Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A driver hit Britney Meux, who later died from her injuries, and fled the scene. The State charged the alleged driver, Jason Cozmanoff, with thirteen crimes, including one count of reckless homicide. A few weeks later, Meux’s Estate sued Cozmanoff for wrongful death. The Estate then served Cozmanoff with discovery requests. If Cozmanoff were to invoke the Fifth Amendment and refuse to comply with the Estate’s requests, the civil jury could infer he was liable for causing Meux’s death. But if he were to provide discovery responses, the State could use his testimony and responses against him in his criminal trial. Cozmanoff moved to stay the civil case pending the resolution of his criminal prosecution, citing his Fifth Amendment privilege. The trial court granted a limited stay of discovery but ordered him to respond to the plaintiff’s complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a stay. View "Hardiman v. Cozmanoff" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a college freshman and a fraternity pledge, sustained injuries in an incident at the fraternity. Claiming that his injuries resulted from a fraternity hazing incident, Plaintiff sought damages from the college, the campus local fraternity, the national fraternity, and one of the fraternity members. The trial court granted summary judgment for the college and the two fraternity organizations. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment for the campus fraternity but affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the college and the national fraternity organization, holding (1) the college and the national fraternity were each entitled to judgment as a matter of law; but (2) as to the local fraternity, there remained genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment. Remanded. View "Yost v. Wabash College" on Justia Law

A fire destroyed a restaurant insured by Insurers. The Insurers brought suit against the City of Indianapolis and Veolia Water Indianapolis, LLC - a private, for-profit company responsible for operating the City’s water utility pursuant to a contract with the City - claiming that the water supply in the hydrants near the restaurant was inadequate to fight the fire. The City claimed sovereign immunity under both the common law and the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA). Veolia also claimed common law sovereign immunity from liability. The trial court concluded that the City and Veolia were not entitled to sovereign immunity regarding the adequacy of the water supply. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the trial court’s rulings that Veolia was not entitled to common law sovereign immunity and that the City was not entitled to statutory sovereign immunity from liability for damages resulting from an inadequate water supply; and (2) reversed the trial court’s ruling that the City was not entitled to common law sovereign immunity, as a governmental unit’s failure to provide adequate fire protection is an exception to governmental tort liability under Campbell v. State. View "Veolia Water Indianapolis, LLC v. Nat’l Trust Ins. Co." on Justia Law

After a police officer rear-ended Plaintiff's vehicle, Plaintiff submitted a tort claim notice to the City of Indianapolis. Plaintiff and her husband subsequently filed a complaint against the City and the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, alleging Plaintiff suffered personal injuries as a direct result of the police officer's negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs. The City appealed, arguing that Plaintiff's tort claim notice did not substantially comply with the requirements of the Indiana Tort Claims Act because, on the form, Plaintiff stated that she suffered no injuries from the accident. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's notice complied with the requirements of Ind. Code 48-8001; and (2) although the notice stated "no injuries," the statute as amended no longer requires any statement regarding injuries, and the legislature did not intend to penalize claimants for including information beyond what the statute requires. View "City of Indianapolis v. Buschman" on Justia Law

In 2008, a jury awarded John Doe $150,000 in punitive damages as part of a judgment in Doe's lawsuit against a priest for childhood sexual abuse. The priest moved to reduce the punitive damages pursuant to the statutory cap. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the statutory cap and allocation statutes violated the State Constitution's separation of governmental powers provision and right to a jury trial in civil cases provision. The State subsequently intervened. In 2011, the trial court issued an order declaring that the statutory cap and allocation statutes violated the separation of powers and right to a jury trial. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statutes did not violate the Indiana Constitution. Remanded with instructions to grant the priest's motion to reduce the punitive damages to the statutory maximum. View "State v. Doe" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Katherine and Michael, were living together in a home that was destroyed by a fire in 1998. Seeking to rebuild their home, Michael and Katherine completed an application for property insurance with American Family Mutual Insurance Company. American Family issued the policy. In 2003, Plaintiffs' garage was destroyed in a fire, and Plaintiffs filed a claim with American Family. During follow-up investigations, Michael disclosed the 1998 fire to American Family. American Family, treating the prior fire loss nondisclosure as a misrepresentation, voided the insurance policy ab initio and denied Plaintiffs' claim. Plaintiffs filed suit against American Family claiming breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted summary judgment for American Family. Plaintiffs appealed, challenging the grant of summary judgment on grounds that American Family failed to return the premiums paid by Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' assignment of error was not properly before the Court on appeal. View "Dodd v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A steel fabrication company deposited solid waste on a landowner's property, after which the landowner (Plaintiff) filed a complaint seeking damages against multiple parties (Defendants) and on multiple grounds, including a claim for an environmental legal action (ELA). Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on his environmental legal action claim and sought to impose corporate liability on Defendants. Defendants filed cross motions for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims, except for his claim of negligence. The trial court denied Plaintiff's motions and granted Defendants' motions as to all claims, leaving for trial only Plaintiff's negligence claim and the claims of potential liability against Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that summary judgment was (1) not proper for either party on Plaintiff's ELA claim; (2) not proper for Defendants on Plaintiff's illegal dumping, fraud, nuisance, and trespass claims; (3) proper for Defendants on Plaintiff's unjust enrichment and intentional torts claims; (4) proper for certain defendants on Plaintiff's responsible corporate officer claim but improper as to others; and (5) proper for Plaintiff on his claims against one defendant as responsible corporate officer. View "Reed v. Reid" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff experienced dizziness and difficulty walking, she was admitted into a medical clinic (Clinic) and seen by the on-duty physician (Doctor). Doctor diagnosed Plaintiff with vertigo. Two days later, Plaintiff was unable to move her right arm or leg and was later diagnosed with having suffered a stroke. Defendant subsequently filed a complaint alleging negligence by Doctor and Clinic (collectively, Defendants) for the failure to diagnose a transient stroke. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $1.25 million but denied Plaintiff's motion for prejudgment interest. The court thereafter denied Defendants' motion for a new trial based upon the cumulative effect of Plaintiff's counsel's alleged unprofessional conduct during the trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Defendants' motion for a new trial, despite Plaintiff's counsel's dissatisfying behavior; and (2) denying the discretionary award of prejudgment interest. View "Wisner v. Laney" on Justia Law

After an automobile collision involving Driver, Plaintiff sued Driver. When Driver passed away, Plaintiff amended her complaint to substitute the Administrator of Driver's estate. A jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded her $210,000 in damages. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion asking the trial court to award her prejudgment interest pursuant to the Tort Prejudgment Interest Statute (TPIS). The trial court enied Plaintiff's motion because her damages were not ascertainable within a time frame that justified an award of prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the TPIS abrogates and supplants the common law prejudgment interest rules in cases covered by the statute; and (2) Plaintiff's motion for prejudgment interest should have been evaluated as provided in the statute and not on abrogated common law. Remanded for reconsideration of the motion. View "Kosarko v. Padula" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's vehicle was rear-ended by Driver's vehicle. Plaintiff sued Driver and settled with his insurer for $50,000, the maximum of Driver's automobile liability policy. Plaintiff then sought an additional $50,000 under her underinsured motorist (UIM) policy with State Farm. State Farm declined to award the requested amount. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff in the amount of $50,000. The trial court declined Plaintiff's motion for prejudgment interest pursuant to the Tort Prejudgment Interest Statute (TPIS). Plaintiff appealed the trial court's denial of her motion for prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the TPIS does apply to UIM coverage disputes; (2) because prejudgment interest is a collateral litigation expense, it can be awarded in excess of an insured's UIM policy limits; but (3) Plaintiff was not entitled to prejudgment interest because the trial court acted within its discretion when it denied her request for prejudgment interest. View "Inman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law