Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Desmond Turner was found guilty of murder, felony murder, criminal confinement, robbery, and burglary. Turner appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in admitting four types of evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting firearms tool mark identification testimony; (2) testimony related to the firearms identification did not deny Turner the right of confrontation and did not violate Indiana's rule against hearsay; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of Turner's alleged other crimes, wrongs or acts; (4) testimony of a witness was hearsay and the trial court erred in admitting it; but (5) the admission of the hearsay testimony did not require reversal because Turner's conviction was supported by substantial evidence of guilt apart from the challenged testimony. View "Turner v. State" on Justia Law

A jury found Richard Barnes guilty of battery on a police officer and resisting arrest. The Supreme Court affirmed Barnes's conviction. Subsequently, Barnes petitioned for rehearing, which the Supreme Court granted. At issue in the appeal was whether the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury that Barnes, a suspected spouse abuser, had the right to get physical with the police officers if he believed their attempt to enter his residence was legally unjustified. The Court continued to affirm Barnes's conviction, holding that the Castle Doctrine, which authorizes a person to use reasonable force against another person to prevent the unlawful entry of his dwelling, is not a defense to the crime of battery or other violent acts on a police officer. View "Barnes v. State" on Justia Law

Glenn Carpenter was discovered passed out in the waiting room of a dental office. Police officers aroused Carpenter and handcuffed him. When searching Carpenter the officers found a handgun with an empty magazine, marijuana, cocaine, and a crack pipe. Carpenter was convicted for unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon and being a habitual offender. The trial court imposed a twenty-year sentence for the felony conviction and added twenty years for the habitual finding. On appeal, Carpenter challenged the appropriateness of his sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Carpenter's conviction but reversed the sentence, holding that a forty-year sentence was inappropriate taking into account the adverse character of the offender and the unaggravated nature of the offense as a whole. Remanded with instructions to issue an amended sentence of twenty years, ten years for the felony and ten for the habitual. View "Carpenter v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant Cedric Lewis was pulled over for speeding and arrested when the police officer discovered Lewis's driver's license had been suspended. After ordering Lewis out of the vehicle, the officer stuck his head inside the car to tell a passenger to get out and immediately saw a handgun near the driver's seat. Lewis moved to suppress the gun, arguing that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment by sticking his head into the car to search for weapons. The trial court overruled Lewis's objection and found him guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. The court sentenced Lewis to twelve years in prison. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) the officer's discovery of the gun was not an impermissible search, and (2) the trial court' sentence, just two years above the advisory, was not inappropriate. View "Lewis v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant Arturo Garcia-Torres was convicted of rape, attempted rape, and two counts of burglary and was sentenced to thirty-six years in prison. Defendant challenged the use of DNA evidence gathered when police obtained a cheek swab while Defendant was in custody after the attempted rape, arguing it was an invalid search under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding (1) the cheek swab was a search requiring its own separate probable cause proceedings; (2) the cheek swab was taken under a valid consent; and (3) a Pirtle warning requiring the presence and advice of counsel prior to consenting to a search was not required. View "Garcia-Torres v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Donald Pierce was convicted of four counts of child molesting and adjudicated as a repeat sex offender. The trial court sentenced Pierce to four consecutive sentences for a total term of 124 years and enhanced the sentences by ten years for the repeat sex offender adjudication. Pierce appealed, raising several claims including the appropriateness of his sentence. The state cross-appealed. The court of appeals affirmed in part the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause with instructions to attach an additional fixed ten-year term to one of Pierce's felony sentences to an aggregate term of 134 years. The Supreme Court granted transfer to address Pierce's appropriateness claim. Based on the nature of the offense and the character of the offender, the Court revised the sentence to a total term of 80 years. Remanded. View "Pierce v. State" on Justia Law

Brenda Moore was convicted of public intoxication, a class B misdemeanor, after a public officer pulled over a car in which defendant was riding as a front seat passenger and found defendant had been drinking. A divided court of appeals reversed. On appeal, the defendant argued that her conviction (1) violated public policy because she caused no harm or annoyance and wasn't driving while drinking; and (2) violated her right to consume alcoholic beverages. The Supreme Court affirmed defendant's conviction, finding (1) whether conduct proscribed by criminal law should be excused under certain circumstances on grounds of public policy is a matter for legislative evaluation and not the courts; and (2) defendant's accountability under the public intoxication statute did not violate her personal liberty rights under the Indiana Constitution. View "Moore v. State" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to child molesting, defendant Michael Harris was sentenced to a prison term of ten years and was required to register on the sex offender list for ten years following his release. Prior to his release, the Department of Correction (DOC) notified Harris that he was required to register as a sexually violent predator (SVP) with local law enforcement for his lifetime. Harris filed a complaint in the circuit court for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the DOC, arguing that the DOC lacked the authority to make an SVP determination. The trial court granted Harris relief, thereby removing his SVP status. The court of appeals affirmed, holding the DOC was not authorized by statute to determine Harris's status as an SVP and that his status did not change by operation of law under an amendment to the Sex Offender Registration Act. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, finding that Harris's status in fact changed by operation of law and that this change did not violate Indiana's prohibition on ex post facto laws or doctrine of separation of powers. View "Lemmon v. Harris" on Justia Law

Appellant Randy Horton was convicted of nine counts of child molesting and was sentenced to an executed term of 324 years in prison. Horton appealed his conviction on grounds that the trial court improperly admitted certain evidence at trial. Horton also appealed his sentence on grounds that it constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion to sentence him to such a lengthy term and that the term was inappropriately long given his character and the nature of his offenses. The court of appeals rejected these claims and affirmed in all respects. On appeal, the Supreme Court revised Horton's sentence to an aggregate executed term of 110 years, finding that Horton's lack of any other adult criminal history, coupled with the fact that his only juvenile adjudication was for truancy, warranted credit as a mitigating circumstance. Remanded. View "Horton v. State" on Justia Law

After being charged with two counts of child molesting, defendant Ronald Fromme asked the circuit court to require Crisis Connection, an organization that provides services to victims of sexual abuse and domestic violence, to provide him with all of its records relating to the alleged victims. Crisis Connection argued that the state victim advocate privilege gave it authority to refuse the request. The circuit court ordered Crisis Connection to deliver the records to the court for its in camera review before turning them over to Fromme. Upon review, the court of appeals concluded that he privacy interest asserted by Crisis Connection was not strong enough to bar the in camera review. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the appellate court and reversed the order of the trial court, holding the state's compelling interest in maintaining the confidentiality of information gathered in the course of serving the needs of victims of violence and abuse was not outweighed by Fromme's right to present a complete defense. Accordingly, Fromme did not have a constitutional right to an in camera review of the records. In the absence of a violation of Fromme's constitutional rights, the Court applied the victim advocate privilege. View "Crisis Connection, Inc. v. Fromme" on Justia Law