Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After Employee was unable to successfully complete her necessary training, Employer gave her the option to resign immediately or to be placed on a thirty-day unpaid leave of absence. Employee opted to resign immediately and thereafter sought unemployment insurance benefits. The Department of Workforce Development denied Employee's application for benefits on the grounds the Employee voluntarily left employment and did so without good cause. An ALJ concluded (1) Employee did not voluntarily quit her position but was constructively discharged, and (2) Employee was disqualified from receiving benefits because she had breached a duty reasonably owed to her employer, which breach constituted just cause for her termination. The Unemployment Insurance Review Board adopted and approved the ALJ's decision. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Employee's claim, holding (1) the Board's finding that Employee breached a duty reasonably owed to Employer was reasonable; and (2) it was reasonable for the Board to find that Employee was discharged for just cause and was therefore ineligible for benefits. View "Recker v. Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev. Review Bd." on Justia Law

Appellant Indiana Spine Group provided medical services to employees of various businesses for injuries the employees sustained arising out of and during the course of their employment. The employers authorized the services and made partial payments. In each case, more than two years after the last payments were made to the injured employee, Appellant filed with the worker's compensation board an application for adjustment of claim seeking the balance of payments. The Board dismissed the applications as untimely. In each case the court of appeals reversed and remanded. At issue on appeal was what limitation period was applicable to a medical provider's claim seeking payment of outstanding bills for authorized treatment to an employer's employee when the Worker's Compensation Act was silent on the question. The Supreme Court reversed the Board, holding (1) the limitation period contained in the general statute of limitation enumerated in Ind. Code 34-11-1-2 controlled; and (2) because Appellant's claim was timely under the statute, the Board erred by dismissing Appellant's application. View "Indiana Spine Gp., PC v. Pilot Travel Ctrs., LLC" on Justia Law

Franklin Electric formed two new subsidiaries and started new unemployment experience accounts with a low introductory contribution rate for each one, which equaled about half the experience rating of Franklin Electric. The Department of Workforce Development later canceled the subsidiaries' experience accounts, and all experience balances and liabilities reverted to Franklin Electric. The Department also demanded back payments, interest, and a ten percent penalty. A liability administrative law judge (LALJ) affirmed the Department's determination that the three entities were a single employer but waived the penalty imposed by the Department. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and affirmed the determination of the LALJ, holding (1) the new subsidiaries were not new employers because they were not distinct and segregable from Franklin Electric; (2) Franklin Electric's experience rating should have applied to contributions made by the subsidiaries; and (3) because there was no evidence suggesting improper conduct on the part of Franklin Electric, the penalty was not appropriate. View "Franklin Elec. Co. v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals of the Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev." on Justia Law

This case involved the placement of juvenile A.B., who was being detained at a juvenile center. The juvenile court concluded that A.B. be placed out of state at Canyon State Academy where A.B. could learn to be independent. The Department of Child Services (DCS) overruled the decision, requiring A.B. to be placed at one of several facilities in Indiana. The trial court entered an order of modification, finding that three sections of the Indiana Code allowing the director of DCS to supplant the juvenile court judge in making dispositional decrees affecting children under his jurisdiction were unconstitutional. DCS appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order regarding the constitutionality of the statues, holding that the three statutes do not violate the separation of powers provision of the Indiana constitution. The Court then held that the DCS requirement that A.B. be placed in Indiana rather than out of state at Canyon State Academy was arbitrary and capricious, upheld the trial court's placement of A.B. at Canyon State Academy, and ordered DCS to pay for the placement. View "A.B. v. State" on Justia Law

After sustaining serious injuries from an attack by a rottweiler, six-year-old Shawn Davis, through his mother as his next friend, filed a complaint against defendants Animal Control and the City of Evansville for failing to protect Davis from the attack. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that defendants were entitled to law enforcement immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA). The court of appeals reversed, and defendants sought transfer. At issue was whether defendants were enforcing a law under the ITCA or rather failing to follow their own procedures for determining whether an animal is dangerous. The Supreme Court held that the alleged failure of defendants to follow their procedures constituted at worst a failure to enforce a law, for which defendants were immune from liability under the ITCA. Judgment of the trial court affirmed. View "Davis ex rel. Davis v. Animal Control" on Justia Law

The Indiana Attorney General (AG) sought to recover a tax refund issued to Aisin USA Manufacturing, Inc. (Aisin) at the Superior Court. The AG appealed the courtâs decision in favor of Aisin, arguing that because it was a tax matter, the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction to hear matters that âarose underâ the state tax laws. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the case could proceed in the Superior Court. The Court found that despite the AGâs characterization of the case, the refund was a result of accounting and clerical errors within the Department of Revenue that were wholly unrelated to any interpretation or application of tax law. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings in Superior Court.

The City of Indianapolis abandoned the âBarrett Lawâ method of financing sewer improvements in favor of a new system that imposes less of a financial burden on property owners. To ease the transition, the City discharged all outstanding Barnett Law assessments owing as of November 1, 2005, but did not give refunds to those property owners who had previously paid their Barrett Law assessments in full or in part. Plaintiffs Christine Armour and other property owners who had paid their Barrett Law assessments in full petitioned the City for refunds in the amount equal to the assessments discharged in 2005. In their claim, Plaintiffs alleged that the City had violated their federal constitutional rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. At trial, the court granted Plaintiffsâ motion for summary judgment, and the City appealed. On appeal, Plaintiffs abandoned their due process claim and sought to have the equal protection claim sustained. The appellate court affirmed the trial courtâs judgment. The City appealed again. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the City did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because forgiving the outstanding assessment balances was rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The Court reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellant George Janiec, a Republican Party candidate for Mayor of the City of Hammond and an incumbent member of the Hammond School Board, was removed from the May 3, 2011 primary election ballot by Appellee Lake County Board of Election and Registration. Appellant challenged the Boardâs decision in Lake Superior Court, requesting judicial review and injunctive relief. The trial court found in favor of the Board. Appellant appealed the trial courtâs decision and sought immediate transfer of the appeal to the Supreme Court. The Board and Lake Superior Court held that Appellantâs candidacy was inconsistent with the ethical policies applicable to members of the Hammond School Board. The Supreme Court found no basis in statute or law for disqualifying Appellant on this basis, and enjoined the Board from removing Appellantâs name from the ballot in the May 2011 primary election.