Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Department of Correction’s change to Indian’s lethal injection protocol, which added Brevital to the lethal injection cocktail, does not carry the effect of law, and therefore, the new three-drug protocol is not a rule and thus not subject to the Administrative Rules and Procedures Act (ARPA).In 2014, the Department announced hat it would alter the three-drug combination used for executions, replacing Sodium Thiopental with Brevital. Plaintiff, a death row inmate, filed a complaint alleging that the Department’s change to the lethal injection protocol violated his rights under the ARPA. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the Department’s execution protocol constituted a rule, and because the Department failed to follow ARPA’s requirements when adding Brevital to the three-drug combination, the changed protocol was void. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals, holding that the Department’s lethal injection protocol did not constitute a “rule” for APRA purposes. View "Ward v. Carter" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court rejected the State’s invitation to graft new language onto Indiana’s habitual-fender statutes, which count all prior non-Indiana felonies as Level 6 felonies and do not allow a habitual-offender findings based only on two Level 6 felonies.Defendant was convicted of Level 4 felony burglary and found to be a habitual offender based on two prior Illinois convictions. On appeal, Defendant challenged the habitual-offender enhancement, arguing that two Level 6 felonies could not support the enhancement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the fact that, under Indiana’s habitual-offender statutes, all non-Indiana felonies count as Level 6 felonies is peculiar and leads to incongruous results, but separation of powers and strict construal of criminal statutes stop the court from declaring it absurd; and (2) Defendant’s two Illinois felonies count as Level 6 felonies under the habitual-offender statutes, but because a habitual-offender enhancement based on only two Level 6 felonies is not allowed, Defendant’s habitual-offender enhancement is reversed as unsupported by sufficient evidence. View "Calvin v. State" on Justia Law

At issue was the habitual offender statute in one of its recently amended forms, Ind. Code 35-50-2-8(d) (Supp. 2015), and whether each lower-level felony used for habitual offender purposes must meet the statute’s ten-year requirement.The State in this case alleged that Defendant was a habitual offender pursuant to section 35-50-2-8(d). Defendant objected, arguing that each of the underlying lower-level offenses must meet the ten-year requirement in subsection 8(d)(2). The trial court overruled Defendant’s objection to the habitual offender enhancement. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plain meaning of the 2015 version of subsection 8(d) required that each lower-level felony the State uses to establish subsection 8(d)(1) must meet the ten-year requirement found in subsection 8(d)(2). View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions, rendered after a jury trial, for six thefts, burglary, and attempted robbery and conspiracy to rob a gas station. The trial court merged the attempt and conspiracy convictions and sentenced Defendant to an aggregate seventeen-year term. On appeal, Defendant challenged only the attempt and conspiracy convictions. Specifically, Defendant claimed that he had abandoned his attempt and conspiracy to rob the gas station. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) abandonment is an available defense for both attempt and conspiracy charges; but (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts and the jury’s finding that the State disproved Defendant’s abandonment defense in at least one way. View "Jones v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s convictions of murder and conspiracy to commit murder but revised his sentence from life without parole (LWOP) to an aggregate eighty-year term.Defendant was seventeen years old when he committed murder. At sentencing, the jury was specifically directed to consider Defendant’s age as a mitigating factor. The jury recommended a LWOP sentence. The Supreme Court held (1) the State’s references to Defendant as “Looney the Shooter” did not lead to fundamental error; (2) the State’s amendment to Defendant’s conspiracy charge was not untimely; (3) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s conspiracy to commit murder conviction; and (4) Defendant’s character and the nature of his offense did not warrant making him “Indiana’s fifth juvenile sentenced to a guaranteed death in prison.” View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s determination as to the good time credit Defendant earned while in the work-release program of a community corrections facility and remanded the matter to the trial court with instructions to recalculate Defendant’s credit time.Defendant's direct placement in a community corrections facility was revoked for his failure to abide by the program’s terms. Thereafter, Defendant was ordered to serve the remainder of his eleven-year sentence in the Department of Correction. The trial court, in calculating Defendant’s earned good time credit, determined that because the community corrections director had deprived Defendant of more good time credit days than he was entitled to receive, Defendant was not entitled to any good time credit for his time served in the work-release program. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the community corrections director lacked the authority to deprive Defendant of good time credit earned. View "Shepard v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. As grounds for the motion, Defendant argued that the search warrant authorizing the search was unsupported by probable cause under the Fourth Amendment and that its execution violated the search-and-seizure protections of the Fourth Amendment and Ind. Const. art. I, 11. The trial court denied the motion. A jury subsequently found Defendant guilty of of several drug-related offenses. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under a state constitutional analysis, the police did not act unreasonably under the totality of the circumstances; and (2) under a federal constitutional analysis, the search warrant was supported by probable cause. View "Watkins v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court overruled Salter v. State, 906 N.E.2d 2012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), which found Ind. Code 35-49-3-3(a)(1) (the Dissemination Statute) void for vagueness was applied because the intended recipient met Indiana’s age of consent to sexual activity.Defendant in this case was charged with dissemination of matter harmful to minors under the Dissemination Statute for sending a photograph of his erect penis to a sixteen-year-old girl. Defendant moved to dismiss on constitutional grounds, arguing that the statute was void for vagueness. The trial court dismissed the charges, relying on Salter. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding that the Dissemination Statute is not unconstitutionally vague. View "State v. Thakar" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of Class A felony dealing in a narcotic drug. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant’s conviction, concluding that the police violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they detained and transported Defendant to the police station to await a search warrant and that the trial court erred in not excluding evidence obtained during that detention. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit the disputed evidence, holding (1) police officers had probable cause to believe Defendant was in possession of narcotics; and (2) therefore, transporting Defendant to, and detaining him at, the police station to await the results of a search warrant request did not violate the Fourth Amendment. View "Thomas v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the trial court requiring Defendant to pay $5,240.32 in restitution. Defendant pled guilty to level 6 felony auto theft, and the victim’s vehicle came back heavily spray-painted. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that insufficient evidence supported the restitution order because the record did not show that the spray-paint damage was attributable to the theft. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thus vacating the court of appeals opinion, and affirmed, holding (1) Defendant did not waive her right to appeal the amount of the restitution order; (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Defendant to pay restitution for the spray-paint damage because there was sufficient evidence that the spray-paint damage was a direct result of the underlying theft; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Defendant had the ability to pay restitution. View "Archer v. State" on Justia Law