Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Seventeen-year-old J.K. and her mother lived with J.D.’s maternal grandmother. In 2013, the Marion County Department of Child Services (DCS) initiated CHINS proceedings over J.K. Father, whose divorce with Mother was pending, denied that J.K. was in need of services. After two hearings, during which the trial court made several derogatory remarks about the parties and the nature of their dispute, the court pressured Father to waive his right to a fact-finding hearing and to instead admit that his daughter was a child in need of services (CHINS). The Supreme Court reversed the CHINS adjudication, holding that the cumulative effect of the trial court’s comments and demeanor had a direct impact on Father accepting the court’s suggestion to “waive fact-finding,” and such coercion is fundamental error. View "M.K. v. Marion County Dep’t of Child Servs. & Child Advocates, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2007, when the parties’ child was just over two years old, Father and Mother’s marriage was dissolved. In 2013, Father filed to modify his support obligation given an increased number of overnights Father was having with the child and a decrease in childcare costs. Under the Indiana Child Support Guidelines, the applicable parenting time credit decreased Father’s support obligation from $135 per week to $59 per week. Mother sought a deviation from the recommended amount, arguing that she could not properly support the child with such a minimal contribution from Father. The trial court agreed with Mother and deviated upward from the recommended support but still reduced Father’s previous support obligation to $105 per week. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s child support modification order, holding that the trial court did not commit clear error when it deviated from the Guidelines by not granting Father the full parenting time credit and permitted Mother to claim the child each year for the federal and state dependency tax exemption. View "Bogner v. Bogner" on Justia Law

When Mother and Father’s marriage was dissolved in 1994, the trial court awarded Mother primary care and custody of the parties’ daughter (Daughter) and ordered Father to pay child support. In 2011, after Daughter enrolled at Ball State University (BSU), Mother petitioned to modify child support, requesting that Father pay Daughter’s postsecondary educational expenses. Daughter withdrew from BSU in 2012 and attempted to enroll at Indian University Northwest. BSU, however, would not release Daughter’s official transcript because of her outstanding tuition bill. Mother requested to join BSU as a supplemental defendant. The trial court granted the request and ordered BSU to release the transcript. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court’s order was appealable as of right under Indiana Appellate Rule 14(A)(3); and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in granting Mother’s motion for joinder, as Mother failed to carry her burden in demonstrating that BSU was a necessary party under Trial Rule 19. View "Ball State University v. Irons" on Justia Law

For most of the first year of her life, B.C.H. remained in the primary care, custody and control of her maternal grandparents (Grandparents), and Mother would visit her once a week. Mother later married Stepfather, who petitioned to adopt B.C.H. The petition was granted. Grandparents filed a motion to reopen B.C.H.’s adoption and to intervene, arguing that, under Indiana’s adoption statutes, they had “lawful custody” of B.C.H. when Stepfather’s adoption petition was granted, so they were entitled to legal notice of and the opportunity to consent to the adoption. The superior court denied Grandparents’ motion for relief from judgment, determining that Grandparents did not have legal custody of B.C.H. at the time Stepfather filed the adoption petition. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the superior court, holding that Grandparents had lawful custody of B.C.H., and therefore, Grandparents were entitled to formal legal notice of the pending adoption and an opportunity to give or withhold their consent to Stepfather’s adoption of B.C.H. Remanded. View "In re Adoption of B.C.H." on Justia Law

When Father and Mother divorced, they reached an agreement regarding child support that substantially deviated from what would be ordered by applying the Indiana Child Support Guidelines. Later, Mother petitioned to modify Father’s child support obligation. The trial court granted the motion and modified Father’s support requirements. Father appealed, arguing that agreed child support terms cannot be modified absent a substantial and continuing change in circumstances that renders those terms unreasonable. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer, adopted the portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion that addresses the available grounds for modification, and summarily affirmed the portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion addressing the trial court’s calculation of Father’s support obligation. View "Rolley v. Rolley" on Justia Law

N.E., the former foster parent of two minor children, filed petitions to adopt the children in Lake Superior Court 2, part of the court’s Civil Division. N.E., however, violated a local rule that all adoptions - a type of probate case - must be filed in the Juvenile Division. The trial court refused to transfer the cases to the Juvenile Division. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the local rule impermissibly expanded jurisdiction beyond statutory bounds and impermissibly impinged on the jurisdiction of the Superior Court’s “civil (including probate) division.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in refusing to transfer the adoptions to the Juvenile Division, as the local rule simply established venue and not jurisdiction and was binding on the court and litigants. View "In re Adoption of J.T.D." on Justia Law

In 2010, A trial court found Father in arrears in child support in the amount of $21,337 and ordered that $15,000 in funds attached from Father’s bank be released to Mother. The State later intercepted an additional $7,025 from Father’s bank account, and the sum was distributed to Mother. In 2013, the court issued an order finding Father in indirect contempt for his willful failure to pay child support as ordered, finding him to be in arrears in the amount of $13,055. Father appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to credit him for the distribution of $7,025 to Mother. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court’s arrearage calculations did not give Father credit for the $7,025. Remanded to recalculate Father’s arrearage to provide him credit for the $7,025 payment. View "In re Paternity of D.M.Y." on Justia Law

Child was four months old when she was placed in foster care with Adoptive Parents. When Child was six years old, Adoptive Parents filed a petition to adopt Child. Child’s biological father (Father) refused to consent to the adoption. The trial court entered an order in favor of Adoptive Parents, concluding that Father’s consent to adoption was not required. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the record not only supported the trial court’s conclusion that Father’s consent to the adoption of Child was not required but also supported the trial court’s conclusion that Adoptive Parents’ adoption of Child was in Child's best interest. View "In re Adoption of O.R." on Justia Law

When Barbara and Michael Pohl divorced, they entered into a custody, support, and property settlement agreement that was incorporated into their dissolution decree. Because the original agreement did not provide for spousal maintenance, the parties filed an addendum calling for Barbara to pay Michael monthly maintenance. Barbara later filed a petition to modify her maintenance obligation. The trial court denied Barbara’s request, concluding that the agreement was not intended to be modifiable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) principles of contract finality preclude modification of a maintenance award unless the agreement is modifiable by its own terms; and (2) the parties’ agreement in this case was modifiable because they expressly made the agreed maintenance amount subject to “further order of the court,” echoing the language of the incapacity maintenance statute. Remanded. View "Pohl v. Pohl" on Justia Law

After K.W., a minor child, was removed from the care of Mother and Father, the Department of Child Services (DCS) sought to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father. On the day of the termination hearing, Mother’s attorney sought a continuance based on Mother’s incarceration in a local jail. The trial court denied the motion and held a termination of parental rights (TPR) hearing in Mother’s absence. The court then issued an order terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father with respect to K.W. The Supreme Court vacated the portion of the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights, holding that the trial court, under the facts of this case, abused its discretion by denying Mother’s motion to continue the TPR hearing and by proceeding without her participation. View "In re Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of K.W. and C.C." on Justia Law