Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1998, Appellant committed child molesting in Indiana. Appellant was released in 2006 and completed parole the next year. In 2009, Appellant moved to Iowa, where he was subject to a registration requirement. When Appellant moved back to Indiana in 2013, the State notified him that he was required to register as a sex offender. Appellant sought removal from the registry. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Appellant argued that because he committed his offense six years prior to the passage of Indiana’s Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA), application of SORA to him violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Indiana Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant was already under an obligation to register in another jurisdiction and Ind. Code 11-8-8-5(b)(1) and -19(f) do not impose any additional punishment on him, there was no ex post facto violation. View "Ammons v. State" on Justia Law

In 1998, Appellant committed child molesting in Indiana. Appellant was released in 2006 and completed parole the next year. In 2009, Appellant moved to Iowa, where he was subject to a registration requirement. When Appellant moved back to Indiana in 2013, the State notified him that he was required to register as a sex offender. Appellant sought removal from the registry. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Appellant argued that because he committed his offense six years prior to the passage of Indiana’s Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA), application of SORA to him violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Indiana Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Appellant was already under an obligation to register in another jurisdiction and Ind. Code 11-8-8-5(b)(1) and -19(f) do not impose any additional punishment on him, there was no ex post facto violation. View "Ammons v. State" on Justia Law

In 2013, Defendant was charged with second degree murder for the death of a toddler that occurred in 1977. During a bench trial, the court admitted into evidence an autopsy report. The autopsy was performed by a pathologist who was unavailable to testify at trial. In addition to the autopsy report, the State called a forensic pathologist to testify regarding his independent opinion of the child’s death and injuries based on the autopsy report. The trial court found Defendant guilty of second degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment under the relevant sentencing statutes in 1977. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the autopsy report was not testimonial, Defendant’s confrontation right was not violated when the report was admitted into evidence or when the surrogate pathologist testified regarding the information detailed in the autopsy report; (2) the delay between the murder of the child and Defendant’s prosecution did not violate Defendant’s due process rights; and (3) even if the trial court erred at sentencing by taking into consideration the current sentencing scheme that was inapplicable in this case, the error was harmless. View "Ackerman v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was arrested for suspected murder. During Defendant’s pre-interrogation with his lawyer, police officers and a prosecutor eavesdropped as Defendant and his attorney discussed the location of evidence and defense trial strategy. Defendant was charged with murder. The officers involved in the investigation invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to all questions related to the eavesdropping, thus preventing Defendant and the court from learning the identity of the eavesdroppers and what they had overhead. Before trial, the trial court ordered blanket suppression of trial testimony from any witness who pleaded the Fifth. The State appealed the blanket suppression ruling. The Court of Appeals reversed the pretrial blanket suppression. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the opinion of the Court of Appeals, holding that prospectively imposing blanket suppression of all testimony from witnesses pleading the Fifth Amendment is inappropriate because a presumption of prejudice, rebuttable only by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, adequately protects Defendant from prejudice caused by the officers’ eavesdropping and their assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. Remanded for a determination as to whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt an independent source for each presumptively tainted witness’s testimony without implicating the witness’s Fifth Amendment privilege and without derogating Defendant’s right of confrontation. View "State v. Taylor" on Justia Law

In 2014, the General Assembly enacted Ind. Code 3-11-1.5-3.4 (the Statute), which created a Small Precinct Committee in Lake County and directed it to identify precincts with 500 active voters or fewer that may be amenable to consolidation. This measure was intended to reduce the cost of election administration in a county that contains more than fifteen percent of the State’s small precincts. Several precinct committeepersons sought declaratory judgment and an injunction, asserting that the Statute violated the State Constitution. The trial court concluded that the Statute is an impermissible special law and a violation of separation of powers principles. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Statute is constitutionally permissible special legislation; and (2) the Statute does not offend Indiana’s separation of powers clause. View "State v. Buncich" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendants, a married couple, were each convicted of involuntary manslaughter. After they were sentenced, Defendants filed a motion to correct error seeking a mistrial based on one juror’s affidavit describing the conduct of an alternate juror during the jury’s deliberations. The trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court granted transfer, consolidated the cases, and reversed the convictions, holding (1) the juror’s affidavit established that the alternate juror’s participation in jury deliberations was an external influence that pertained to the case, which showings resulted in a presumption of prejudice to Defendants; and (2) the State did not rebut the presumption by showing that the jury was nonetheless impartial, and therefore, a new trial is required. Remanded. View "Wahl v. State" on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendant was adjudicated delinquent in Texas for a sex offense. Defendant was required to register in Texas as a sex offender until 2014. In 2006, Indiana amended the Sex Offender Registry Act’s definition of sex offender to include “a person who is required to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction.” In 2009, Defendant moved to Indiana but did not register as a sex offender. Defendant was charged with failing to register as a sex offender in Indiana. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that enforcing the registry requirement would be an ex post violation because his offense occurred before the change to the definition of sex offender took effect. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant has failed to show the amended definition retroactively punished him, and therefore, there was no ex post facto law violation. View "Tyson v. State" on Justia Law

In 1992, Defendant was convicted in Michigan of a sex offense. Michigan and Indiana later enacted laws requiring convicted sex offenders to register with local law enforcement. Pursuant to Michigan’s Sex Offender Registration Act, Defendant was required to register as a sex offender for twenty-five years upon his release from prison in 1999. In 2006, the Indiana General Assembly amended the definition of sex offender in Indiana’s Act to include “a person who is required to register as a sex offender in any jurisdiction.” In 2012, Defendant moved to Indiana, where he was required to register for the remainder of his Michigan registration period. Defendant petitioned for removal from the registry, arguing that enforcing the requirement would be an ex post facto violation as applied to him because, at the time he committed the underlying offense, neither Michigan nor Indiana had adopted Sex Offender Registration Acts. The trial court granted Defendant’s petition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 2006 definitional amendment to the Michigan Act does not impose a punitive burden on Defendant beyond that which Michigan has already imposed, and therefore, there is not ex post facto violation. View "State v. Zerbe" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with battering J.M., his girlfriend. While she was being treated for her injuries, J.M. told a paramedic and forensic nurse that Defendant was the source of her injuries. J.M. was reported missing shortly after the assault and failed to appear for scheduled depositions. The State later provided notice of intent to introduce J.M.'s statement identifying Defendant as her attacker through the testimony of the paramedic and forensic nurse. The trial court granted the motion. After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of C-felony battery and A-misdemeanor domestic battery. Defendant appealed, arguing that J.M.’s statements were testimonial hearsay admitted in violation of his confrontation rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that J.M.’s hearsay statements were non-testimonial and, therefore, were properly admitted into evidence. View "Ward v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was lawfully placed under arrest for driving without a valid driver’s license. Before the police officer placed Defendant in his police cruiser, he conducted a pat-down search of Defendant’s clothing to check for weapons. The officer discovered a pill container in Defendant’s pocket, opened the container, and found a single narcotic pill for which Defendant did not have a valid prescription. Defendant was charged with driving without a license and possession of a controlled substance. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of the pill container’s contents, arguing that the officer’s opening of the pill contained was an unreasonable search. The trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the opening of the pill container was within the scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest and reasonable under the Indiana Constitution. View "Garcia v. State" on Justia Law