Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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Defendant and his wife were on the brink of divorce when Defendant screamed in his wife’s face and spat in her eye. Defendant was found guilty of B-misdemeanor disorderly conduct for knowingly or intentionally engaging in fighting and/or tumultuous conduct with his wife. Defendant appealed, arguing that the disorderly conduct statute requires both a public disturbance and a physical altercation and that the State failed to prove those elements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the disorderly conduct statute’s “fighting” subsection does not contain a public disturbance element but does require a physical altercation; and (2) Defendant’s intentional spitting provided sufficient evidence of a physical altercation. View "Day v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Defendant was convicted for refusing to identify himself to a law enforcement official. A majority of the court of appeals reversed, concluding that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. One judge dissented and would have affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thus vacating the judgment of the court of appeals. The Court agreed with the dissenting opinion and affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction under Ind. Code 34-28-5-3.5. View "Weaver v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Defendant was arrested and charged with several drug-related offenses. Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized as a result of a search of his home conducted without a warrant. The trial court largely denied the motion. After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of four drug-related counts. On appeal, Defendant argued that the police made a warrantless entry into his home without valid consent and that the police conducted an illegal protective sweep once inside. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress all evidence seized in the search of his home, holding (1) under the circumstances of this case, Defendant’s house guest, who answered the door to Defendant’s home, did not have the apparent authority to consent to police entry; and (2) because the police did not have a warrant or warrant exception to justify entry into Defendant’s home, the subsequent searches, including the protective sweep, were unlawful, and the fruits of those searches must be suppressed. View "Bradley v. State" on Justia Law

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After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder and of being a serious violent felon in possession of a firearm. After a separate sentencing phase, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve two life sentences without parole consecutively. After a subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an additional twenty-year sentence for the firearm possession conviction, also to run consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive life sentences; and (2) the trial court’s sentencing order was inadequate, but Defendant’s sentence was proper. View "Clippinger v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Defendant was charged with operating a vehicle with an alcohol concentration equivalent (ACE) of 0.08 or more. At trial, the judge instructed the jury to presume Defendant’s ACE at the time of the offense based on a chemical test that was performed within three hours of his being stopped by law enforcement. The instruction told the jury it “shall presume,” yet also stated that “the presumption is rebuttable.” Defendant appealed, arguing that the instruction amounted to fundamental error because it improperly relieved the State of its burden to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed Defendant’s conviction, concluding that the instruction did not make clear that the presumption was merely permissible. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thus vacating the opinion below, and affirmed, holding that the instruction did not unconstitutionally shift the State’s burden of proof in violation of Defendant’s due process rights. View "Pattison v. State" on Justia Law

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Thomas Hale appealed his conviction for dealing in methamphetamine, on the sole grounds that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant him, at public expense, depositions of two State’s witnesses. After review, the Indiana Supreme Court found that prior precedent compelled the Court to agree with Hale and reverse his conviction. The Court took the opportunity of this case to provide guidance as to how trial courts should address such motions in the future. View "Hale v. Indiana" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of four traffic offenses related to his driving while intoxicated and his lack of a driver’s license. Defendant’s trial took place almost three years after his arrest. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his Ind. R. Crim. P. 4(C) motion for discharge for delay. Rule 4(C) provides that a defendant may not be held to answer a criminal charge for greater than one year except in certain circumstances. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of Defendant’s motion for discharge, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Defendant was entitled to discharge pursuant to Rule 4(C). Remanded to the trial court to grant the motion pursuant to Rule 4(C). View "Allen v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of domestic battery as a level 6 felony and battery as a level 6 felony. The level 6 battery conviction arose from Defendant’s assault on a woman whose brother had previously been married to Defendant’s aunt. The trial court sentenced Defendant to two years for each conviction to be served consecutively. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s judgment with respect to Defendant’s level 6 battery conviction, holding that the sister of a brother who was once married to Defendant’s aunt is not a “family or household” member within the meaning of the statute elevating misdemeanor battery to a level 6 felony. Remanded. View "Suggs v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of murder, one count of class A felony robbery, and one count of class B felony burglary for crimes he committed when he was thirteen years old. Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 170 years imprisonment. Beginning in 1991, Appellant attempted to obtain his trial court transcripts to prepare a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), but his requests were denied until 2006 when the trial court ultimately granted Appellant’s request for transcripts. When he still had not received the transcript of the plea hearing, he withdrew his post-conviction relief petition. In 2010, Appellant moved to compel compliance with the trial court’s order for transcripts, but the trial court denied the petition because Appellant’s PCR petition had been withdrawn. In 2011, Appellant again filed a pro se PCR petition. In 2015, Appellant filed a petition for permission to file a belated appeal. The trial court denied the petition. Appellant now asked the Supreme Court to permit him to file a belated notice of appeal to appeal his sentence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, under the unique circumstances of this case, Appellant should be permitted to file a belated notice of appeal. View "Sanford v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of dealing in a narcotic drug within 1,000 feet of school property, a class A felony, and of being a habitual substance offender. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s claim that he was a victim of “sentencing factor manipulation” was unavailing because “sentencing factor manipulation” was inapplicable to the charges against him; (2) Defendant waived his claim that the jury verdict was not unanimous; (3) the trial court did not err in admitting redacted letters Defendant wrote to potential witnesses from prison; (4) there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (5) the trial court was within its discretion in ordering Defendant to serve a sentence of forty years for felony dealing. View "Bowman v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law