Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a two-day jury trial, the trial court found Joey Addison guilty of murder but mentally ill and imposed the minimum sentence for murder. Addison appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his Batson challenge to the State's peremptory strike of an African American prospective juror. The court of appeals rejected Addison's Batson claim. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the trial court with respect to Addison's Batson claim, holding that the State's proffered explanation for striking the venireperson was a mere pretext based on race, making a fair trial impossible. Remanded for a new trial. View "Addison v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Antwon Abbott was convicted of possession of cocaine as a Class B felony for which he was sentenced to the maximum term of twenty years. The Supreme Court granted transfer and revised Abbott's sentence to twelve years, two years above the statutory advisory term for a Class B felony. Although Abbott's character did not necessarily justify a revision of his sentence, the Court held that the nature of Abbott's offense in this case rendered his twenty-year maximum sentence inappropriate. Remanded to the trial court with instructions to issue an amended sentencing order consistent with this opinion. View "Abbott v. State" on Justia Law

For his failure to pay child support for his two daughters, a jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of nonsupport of a dependent child, each a class D felony, plus two additional counts of nonsupport of a dependent child while owing over $15,000 in child support, each a class C felony. The trial court entered judgment only as to the two class C felonies. Defendant appealed, contending that the two class C felonies should have merged into one conviction under Indiana double jeopardy jurisprudence. The court of appeals vacated one of Defendant's class C felony convictions but affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The Supreme Court granted transfer and held that applicable law permitted a separate Class D felony conviction for nonsupport of each dependent child, but only one such offense could be enhanced to a class C felony where the unpaid support for one or more of such children is $15,000 or more. Remanded for the entry of judgment as follows: one class C felony as to the nonsupport applicable to one of the dependent children and one class D felony as to the nonsupport of the other dependent child. View "Sanjari v. State" on Justia Law

For over twenty-five years, the State required certain employees to work forty-hour weeks while requiring other employees to work only 37.5-hour weeks. Through the employees received the same biweekly paycheck, the effect of the State's policy was a disparity in actual hourly wage. The State ended the policy in 1993, but this class action was brought on behalf of those forty-hour employees. The court of appeals found (1) the merit employees were owed back pay on their statute-base claims from the day they filed their complaint or grievances until the day the State eliminated its split-pay system; and (2) the non-merit employees were owed back pay on their constitutional claims from the day the State eliminated its split-pay system and extending back approximately twenty years. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that, under the doctrine of laches, the back pay recovery of the non-merit employees should be limited in the same manner as the court of appeals set forth for that of the merit employees. View "Richmond State Hosp. v. Brattain" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder, rape, and criminal deviate conduct. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant next sought post-conviction relief, asserting that his appellate counsel's failure to challenge the refusal of a tendered instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the instruction on proof beyond a reasonable doubt rendered harmless any potential error in refusing the tendered instruction that "where proof of guilt is by circumstantial evidence only, it must be so conclusive...as to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence." The Supreme Court rejected Defendant's claim of post-conviction court error but granted transfer to provide clarification regarding the "reasonable theory of innocence" instruction, as the Court disagreed with the court of appeals that the giving of a conventional reasonable doubt instruction rendered unnecessary the giving of a reasonable theory of innocence instruction. View "Hampton v. State" on Justia Law

After pulling over a vehicle for speeding, a law enforcement officer arrested the driver and passenger and, upon searching the vehicle, discovered a jar of marijuana sitting on the floorboard of the passenger seat. The trial court found the passenger (Passenger) guilty of possessing marijuana. The trial judge also suspended Passenger's driver's license and registration under Ind. Code 35-48-4-15(a), believing that the driver's license suspension statute left her no discretion in the matter even though Passenger was not driving the vehicle. At issue on appeal was whether an automotible passenger riding down the highway with a jar of marijuana between his legs can be found to have "used the vehicle" in committing the offense of possessing marijuana pursuant to section 35-48-4-15(a). The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, holding (1) Passenger used the vehicle in committing the offense of possessing marijuana; and (2) the trial court properly ordered Passenger's driver's license, registration, and ability to register other vehicles suspended, as the statute left the court no discretion in the matter. View "Adams v. State" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Antoine Hill pleaded guilty to one count of Class A felony attempted murder and two counts of Class C felony attempted battery. Hill did not appeal. Hill's counsel subsequently filed a Post-Convcition Rule 2 petition, seeking permission to file a belated notice of appeal. The trial court denied permission, and counsel did not timely appeal this denial. Thereafter, Hill, through different counsel, filed a Post-Conviction Rule 1 petition, alleging that his Post-Conviction Rule 2 counsel was ineffective for failing to timely appeal the trial court's denial of permission to file a belated notice of appeal. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that Hill could not satisfy the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test set forth in Strickland v. Washington. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the appropriate standard for judging the performance of Post-Conviction Rule 2 counsel is the standard set forth in Baum v. State; and (2) Post-Conviction Rule 2 counsel in this case did not violate Baum because she represented Hill in a procedurally fair setting that resulted in a judgment of the court. View "Hill v. State" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of Class A felony neglect of a dependent and found him to be a habitual offender, which resulted in a thirty-year sentencing enhancement. The court of appeals affirmed. On transfer to the Supreme Court, the State presented an unsigned judgment of conviction to prove that Defendant in fact had been convicted of one of the predicate felonies. The Court vacated the court of appeals in regard to Dexter's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that he was a habitual offender and affirmed in all other respects, holding (1) an unsigned judgment was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the fact of a prior conviction, and therefore, Defendant's habitual-offender sentencing enhancement must be reversed; and (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the State from retrying Defendant on the habitual-offender enhancement. View "Dexter v. State " on Justia Law

After a 911 call was made by a motorist complaining that the driver of a blue Volkswagen, who had just pulled into a gas station, was driving erratically, a police officer arrived at the gas station and observed the blue Volkswagen. The officer then made an investigatory stop of the driver of the vehicle, Amanda Renzulli. Renzulli was later charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated. The trial court granted Renzulli's motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the police officer in this instance had reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts to briefly detain Renzulli for investigatory purposes. View "State v. Renzulli" on Justia Law

In this case, the State sought to enforce a particular provision of the Indiana Autodialer Law against an entity that used an automated dialing device to deliver prerecorded political messages. The trial court, on cross-motions for preliminary injunction, decided that the entity had a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that the live-operator requirement of the Autodialer Law violated the free speech clause of the Indiana Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the entity's First Amendment claim would likely fail, and (2) there was no reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of the entity's claim that the Autodialer Law's live-operator requirement materially burdened its right to engage in political speech in violation of the state Constitution. Remanded. View "State v. Econ. Freedom Fund" on Justia Law