Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Indiana Department of Insurance Commissioner reviewed the practices of First American Title Insurance Company, resulting in the generation of a report. Six weeks after the deadline for taking action regarding the report, the Commissioner called for a hearing and appointed an administrative judge. First American filed a petition seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s order. The Commissioner moved to dismiss the petition on grounds that First American failed to submit the agency record as required by the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA). The trial court denied the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss but also denied First American’s petition for judicial review on grounds that First American failed to show that it was prejudiced by the untimely order. Both parties appealed. On cross-appeal, the Commissioner argued, in part, that First American’s petition for judicial review should have been dismissed because First American did not submit an agency record. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in declining to grant the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss the petition in light of First American’s failure to file the agency record with the trial court, as a petitioner for review cannot receive consideration of its petition where the statutorily-defined agency record has not been filed. View "First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Robertson" on Justia Law

One year after the Indiana Department of Education and the Indiana State Board of Education (collectively, “DOE”) approved Teaching Our Posterity Success, Inc. (“TOPS”) as a Supplemental Educational Services provider, the DOE removed TOPS from its list of approved providers. TOPS sought administrative review of that removal. In response, DOE sent TOPS a letter declaring that TOPS will remain removed from the provider list. TOPS filed a petition for judicial review but did not file an official agency record. The trial court dismissed TOPS’ petition on the grounds of its failure to file a timely and complete agency record. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a petitioner seeking judicial review of an agency action must file with the trial court the agency record as defined by the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA); and (2) because TOPS did not file the agency record as anticipated by the AOPA, the trial court properly dismissed its petition for judicial review. View "Teaching Our Posterity Success, Inc. v. Ind. Dep’t of Educ." on Justia Law

Petitioner was fired from her job at the Indiana Department of Workforce Development for alleged misconduct. After it was discovered that Petitioner kept several items of state property in her possession, Petitioner was charged with theft. The charges were later dismissed. Thereafter, the State filed an ethics proceeding against Petitioner, alleging that she violated 42 Ind. Admin. Code 1-5-12. After an adjudicative hearing, the Indiana State Ethics Commission found that Petitioner did commit the alleged violation and barred her from future State executive branch employment. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision, holding (1) double jeopardy did not bar the proceeding before the Commission, and the criminal court’s probable cause determination was not binding upon the Commission; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the Commission’s determination; and (3) the sanction imposed in this case was within the Commission’s discretion. View "Ind. State Ethics Comm’n v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the certificates of death that doctors, coroners, and funeral directors file with county health departments under Ind. Code 16-37-3 are public records that the public may freely obtain from county health departments. In 2012, Rita Ward sent a letter to the Vanderburgh County Health Department requesting certain copies of records created under Ind. Code 16-37-3-3 and maintained by the Department. The Department denied the request. The Evansville Courier & Press newspaper subsequently requested access to certain Vanderburgh County death records. The Department denied the request. Thereafter, Ward and the Courier & Press sued the Department, arguing that the death certificates were public records covered by the Indiana Access to Public Records Act. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Department. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that death certificates are public records that a county health department must provide public access to under the Act. View "Evansville Courier & Press v. Vanderburgh County Health Dep’t" on Justia Law

The Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM), Indiana’s environmental agency, revised its interpretation of the regulatory term “chemical process plants.” After IDEM issued operating permits to two companies for ethanol and ethanol production facilities, NRDC sought administrative review of both permits based on the interpretation of the term “chemical process plants.” The Indiana Office of Environmental Adjudication (OEA) ordered the permits remanded to IDEM. The companies and others sought judicial review of the OEA order. The trial court reversed the OEA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) IDEM was not required to formally amend Indiana’s State Implementation Plan to effectuate its change in how it interprets the regulatory phrase “chemical process plant”; and (2) IDEM’s new interpretation was reasonable and supported the issuance of the permits in this case. View "Nat. Res. Defense Council v. Poet Biorefining- North Manchester, LLC" on Justia Law

The Indianapolis Marion County City-County Council and Mayor Gregory Ballard agreed on an ordinance dividing Marion County into legislative districts. Three members of the Council (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the ordinance failed to comply with the Redistricting Statute for Marion County, which assigns the task of redrawing the County’s legislative districts to the judiciary if the County’s legislative and executive branches become deadlocked over required redistricting. The trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and then drew new legislative districts, concluding that because the Council divided the County by ordinance in 2011, not during 2012 as required by the Redistricting Statute, the ordinance failed to satisfy the requirement for “mandatory redistricting” during 2012. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that this case did not present a redistricting impasse that required judicial intervention. View "Ballard v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In order to renovate a former warehouse building into administrative offices, Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corporation (“School Corporation”) implemented a plan to convey the Building to the EVSC Foundation (“Foundation”), a private non-profit entity, have the Foundation contract with a contractor for the renovations, and then have the Foundation sell the Building back to the School Corporation. School Corporation officials selected this arrangement because the Foundation was not subject to public bidding laws, and therefore, the renovation could occur more quickly. Plaintiffs, several area contracting businesses paying taxes in the school district, filed an action against the School Corporation and the Foundation (together, “Defendants”) claiming that Defendants violated public bidding statutes and Indiana’s Antitrust Act. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, determining that the School Corporation engaged in the transactions to circumvent the public bidding statutes but that the transactions were not unlawful. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the project violated the Public Bidding Laws. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the court of appeals’ opinion holding that the scheme used by Defendants violated the Public Bidding Laws; and (2) concluded that Plaintiffs' antitrust claim failed because Plaintiffs did not present evidence of an antitrust injury. View "Alva Elec., Inc. v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp." on Justia Law

Howard Price was the Fayette County Highway Supervisor from 1991 to 2002 and again resumed the position in 2006. In 2011, the Fayette County Board of Commissioners decided not to reappoint Price as Highway Supervisor. Thereafter, Price brought this action requesting a review of the Board’s decision to terminate his continued employment. The Board filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court treated as a motion for summary judgment, asserting that its employment decision was not subject to judicial review. The trial court denied summary judgment, concluding that the Board’s decision was quasi-judicial in nature and thus subject to judicial review. The court of appeals affirmed on interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Board’s employment decision with respect to Price was a ministerial decision, not a quasi-judicial one, and therefore not subject to judicial review. View "Fayette County Bd. of Comm’rs v. Price" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Common Council of the City of Evansville enacted an ordinance (“the Amending Ordinance”) that amended an existing smoking ban (“the Smoking Ban”). The Amending Ordinance extended the Smoking Ban to bars, taverns, and eating establishments but exempted riverboat casinos from the Smoking Ban. Various bars and private clubs brought actions against the City and its Council, claiming that the Amending Ordinance was unconstitutional. The trial court upheld the constitutionality of the Amending Ordinance, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) on its face, the Amending Ordinance violates the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution because the disparate treatment is not reasonably related to the inherent differences between divergently-related classes; and (2) the Amending Ordinance must be stricken in its entirety. View "Paul Stieler Enters., Inc. v. City of Evansville" on Justia Law

The City of Boonville passed an ordinance to annex 1,165 acres of real estate located west of the city limits. Later that year, numerous landowners opposed to the annexation filed written remonstrance and complaint for declaratory relief. The City moved to dismiss, arguing that the Landowners did not satisfy the statutory requirement that at least sixty-five percent of landowners in the annexed territory sign the remonstrance. At issue in this case was whether the sixty-five percent remonstrance threshold was to be determined by separately counting the multiple parcels acquired by the State for an adjoining public roadway or collectively as one parcel. The trial court ultimately determined that the threshold was not satisfied. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the land in this case, which comprised the portion of the public roadway included in the annexed territory, should be considered and counted as a single parcel in determining whether the remonstrating landowners comprised sixty-five percent of the owners of the annexed territory. View "Am. Cold Storage v. City of Boonville" on Justia Law