Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Antoine Hill pleaded guilty to one count of Class A felony attempted murder and two counts of Class C felony attempted battery. Hill did not appeal. Hill's counsel subsequently filed a Post-Convcition Rule 2 petition, seeking permission to file a belated notice of appeal. The trial court denied permission, and counsel did not timely appeal this denial. Thereafter, Hill, through different counsel, filed a Post-Conviction Rule 1 petition, alleging that his Post-Conviction Rule 2 counsel was ineffective for failing to timely appeal the trial court's denial of permission to file a belated notice of appeal. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that Hill could not satisfy the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel test set forth in Strickland v. Washington. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) the appropriate standard for judging the performance of Post-Conviction Rule 2 counsel is the standard set forth in Baum v. State; and (2) Post-Conviction Rule 2 counsel in this case did not violate Baum because she represented Hill in a procedurally fair setting that resulted in a judgment of the court. View "Hill v. State" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant of Class A felony neglect of a dependent and found him to be a habitual offender, which resulted in a thirty-year sentencing enhancement. The court of appeals affirmed. On transfer to the Supreme Court, the State presented an unsigned judgment of conviction to prove that Defendant in fact had been convicted of one of the predicate felonies. The Court vacated the court of appeals in regard to Dexter's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's finding that he was a habitual offender and affirmed in all other respects, holding (1) an unsigned judgment was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the fact of a prior conviction, and therefore, Defendant's habitual-offender sentencing enhancement must be reversed; and (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the State from retrying Defendant on the habitual-offender enhancement. View "Dexter v. State " on Justia Law

After a 911 call was made by a motorist complaining that the driver of a blue Volkswagen, who had just pulled into a gas station, was driving erratically, a police officer arrived at the gas station and observed the blue Volkswagen. The officer then made an investigatory stop of the driver of the vehicle, Amanda Renzulli. Renzulli was later charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated. The trial court granted Renzulli's motion to suppress the evidence on the grounds that there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the police officer in this instance had reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts to briefly detain Renzulli for investigatory purposes. View "State v. Renzulli" on Justia Law

In this case, the State sought to enforce a particular provision of the Indiana Autodialer Law against an entity that used an automated dialing device to deliver prerecorded political messages. The trial court, on cross-motions for preliminary injunction, decided that the entity had a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of its claim that the live-operator requirement of the Autodialer Law violated the free speech clause of the Indiana Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the entity's First Amendment claim would likely fail, and (2) there was no reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of the entity's claim that the Autodialer Law's live-operator requirement materially burdened its right to engage in political speech in violation of the state Constitution. Remanded. View "State v. Econ. Freedom Fund" on Justia Law

The Indiana Constitution authorizes the General Assembly to disenfranchise "any person convicted of an infamous crime." Plaintiff was convicted of misdemeanor battery. During his incarceration, Plaintiff was informed that his voter registration was canceled in accordance with several provisions of state law under which persons convicted of crimes and sentenced to imprisonment are disenfranchised for the duration of incarceration. After his release, Plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against state and county election officials. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer whether Plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated when his voter registration was canceled because, as Plaintiff alleged, misdemeanor battery was not an "infamous crime." The Court held (1) the crime in this case was not an "infamous crime," but (2) the General Assembly has separate constitutional authority to cancel the registration of any person incarcerated following conviction for the duration of the incarceration, and (3) therefore, Plaintiff's Constitutional rights were not violated when he was disenfranchised while incarcerated. View "Snyder v. King" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with tattooing a minor for taking his former Stepdaughter to get a tattoo. While the charge was pending, a detective arranged for Stepdaughter to make recorded phone calls to Appellant to obtain evidence concerning a sexual relationship Appellant allegedly forced upon Stepdaughter. The State subsequently charged Appellant with several sex-related crimes. Appellant moved to suppress the incriminating statements from the conversations, claiming they were obtained in violation of his right to counsel. The trial court denied the motion and convicted Appellant as charged. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether an "inextricably intertwined" exception to the offense-specific nature of the right to counsel existed under the state Constitution. The Court affirmed, holding (1) under the Indiana Constitution, the right to counsel is violated only where the different offense is inextricably intertwined with the charge on which counsel is already representing the defendant; and (2) because there was no evidence that it would have been objectively foreseeable for the detective, at the time he conducted the phone calls, to believe the pending tattooing offense was inextricably intertwined with the alleged sexual misconduct, the recorded conversations did not violate Appellant's right to counsel. View "Jewell v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to driving while intoxicated after proceeding pro se in plea negotiations with the State. Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging that his waiver of counsel was invalid. The trial court denied the petition. The Supreme Court granted transfer and announced that future defendants expressing a desire to proceed without counsel must be informed that an attorney is more experienced in plea negotiations and better able to identify and evaluate potential defenses and problems in the prosecution's case (Hopper warning). The Court subsequently granted the State's petition for rehearing and affirmed the post-conviction court, holding (1) the Sixth Amendment does not require the same warnings and analysis for a valid waiver of counsel during plea negotiations as it requires for the entry of a guilty plea; (2) the post-conviction court properly found that Hopper's waiver of counsel during his guilty plea hearing was voluntary and intelligent; and (3) the absence of the Hopper warning is not a per se violation of a defendant's right to counsel, but rather, courts should consider the absence of the instruction as an additional factor in a totality of the circumstances approach. View "Hopper v. State" on Justia Law

A trial court found Lisa Gray guilty of possessing marijuana as a class A misdemeanor. The court of appeals set aside the conviction on the grounds of insufficient evidence. At issue on appeal was whether the trial court properly found Gray had constructive possession of the marijuana when it was found on the floor of her apartment and Gray's son testified that the marijuana belonged to him. The Supreme Court granted transfer, vacated the court of appeals, and affirmed the trial court, holding that there was substantial evidence of probative value from which the court could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Gray committed the crime. View "Gray v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant Otha Hamilton was convicted of one count of molesting a child for an incident in which Appellant's nine-year-old step-granddaughter performed oral sex on him. Hamilton was sentenced to the maximum sentence of fifty years in prison. Hamilton appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the sentence was inappropriate given the nature of his offense and his character. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed Hamilton's conviction but revised his sentence, holding that, given the nature of Hamilton's sexual misconduct, the sentence imposed by the trial court was inappropriate. Remanded with instructions to enter an amended sentence of thirty-five years in prison. View "Hamilton v. State" on Justia Law

Jeffery Cain was convicted of murder and robbery and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. Cain appealed his conviction and sentence, claiming that a co-defendant's testimony was improperly admitted at the guilt phase of his trial and that the prosecutor made inappropriate arguments during the sentencing phase. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances, the trial court was well within its discretion to deny Cain's motion to exclude the co-defendant's testimony; and (2) although the prosecutor inaccurately portrayed education programs for offenders in her closing argument during the sentencing phase of Cain's trial, the prosecutor's statements did not qualify as fundamental error. View "Cain v. State" on Justia Law