Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant-Plaintiff Bradley Love was a volunteer and part-time firefighter for the Sugar Creek Township Fire Department (Department) during the spring of 2006. During the Republican primary election that spring, Bob Boyer, a retired volunteer firefighter, challenged the incumbent, C.O. Montgomery, for the office of Sugar Creek Township Trustee. One of the Trusteeâs principal duties is to appoint a fire chief to oversee the Department. On April 24, 2006, a few weeks before the May 2nd primary, an email concerning Boyerâs political intentions was forwarded to Appellant by an acquaintance. Eventually a copy of Appellantâs email made its way to Appellee-Defendant Fire Chief Robert Rehfus. After consulting with Township counsel, Appellee sought to verify whether some of the facts in the email were true. Appellee was particularly offended by parts of the email. Concluding that Appellant made some false statements in the email, Appellee terminated Appellantâs employment for conduct unbecoming a firefighter and failing to be truthful in accordance with the Departmentâs General Orders. Appellant filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Hancock Circuit Court against both the Chief and the Township for violation of his constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment arguing both that Appellantâs constitutional rights were not violated because false statements are not protected, and that the Township could not be held liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. The trial court entered summary judgment on behalf of Appellees on both grounds. The appellate court reversed, finding that Appellantâs speech was protected under the First Amendment and that the Township was subject to liability under § 1983 because the Chief established final government policy respecting employment decisions within the fire department. The Supreme Court on review affirmed the appellate court decision, finding that the email was constitutionally protected speech, and that there were genuine issues of material fact that needed to be resolved in order to determine whether, as a matter of state law, the township is liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the Chiefâs actions.