1) the experts were qualified to offer their opinions, and (2) the experts' opinions were based on reliable scientific principles that could be applied to the facts at issue. View "Person v. Shipley" on Justia Law

While operating a truck, Henry Bennett rear-ended John Richmond's vehicle. Richmond and his wife sued Bennett for injuries Richmond sustained in the collision. During trial, a psychologist testified that Richmond experienced a traumatic brain injury in the accident. The jury returned a judgment in favor of Richmond. Bennett appealed, contending that the trial court erred when it admitted the psychologist's causation testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the psychologist's causation testimony under Ind. R. Evid. 702 where (1) the psychologist was qualified to offer his opinion as to the cause of Richmond's brain injury, and (2) the psychologist's testimony was based on reliable scientific principles that could be applied to the facts at issue. View "Bennett v. Richmond" on Justia Law

Robin Everhart filed suit against the Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund (PCF) to recover excess damages after settling a wrongful death claim against an emergency room physician in whose care her husband died. The PCF asked the trial court to reduce its award of damages to account for the twenty percent change that Robin's husband would have died anyway, even in the absence of the physician's negligence. The trial court declined to do so, awarding Robin the statutory maximum of $1 million in excess damages. The Supreme Court affirmed but on slightly different grounds, holding that the PCF was required to pay the statutory maximum in excess damages and was not entitled to a set-off because of how the trial court's peculiar findings of fact interacted with the rules for calculating a set-off. View "Ind. Dep't of Ins. v. Everhart" on Justia Law

After an automobile collision in which Travis Becker struck Rickey Whitaker, Whitaker filed suit for personal injuries. Thereafter, Whitaker's lawyer ignored repeated requests to provide information about his client's medical treatment, responded only after the trial court ordered him to do so, and then supplied false and misleading information in a way that damaged Becker's ability to ascertain the facts necessary to litigate the case. Becker's counsel filed a motion for sanctions. The trial court found that Whitaker and his lawyer had acted in bad faith and dismissed the case. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, holding that the court acted within its discretion in making it clear to counsel that this type of behavior was unacceptable. View "Whitaker v. Becker" on Justia Law

Players on a local youth soccer team sought to recover under the state youth soccer governing association's business auto-insurance policy for injuries sustained when the van in which they were riding was involved in an accident. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the association's insurance carrier. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that under the relevant insurance policy language, the rented van was not being used in the business of the association at the time of the accident. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding that because Castro was not using the automobile "in the business" of the association, a condition for coverage under the insurance policy at issue, the policy provided no coverage to the injured players. View "Haag v. Castro" on Justia Law

Following the death of their full-term baby daughter in utero during labor, Plaintiffs brought an action against the hospital, the Plaintiffs' nurse-midwife, and the nurse-midwife's alleged employer for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed the trial court, holding (1) Plaintiffs' claims were not precluded by the Indiana Child Wrongful Death Act; (2) Plaintiffs were not precluded from maintaining an action for emotional distress under the bystander rule; and (3) Plaintiffs' actions were not barred by the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. Remanded. View "Spangler v. Bechtel" on Justia Law

Appellant Indiana Spine Group provided medical services to employees of various businesses for injuries the employees sustained arising out of and during the course of their employment. The employers authorized the services and made partial payments. In each case, more than two years after the last payments were made to the injured employee, Appellant filed with the worker's compensation board an application for adjustment of claim seeking the balance of payments. The Board dismissed the applications as untimely. In each case the court of appeals reversed and remanded. At issue on appeal was what limitation period was applicable to a medical provider's claim seeking payment of outstanding bills for authorized treatment to an employer's employee when the Worker's Compensation Act was silent on the question. The Supreme Court reversed the Board, holding (1) the limitation period contained in the general statute of limitation enumerated in Ind. Code 34-11-1-2 controlled; and (2) because Appellant's claim was timely under the statute, the Board erred by dismissing Appellant's application. View "Indiana Spine Gp., PC v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured by a golf ball at a golf outing. Plaintiff filed an action against four Defendants, her grandfather, the golfer who hit the ball that struck her, a tavern that promoted the event, and the operator of the golf course. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of each Defendant. Plaintiff appealed, claiming that genuine issues of material fact existed to preclude summary judgment on her claims of general negligence, negligent supervision, and premises liability of Defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was a sports participant's liability to others. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the golfer and the golf course operator but reversed summary judgment as to the tavern and the grandfather, holding (1) a participant in a sporting event may owe a duty of care to protect others from inherent risks of the sport, and (2) summary judgment is proper due to the absence of breach of duty when the conduct of a sports participant is within the range of ordinary behavior of participants in the sport and therefore is reasonable as a matter of law. View "Pfenning v. Lineman" on Justia Law