Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2007, the Brown County Board of Commissioners enacted an ordinance that established a county-wide fire protection district. In 2008, the newly elected Board enacted an ordinance purporting to dissolve the district. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Board lacked the authority to unilaterally dissolve the district by ordinance absent a petition process. In 2011, the Board amended the ordinance. Several county landowners sued various commissioners and the Board of Trustees, Brown County Fire Protection District seeking a declaration that the amendments were void. The trial court granted summary judgment to the landowners, concluding that the amending ordinance was not a valid exercise of the Board’s authority. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the amended ordinance was a valid exercise of the authority of the Brown County Board of Commissioners. View "Anderson v. Gaudin" on Justia Law

The State filed a complaint against Defendant seeking forfeiture of her 1996 Buick Century automobile under the provisions of the Civil Forfeiture Statute, which provides in relevant part that a vehicle may be seized if it is used or is intended for use by the person in possession of it to facilitate the transportation of stolen property. On cross-motions for summary judgment the trial court deemed the vehicle forfeited and awarded the vehicle to the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State was not entitled to forfeiture of the vehicle because it failed to demonstrate that Defendant was “in possession” of the vehicle as contemplated by the Civil Forfeiture Statute. View "Sargent v. State" on Justia Law

Mrs. Bridgewater, a Fishers Adolescent Catholic Enrichment Society, Inc. (FACES) member parent, filed a complaint with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission, alleging that FACES refused a reasonable accommodation for her allergic daughter by not serving her beef instead of chicken at a social event, therefore discriminating against her due to her disability. FACES subsequently expelled the Bridgewater family. Mrs. Bridgewater then filed a second complaint with the Commission, alleging that FACES unlawfully retaliated against her family for filing the disability discrimination claim. FACES filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the Commission did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because FACES was a religious organization, not an educational one. The Commission denied the motion to dismiss and awarded judgment in favor of Mrs. Bridgewater on the retaliatory discrimination claim. The Supreme Court vacated the Commission’s final order, holding that the Commission lacked authority to take any action other than the dismissal of these claims because the incident giving rise to the claims was not related to education and was thus not within the Commission’s prerequisite statutory authority. Remanded to grant FACES’s motion to dismiss as to both claims. View "Fishers Adolescent Catholic Enrichment Soc’y, Inc. v. Bridgewater" on Justia Law

The Indiana Department of Insurance Commissioner reviewed the practices of First American Title Insurance Company, resulting in the generation of a report. Six weeks after the deadline for taking action regarding the report, the Commissioner called for a hearing and appointed an administrative judge. First American filed a petition seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s order. The Commissioner moved to dismiss the petition on grounds that First American failed to submit the agency record as required by the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA). The trial court denied the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss but also denied First American’s petition for judicial review on grounds that First American failed to show that it was prejudiced by the untimely order. Both parties appealed. On cross-appeal, the Commissioner argued, in part, that First American’s petition for judicial review should have been dismissed because First American did not submit an agency record. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in declining to grant the Commissioner’s motion to dismiss the petition in light of First American’s failure to file the agency record with the trial court, as a petitioner for review cannot receive consideration of its petition where the statutorily-defined agency record has not been filed. View "First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. Robertson" on Justia Law

One year after the Indiana Department of Education and the Indiana State Board of Education (collectively, “DOE”) approved Teaching Our Posterity Success, Inc. (“TOPS”) as a Supplemental Educational Services provider, the DOE removed TOPS from its list of approved providers. TOPS sought administrative review of that removal. In response, DOE sent TOPS a letter declaring that TOPS will remain removed from the provider list. TOPS filed a petition for judicial review but did not file an official agency record. The trial court dismissed TOPS’ petition on the grounds of its failure to file a timely and complete agency record. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a petitioner seeking judicial review of an agency action must file with the trial court the agency record as defined by the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (AOPA); and (2) because TOPS did not file the agency record as anticipated by the AOPA, the trial court properly dismissed its petition for judicial review. View "Teaching Our Posterity Success, Inc. v. Ind. Dep’t of Educ." on Justia Law

Petitioner was fired from her job at the Indiana Department of Workforce Development for alleged misconduct. After it was discovered that Petitioner kept several items of state property in her possession, Petitioner was charged with theft. The charges were later dismissed. Thereafter, the State filed an ethics proceeding against Petitioner, alleging that she violated 42 Ind. Admin. Code 1-5-12. After an adjudicative hearing, the Indiana State Ethics Commission found that Petitioner did commit the alleged violation and barred her from future State executive branch employment. The Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision, holding (1) double jeopardy did not bar the proceeding before the Commission, and the criminal court’s probable cause determination was not binding upon the Commission; (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the Commission’s determination; and (3) the sanction imposed in this case was within the Commission’s discretion. View "Ind. State Ethics Comm’n v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the certificates of death that doctors, coroners, and funeral directors file with county health departments under Ind. Code 16-37-3 are public records that the public may freely obtain from county health departments. In 2012, Rita Ward sent a letter to the Vanderburgh County Health Department requesting certain copies of records created under Ind. Code 16-37-3-3 and maintained by the Department. The Department denied the request. The Evansville Courier & Press newspaper subsequently requested access to certain Vanderburgh County death records. The Department denied the request. Thereafter, Ward and the Courier & Press sued the Department, arguing that the death certificates were public records covered by the Indiana Access to Public Records Act. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Department. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that death certificates are public records that a county health department must provide public access to under the Act. View "Evansville Courier & Press v. Vanderburgh County Health Dep’t" on Justia Law

The Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM), Indiana’s environmental agency, revised its interpretation of the regulatory term “chemical process plants.” After IDEM issued operating permits to two companies for ethanol and ethanol production facilities, NRDC sought administrative review of both permits based on the interpretation of the term “chemical process plants.” The Indiana Office of Environmental Adjudication (OEA) ordered the permits remanded to IDEM. The companies and others sought judicial review of the OEA order. The trial court reversed the OEA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) IDEM was not required to formally amend Indiana’s State Implementation Plan to effectuate its change in how it interprets the regulatory phrase “chemical process plant”; and (2) IDEM’s new interpretation was reasonable and supported the issuance of the permits in this case. View "Nat. Res. Defense Council v. Poet Biorefining- North Manchester, LLC" on Justia Law

The Indianapolis Marion County City-County Council and Mayor Gregory Ballard agreed on an ordinance dividing Marion County into legislative districts. Three members of the Council (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the ordinance failed to comply with the Redistricting Statute for Marion County, which assigns the task of redrawing the County’s legislative districts to the judiciary if the County’s legislative and executive branches become deadlocked over required redistricting. The trial court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment and then drew new legislative districts, concluding that because the Council divided the County by ordinance in 2011, not during 2012 as required by the Redistricting Statute, the ordinance failed to satisfy the requirement for “mandatory redistricting” during 2012. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that this case did not present a redistricting impasse that required judicial intervention. View "Ballard v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In order to renovate a former warehouse building into administrative offices, Evansville-Vanderburgh School Corporation (“School Corporation”) implemented a plan to convey the Building to the EVSC Foundation (“Foundation”), a private non-profit entity, have the Foundation contract with a contractor for the renovations, and then have the Foundation sell the Building back to the School Corporation. School Corporation officials selected this arrangement because the Foundation was not subject to public bidding laws, and therefore, the renovation could occur more quickly. Plaintiffs, several area contracting businesses paying taxes in the school district, filed an action against the School Corporation and the Foundation (together, “Defendants”) claiming that Defendants violated public bidding statutes and Indiana’s Antitrust Act. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, determining that the School Corporation engaged in the transactions to circumvent the public bidding statutes but that the transactions were not unlawful. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the project violated the Public Bidding Laws. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the court of appeals’ opinion holding that the scheme used by Defendants violated the Public Bidding Laws; and (2) concluded that Plaintiffs' antitrust claim failed because Plaintiffs did not present evidence of an antitrust injury. View "Alva Elec., Inc. v. Evansville-Vanderburgh Sch. Corp." on Justia Law