Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

DePuy Orthopaedics, an Indiana corporation with its principal place of business in Indiana, sold a prosthetic hip implant that Plaintiffs, nineteen individuals, had implanted during hip replacement surgeries in Virginia and Mississippi. After DePuy issued a voluntary global recall of the prosthetic hip implant Plaintiffs filed suit in Marion Superior Court, alleging injuries related to the hip replacement equipment. DePuy moved to transfer venue to Virginia and Missisippi on the grounds of forum non conveniens pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(C). The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to have reasonably concluded that Indiana was the appropriate forum for this litigation. View "DePuy Orthopaedics, Inc. v. Brown" on Justia Law

Indiana Restorative Dentistry, P.C. (“IRD”) insured its dentist’s office under a policy issued by ProAssurance Indemnity Company, Inc. (“ProAssurance”) and procured through the Laven Insurance Agency, Inc. (“Laven”). After a fire destroyed the entire IRD office, IRD discovered that the contents coverage of its insurance policy was inadequate to cover its loss. IRD sued ProAssurance and Laven in tort and contract. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for ProAssurance, concluding that Laven had no duty to advise based on a special relationship, that Laven had no contractual duty to procure insurance that would have fully covered the fire losses, and that ProAssurance was not vicariously liable for the alleged acts or omissions of Laven. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) genuine issues of material fact remained regarding the existence of a special relationship between IRD and Laven and, consequently, a duty to advise; and (2) Laven had no duty to procure full coverage because there was no evidence showing a “meeting of the minds” on an implied contract requiring Laven to procure a policy that would cover all losses to office contents. View "Ind. Restorative Dentistry, P.C. v. Laven Ins. Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

The operator of a wholesale greenhouse business hired a contractor to remove a large tree at its business. As a result of the work, the contractor received the wood from the removed tree, and the business paid the contractor $600. To complete the work, the contractor hired Appellant, a tree climber-cutter, to remove the trunk of the tree. Appellant was severely injured while working and rendered a paraplegic. The business brought this declaratory judgment action seeking to establish that it had no secondary liability because the value of the work by the contractor was less than $1,000. The trial court granted summary judgment for the business. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the “value” attributable to the performance of work that triggers secondary liability under Ind. Code 22-3-2-14(b) includes both direct monetary payment as well as ancillary consideration received for the work; and (2) the business was not entitled to summary judgment because it failed to designate evidence establishing that the undisputed value of the ancillary consideration it received - the wood - plus the $600 monetary payment did not exceed $1,000. View "Young v. Hood’s Gardens, Inc." on Justia Law

A seventeen-year-old high school student with Down Syndrome choked to death during lunchtime in the school cafeteria. The parents of the child sued the school and several administrators, alleging negligence, wrongful death, and federal civil rights violations. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court erred by granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of Plaintiffs’ compliance with the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA) notice requirement, as material issues of fact remained as to whether Plaintiffs complied with the ITCA notice requirement; and (2) Plaintiffs’ state law claims for negligence and wrongful death were not ripe for summary judgment. View "Lyons v. Richmond Cmty. Sch. Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Defendants for fraudulently failing to disclose defects in a home on a sales disclosure form. The trial court awarded compensatory damages but not fees, costs, or exemplary damages under the Crime Victims Relief Act (CVRA). Plaintiffs moved to correct error, asserting that the court was required to award fees and costs because they had established the CVRA predicate crime of deception. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in compensating Plaintiffs for their common-law damages but refusing to award attorney fees or exemplary damages under the CVRA, as Plaintiffs’ complaint encompassed multiple alternative theories of liability not limited to the CVRA, and a court need not impose CVRA liability when it believes ordinary tort liability will do. View "Wysocki v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was seriously injured when she was hit by a ball while attending a South Shore RailCats baseball game at their home stadium, the U.S. Steelyard. Plaintiff filed negligence and premises liability claims against South Shore Baseball and the Steelyard, alleging that Defendants breached their duty to her because they failed to extend protective netting far enough to protect her. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff was a mere licensee, and therefore, South Shore fulfilled its duty to warn her of latent dangers. The trial court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims. View "S. Shore Baseball, LLC v. DeJesus" on Justia Law

In November 2006, The Good Samaritan Home, a nursing home where Venita Hargis was living, told Hargis’s family that Hargis had suffered a fall. Hargis died later that month as a result of the injury she sustained in the alleged fall. In November 2009, Hargis’s family discovered that Hargis’s injury had been caused by an attack from another resident and not by a fall. In October 2011, Hargis’s Estate filed a wrongful death complaint against Good Samaritan, alleging that Good Samaritan negligently caused Hargis’s death and then fraudulently concealed its negligence. Good Samaritan filed a motion to dismiss the complaint due to the Estate’s failure to file the action within two years of Hargis’s death. The trial court dismissed the complaint, concluding that fraudulent concealment does not extend or delay the two-year statutory period to file a wrongful death action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that if a plaintiff makes the necessary factual showing, the fraudulent concealment statute may apply to toll the Wrongful Death Act’s two-year filing period. View "Alldredge v. Good Samaritan Home, Inc." on Justia Law

After Plaintiffs’ eighteen-year-old son, a freshman pledge of a college fraternity, died from acute alcohol ingestion, Plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against the national fraternity, the local fraternity, and the college. The trial court granted summary judgment for the national fraternity. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not err in (1) denying Plaintiffs’ motion to strike an affidavit and two purported interview transcriptions designated as evidentiary material by the national fraternity; and (2) entering summary judgment for the national fraternity, as the national fraternity did not have a duty to insure the safety of the freshman pledges at the local fraternity and was not subject to vicarious liability for the actions of the local fraternity, its officers, or its members. View "Smith v. Delta Tau Delta, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs obtained a homeowners insurance policy from American Family Mutual Insurance Company. After Plaintiffs’ home sustained substantial fire damage, a dispute arose regarding the amount of insurance claim benefits payable under the policy. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint against American Family and Michael Meek, the insurance agent through whom they obtained their insurance, for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that Plaintiffs failed to commence the action within the applicable statute of limitations. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court was correct to grant summary judgment on the basis of the applicable two-year statute of limitations. View "Groce v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

An underinsured motorist collided with a city bus driven by Plaintiff. Plaintiff received a net workers’ compensation award of $71,958. Plaintiff also received $25,000 from the tortfeasor’s insurer. Plaintiff carried an underinsured (UM) policy issued by American Family Mutual Insurance Company that provided coverage up to $50,000 per person. Plaintiff submitted a UM claim to American Family, which denied coverage. Plaintiff filed a breach of contract action against American Family, asserting that he was entitled, under the terms of the policy, to $25,000 - the difference between his UM policy limit of $50,000 and the $25,000 he received from the tortfeasor’s insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment for American Family, concluding that the workers’ compensation benefits Plaintiff received operated as a setoff against the policy limit, thus reducing American Family’s liability to zero. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the policy language unambiguously provided for a setoff against the policy limit; but (2) because this particular set-off would reduce the policy limit below the statutory minimum, Plaintiff was entitled to recover the remaining $25,000 from American Family. View "Justice v. Am. Family Ins. Co." on Justia Law