Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An employee of a concrete subcontractor was injured in a workplace accident during the construction of a stadium. The employee sought to recover damages for negligence from the project's construction manager by whom she was not employed but whom she contended had a legal duty of care for jobsite-employee safety. The trial court ruled in the employee's favor that the construction manager could be held vicariously liable for the actions of the subcontractor. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed the trial court, holding (1) the construction manager was not vicariously liable to the worker for any negligence of the subcontractor because the construction manager and subcontractor did not have the requisite relationship; and (2) the construction manager did not have, either by the terms of its contracts or by its actions, a legal duty of care for jobsite-employee safety, and therefore the construction manager could not be held liable to the employee for negligence. Remanded. View "Hunt Constr. Group, Inc. v. Garrett" on Justia Law

John Witt, HydroTech Corporation, and attorney Mark Shere (Appellants) were held in contempt of court for violating the terms of a temporary restraining order (TRO). The contempt holding arose from protracted litigation in a lawsuit over the costs of an environmental cleanup. The trial court issued the TRO enjoining work on the site until a preliminary injunction hearing could be held. After the TRO was issued, work on the site commenced. The trial court subsequently issued the preliminary injunction. Later, the court held Appellants in contempt and held them jointly and severally liable for $108,487 in costs and attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, concluding that the trial court did not err in holding Witt, Shere, and HydroTech in contempt, determining the sanction, and imposing it jointly and severally. View "Witt v. Jay Petroleum, Inc." on Justia Law

The State entered into a contract with IBM, and the Governor signed the contract. IBM later terminated the contract, after which the State filed suit against IBM asserting breach of contract among other claims. IBM then served notice on the Governor to take his testimonial deposition. The State moved for a protective order, asserting that the Governor's deposition was prohibited based on the Governor's unqualified privilege from arrest on civil process, and from obeying any subpoena to testify, pursuant to Ind. Code 34-29-2-1. The trial court granted IBM's motion with certain limitations. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute clearly precludes a deposition of a sitting Governor. The privilege afforded by the statute is absolute, the Court stated, and once it is invoked, any party protected by the privilege may not be compelled to give testimony. View "State v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp." on Justia Law

A jury found Rodney Nicholson guilty of stalking and harassment, and Nicholson admitted to being a habitual offender. A majority of the court of appeals held that a span of twenty-two months between contacts would not fit the definition of repeated or continuing harassment and therefore would not support a conviction for stalking. The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding that the lag in time between the harassing calls in 2006 and subsequent single call in 2008 did not foreclose the conviction for stalking, as there was no statutorily determine timeframe required for a stalking conviction and there was sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to determine Nicholson engaged in stalking. View "Nicholson v. State" on Justia Law

After Sawmill Creek's taxes became delinquent on its property, the Marion County Auditor set the property for tax sale. A tax deed was issued to McCord Investments upon the petition of the Auditor following the one-year redemption period after a tax sale. The trial court ultimately set aside the tax deed on grounds that the Auditor's effort to notify Sawmill of the tax sale was constitutionally deficient for failing to meet the requirements of due process. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the notices of the tax sale and of Sawmill's right to redeem did not violate due process because, under the Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co. standard, the Auditor's actions were reasonably calculated to provide notice to Sawmill. View "Marion County Auditor v. Sawmill Creek, LLC" on Justia Law

Stephan Odders and Gerald Kerber were former employees of Loparex, a corporation in the release liner industry. Both employees were subject to a one-year noncompetition agreement upon termination of employment. After ceasing employment at Loparex, both employees began employment with MPI Release Technologies, a competitor in the release liner industry. Loparex sued Kerber and Odders (Defendants) in the U.S. district court, seeking injunctive relief under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act and damages resulting from Defendants' breach of the noncompetition agreement. Defendants filed amended answers and counterclaims accusing Loparex of blacklisting in violation of Indiana law. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer questions of state law and held (1) Wabash Railroad Co. v. Young, which held that Indiana's Blacklisting Statute did not provide a cause of action to individuals who voluntarily leave their employment, is no longer good law and individuals who voluntarily leave employment are not barred from making a claim under the Blacklisting Statute; (2) attorney fees are not an element of compensatory damages under the Blacklisting Statute; and (3) an employer's suit against a former employee to protect trade secrets is not a basis for recovery under the Blacklisting Statute. View "Loparex, LLC v. MPI Release Techs., LLC" on Justia Law

After an inspection revealed deplorable health conditions for its residents, an intermediate care facility for the developmentally disabled was decertified for Medicaid reimbursement. As a result, until the State appointed a receiver nine months later, the facility operated without receiving federal or state funds. This case was a common-law claim for expenses the facility laid out in the meantime for the individuals still residing there. The trial court denied the facility restitution for the unpaid months under a theory of quantum meruit, afforded relief under related breach of contract claims, but offset that judgment by the amount the State paid for its receiver. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ultimate judgment, which resulted in neither party taking anything from the action, holding (1) the facility exhausted its administrative remedies; (2) the facility's quantum meruit claim failed; and (3) the state was entitled to set off the amount owed to the facility on the breach of contract claim against the amount the State paid in operating the receivership of the facility and which the facility then owed. View "Woodruff ex rel. Legacy Healthcare, Inc. v. Ind. Family & Social Servs. Admin." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with felony robbery, felony theft, and felony receiving stolen property. Before trial, the trial court permitted a late filing of a habitual-offender charge. The jury found Defendant was guilty of theft and receiving stolen property and determined that White was a habitual offender. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the decision of the court of appeals but summarily affirming the court of appeals' decision that the two convictions violated double jeopardy principles (resulting in vacation of Defendant's conviction for receiving stolen property). The Court then held (1) under the circumstances of this case, Defendant did not preserve the issue of whether the trial court properly allowed the habitual-offender filing; and (2) the authenticated and certified evidence was sufficient to uphold the jury's determination that Defendant was a habitual offender. View "White v. State" on Justia Law

Several family members were injured in a car accident and divided the benefits paid by the tortfeasor's insurer. One family member, Hannah Lakes, also sought to recover under the underinsured motorist (UIM) endorsement of an insurance policy provided by Grange Mutual Casualty Company that applied to all the family members involved in the accident. The trial court granted Grange's motion for summary judgment, holding that the tortfeasor's vehicle was not underinsured because the per-accident limit of his policy was equal to the UIM coverage under the family members' policy. The Supreme Court reversed after reaffirming its decision in Corr v. American Family Insurance, holding that the tortfeasor's vehicle was underinsured because the amount actually paid to Lakes was less than the per-person limit of liability of the under-insurance endorsement. View "Lakes v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co." on Justia Law

Defendant Harold Klinker managed and owned Trucks Unlimited (Trucks), a used-car dealership. Plaintiff First Merchants Bank (FMB) financed Trucks' vehicle inventory. After it was discovered that thirty-one vehicles for which FMB had loaned purchase money were not in Trucks' possession, FMB filed an eight-count complaint against Klinker, Trucks, and others (only Klinker appealed), alleging fraud, among other claims. FMB moved for summary judgment on seven counts, but by then only twenty-two vehicles were missing. The trial court nevertheless granted summary judgment to FMB on all seven counts and awarded treble damages and attorney's fees on the fraud claims under the Indiana Crime Victims' Compensation Act. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment on the fraud claims and treble-damages claims because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether Defendant acted with the requisite criminal intent. View "Klinker v. First Merchants Bank, N.A." on Justia Law