Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Cedric Lewis was pulled over for speeding and arrested when the police officer discovered Lewis's driver's license had been suspended. After ordering Lewis out of the vehicle, the officer stuck his head inside the car to tell a passenger to get out and immediately saw a handgun near the driver's seat. Lewis moved to suppress the gun, arguing that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment by sticking his head into the car to search for weapons. The trial court overruled Lewis's objection and found him guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. The court sentenced Lewis to twelve years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the officer's discovery of the gun was not an impermissible search, and (2) the trial court' sentence, just two years above the advisory, was not inappropriate. View "Lewis v. State" on Justia Law

Following the death of his mother, Jeffery McCabe asserted a medical malpractice claim against his mother's medical care providers, who agreed to a settlement sufficient to allow McCabe to petition Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund for additional compensation. McCabe then filed an action pursuant to the Adult Wrongful Death Statute (AWDS), seeking additional recovery from the Fund for, inter alia, medical expenses and attorney fees. The trial granted granted partial summary judgment to the Fund, finding that the AWDS does not allow recovery of attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the entry of partial summary judgment, holding that reasonable attorney fees incurred in the prosecution of an action under the AWDS are within the damages permitted by the statute. Remanded. View "McCabe v. Comm'r, Ind. Dep't of Ins." on Justia Law

Defendant Hematology-Oncology of Indiana, a health care provider, appealed a trial court judgment awarding attorney fees and litigation expenses brought under the Adult Wrongful Death Statute (AWDS) and the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA). The trial court entered judgment against defendants for $108,509 in attorney fees and litigation expenses in addition to a $229,148 judgment on the jury verdict for damages exclusive of attorney fees and expenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer, holding (1) the trial court's award of attorney and litigation expenses was authorized by the AWDS; and (2) the total judgment, including both the jury's damage verdict and the attorney fees and expenses, exceeded the cap limiting damages against individual providers under the MMA. The Court affirmed in part and remanded to limit the provider's aggregate liability to the $250,000 cap prescribed by the MMA. View "Hematology-Oncology of Ind., P.C. v. Fruits" on Justia Law

Defendant Arturo Garcia-Torres was convicted of rape, attempted rape, and two counts of burglary and was sentenced to thirty-six years in prison. Defendant challenged the use of DNA evidence gathered when police obtained a cheek swab while Defendant was in custody after the attempted rape, arguing it was an invalid search under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding (1) the cheek swab was a search requiring its own separate probable cause proceedings; (2) the cheek swab was taken under a valid consent; and (3) a Pirtle warning requiring the presence and advice of counsel prior to consenting to a search was not required. View "Garcia-Torres v. State" on Justia Law

Steven and Lauren Siwinski, homeowners in the town of Ogden Dunes, rented their home despite receiving a cease and desist letter advising them that that rentals were prohibited by the town zoning ordinances. The town filed suit against the Siwinskis for violating town ordinances. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the town's motion for summary judgment and injunctive relief. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the town in the amount of $40,000. The court of appeals reversed and remanded with instructions that the trial court enter summary judgment in favor of the Siwinskis. On transfer, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the town, holding that the Siwinskis impermissibly rented their dwelling in violation of the town's ordinances. The Court then held that the fine for violating this ordinance should not have exceeded $32,500. Remanded. View "Siwinski v. Town of Ogden Dunes" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Donald Pierce was convicted of four counts of child molesting and adjudicated as a repeat sex offender. The trial court sentenced Pierce to four consecutive sentences for a total term of 124 years and enhanced the sentences by ten years for the repeat sex offender adjudication. Pierce appealed, raising several claims including the appropriateness of his sentence. The state cross-appealed. The court of appeals affirmed in part the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause with instructions to attach an additional fixed ten-year term to one of Pierce's felony sentences to an aggregate term of 134 years. The Supreme Court granted transfer to address Pierce's appropriateness claim. Based on the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, the Court revised the sentence to a total term of 80 years. Remanded. View "Pierce v. State" on Justia Law

Brenda Moore was convicted of public intoxication, a class B misdemeanor, after a public officer pulled over a car in which defendant was riding as a front seat passenger and found defendant had been drinking. A divided court of appeals reversed. On appeal, the defendant argued that her conviction (1) violated public policy because she caused no harm or annoyance and wasn't driving while drinking; and (2) violated her right to consume alcoholic beverages. The Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction, finding (1) whether conduct proscribed by criminal law should be excused under certain circumstances on grounds of public policy is a matter for legislative evaluation and not the courts; and (2) defendant's accountability under the public intoxication statute did not violate her personal liberty rights under the Indiana Constitution. View "Moore v. State" on Justia Law

Countrywide Home Loans, a mortgage holder on certain real estate, foreclosed its mortgage, took title to the property at a sheriff's sale, and then sold the property to a third party. Before these events, the property owners executed a promissory note in favor of Citizens State Bank. When the property owners failed to pay the note, Citizens Bank obtained a judgment in trial court, which was properly recorded. At the time Countrywide filed its foreclosure action, it did not name Citizens Bank as a party. After Countrywide discovered Citizens Bank's judgment lien on the property, Countrywide filed an action to foreclose any interest Citizen Bank may have had on the property. Citizens Bank filed a separate complaint seeking to foreclose its judgment lien. The trial court directed Citizens Bank to redeem Countrywide's mortgage or be barred from asserting its judgment lien. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court also reversed the judgment of the trial court but on different grounds, holding that because Citizen Bank's lien on the property was properly recorded and indexed and because Countrywide did not explain why the lien was overlooked, Countrywide failed to demonstrate that it was entitled to the remedy of strict foreclosure. View "Citizens State Bank of New Castle v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved the placement of juvenile A.B., who was being detained at a juvenile center. The juvenile court concluded that A.B. be placed out of state at Canyon State Academy where A.B. could learn to be independent. The Department of Child Services (DCS) overruled the decision, requiring A.B. to be placed at one of several facilities in Indiana. The trial court entered an order of modification, finding that three sections of the Indiana Code allowing the director of DCS to supplant the juvenile court judge in making dispositional decrees affecting children under his jurisdiction were unconstitutional. DCS appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order regarding the constitutionality of the statues, holding that the three statutes do not violate the separation of powers provision of the Indiana constitution. The Court then held that the DCS requirement that A.B. be placed in Indiana rather than out of state at Canyon State Academy was arbitrary and capricious, upheld the trial court's placement of A.B. at Canyon State Academy, and ordered DCS to pay for the placement. View "A.B. v. State" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to child molesting, defendant Michael Harris was sentenced to a prison term of ten years and was required to register on the sex offender list for ten years following his release. Prior to his release, the Department of Correction (DOC) notified Harris that he was required to register as a sexually violent predator (SVP) with local law enforcement for his lifetime. Harris filed a complaint in the circuit court for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the DOC, arguing that the DOC lacked the authority to make an SVP determination. The trial court granted Harris relief, thereby removing his SVP status. The court of appeals affirmed, holding the DOC was not authorized by statute to determine Harris's status as an SVP and that his status did not change by operation of law under an amendment to the Sex Offender Registration Act. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, finding that Harris's status in fact changed by operation of law and that this change did not violate Indiana's prohibition on ex post facto laws or doctrine of separation of powers. View "Lemmon v. Harris" on Justia Law