Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A law enforcement officer stopped the vehicle Defendant was driving after observing the vehicle driving under the speed limit and coming to a full stop before turning onto a county road, where Defendant drove left of center. Defendant was subsequently charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated and with an alcohol concentration equivalent of 0.08 or more. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to suppress on the ground that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop, taking judicial notice of the poor condition of the county’s roads, which required “evasive action” on the part of drivers. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of Defendant’s motion to suppress, holding that, under these circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that Defendant’s driving left of center did not provide reasonable suspicion to stop him. View "State v. Keck" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with four misdemeanors after a law enforcement officer stopped her vehicle for “unsafe lane movement,” conducted field sobriety tests on Defendant, which she failed, and discovered marijuana concealed in Defendant’s clothing. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that, while a video from the officer’s vehicle did not show Defendant’s vehicle leaving the roadway, it did show Defendant’s vehicle veering onto the white fog line, and to the extent the officer’s testimony conflicted with the video, the testimony was more reliable than the video. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer’s conduct was reasonable, and the stop was constitutional. View "Robinson v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to driving while suspended as a habitual traffic violator (HTV). Defendant later filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging an underlying offense for operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) on grounds of the trial judge's alleged impropriety and the alleged violation of his right to counsel. The post-conviction court vacated the OWI conviction based on impropriety on the part of the trial judge. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to set aside his guilty plea because the OWI underlying offense had been set aside. The trial court granted the motion, set aside the guilty plea, and ordered Defendant's conviction expunged from his record. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although a defendant who pleads guilty to driving while suspended as a HTV may not later challenge the plea contending that an underlying offense has been set aside on grounds of procedural error, the defendant may be entitled to relief where an underlying offense has been set aside on grounds of material error; and (2) the State failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the trial court clearly erred in granting Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.View "State v. Oney" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with felony rape and related charges. Petitioner's case was first tried to a jury in 2008. The jury deadlocked on Petitioner's charges for felony rape and felony confinement, and a retrial was scheduled. After a second bench trial, the trial court found Defendant guilty of felony rape and not guilty of criminal confinement. The court of appeals affirmed. Petitioner's convictions were affirmed on appeal. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, inter alia, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object and/or move for a dismissal of the rape charge on state double jeopardy grounds. The post-conviction court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the "actual evidence" test announced in Richardson v. State is applicable to cases in which there has been an acquittal on one charge and retrial on another charge after a hung jury; and (2) the post-conviction court properly denied Petitioner's petition.View "Garrett v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony criminal deviate conduct in 1998, was released from prison in 2000, and began registering annually as a sex offender. Indiana later expanded its registration requirements. Defendant petitioned for relief from the additional SVP obligations, arguing that they were an unconstitutional ex post facto law as applied to him. The trial court concluded in 2008 that retroactively classifying Defendant as an SVP under the expanded statutes would be unconstitutional. The State did not appeal the 2008 order, nor did the Department of Corrections (DOC) intervene to challenge it. In 2011, the State found Defendant had satisfied his registration obligations under the ten-year statute that existed at the time of his conviction. The DOC later filed a motion to correct error, arguing that Defendant's registration obligation from ten years to life was not an ex post facto violation. The trial court granted the motion and vacated the 2008 order. Defendant appealed, arguing that the 2008 order was res judicata against the DOC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that even if the 2008 order was erroneous, it nevertheless became res judicata against the "State" - both the prosecutor and the DOC - when the State failed to appeal it.View "Becker v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of four counts of felony attempted child exploitation for taking “upskirt” photographs of women and girls at a mall by means of a concealed shoe camera. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Defendant did not violate the child exploitation statute, which requires that in order for a defendant to commit child exploitation, the child must “be exhibiting her uncovered genitals with the intent to satisfy someone’s sexual desires.” The Supreme Court granted transfer and affirmed the trial court, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s convictions for attempted child exploitation because, in light of the circumstantial evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that Defendant intended to capture not just images of undergarments but also images of uncovered genitals. View "Delagrange v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of two counts of aggravated battery and sentenced to a term of years in the Department of Correction. The State sought restitution, and the trial court scheduled a restitution hearing. Before the hearing on restitution, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. The State moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the appeal was premature because there had been no resolution of whether or how much restitution would be ordered. The court of appeals subsequently dismissed the appeal as premature. The Supreme Court granted transfer and remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of the points raised in Appellant’s brief, holding that, due to confusion about appellate deadlines and in view of the delay already in this case, Appellant’s appeal should be addressed on the merits even though the issue of restitution remained unresolved. Remanded. View "Alexander v. State" on Justia Law

A driver hit Britney Meux, who later died from her injuries, and fled the scene. The State charged the alleged driver, Jason Cozmanoff, with thirteen crimes, including one count of reckless homicide. A few weeks later, Meux’s Estate sued Cozmanoff for wrongful death. The Estate then served Cozmanoff with discovery requests. If Cozmanoff were to invoke the Fifth Amendment and refuse to comply with the Estate’s requests, the civil jury could infer he was liable for causing Meux’s death. But if he were to provide discovery responses, the State could use his testimony and responses against him in his criminal trial. Cozmanoff moved to stay the civil case pending the resolution of his criminal prosecution, citing his Fifth Amendment privilege. The trial court granted a limited stay of discovery but ordered him to respond to the plaintiff’s complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a stay. View "Hardiman v. Cozmanoff" on Justia Law

In 2005, Defendant was sentenced to seventeen years in prison. In 2010, Defendant struck a prison employee in the face. Defendant was found guilty of battery with injury and sentenced to an enhanced term of three years. The trial court ordered a consecutive sentence as statutorily required but awarded Defendant 471 days credit for time he served incarcerated prior to trial on the battery charge plus 471 days of Class I credit time for a total credit of 942 days against the battery sentence. The State subsequently filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, which the trial court denied. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to re-evaluate the award of credit time and to re-sentence Defendant, holding that the trial court erred in awarding credit time with respect to the mandatory consecutive sentence. View "State v. Lotaki" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with class D felony sexual battery. Defendant, who was born in 1943, filed a motion for a competency determination. Doctors evaluating Defendant diagnosed him with dementia, concluded that he was not competent to stand trial, and predicted that he would not be able to be restored to competency. Based on the doctors’ reports and without a hearing, the trial court found that Defendant was not competent to stand trial and that he could not be restored to competency. The State then requested that the court commit Defendant to the Division of Mental Health and Addiction (DMHA) pursuant to Ind. Code 35-36-3-1(b). The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s denial of the State’s motion to commit Defendant to the DMHA, holding that section 35-36-3-1(b) requires trial courts to commit defendants found not competent to stand trial to the DMHA for competency restoration services. Remanded. View "State v. Coats" on Justia Law