Justia Indiana Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mother and Stepfather lived with Mother's two children. The Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging that K.D. and K.S. were children in need of services (CHINS). Mother admitted the children were CHINS, but Stepfather denied the allegations. After Stepfather requested a fact-finding hearing, the trial court converted the contested fact-finding hearing scheduled for Stepfather into a contested dispositional hearing. After the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court found the children were in need of services. The court of appeals reversed, finding that Stepfather was denied due process by not receiving a fact-finding hearing. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the court of appeals, and held that a parent who requests a contested fact-finding hearing has a due process right to that hearing, and whenever a trial court is confronted with one parent wishing to make an admission that a child is in need of services and the other parent wishing to deny the same, the trial court shall conduct a fact-finding hearing as to the entire matter. Remanded. View "In re K.D." on Justia Law

A jury found Keith Hoglund guilty of two counts of child molesting. The court of appeals affirmed. Hoglund appealed, contending the testimony of expert witnesses constituted impermissible vouching evidence. The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the court of appeals. The Court then affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding (1) testimony amounting to the equivalent that a witness believes the child in a case involving child sex abuse allegations is telling the truth is inconsistent with the rules of evidence; (2) the trial court erred in allowing expert testimony that commented on the child witness' truthfulness into evidence over Hoglund's objection; but (3) because Hoglund's conviction was supported by substantial independent evidence of his guilt, and because the improper admission of the evidence was cumulative of other evidence properly before the jury, the error in admitting the testimony was harmless. View "Hoglund v. State" on Justia Law

The City of Kokomo terminated the employment of Mark Thatcher, a police officer, after Thatcher sustained a knee injury in the line of duty. Thatcher was a member of the 1977 Fund, a disability and pension fund for police officers. Thatcher began receiving disability benefits subsequent to his injury. After Thatcher's knee was repaired, he sought reinstatement to active duty. The City decided not to reinstate Thatcher, who was fifty years of age and had completed four years of service in the police department, based on Ind. Code 36-8-4-7(a). Thatcher brought claims in federal district court against the City and Kokomo Police Department (KPD) under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Americans with Disabilities Act. The Supreme Court accepted certification and held that the City correctly determined that Thatcher was statutorily prohibited from returning to the KPD, as (1) section 36-8-4-7(a) applies to a member of the 1977 Fund who is receiving disability benefits and who has been determined to have been recovered; and (2) the time period during which a person receives disability benefits does not count toward "years of service" as that term is used in section 36-8-4-7(a). View "Thatcher v. City of Kokomo " on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Jerrme Cartwright was convicted of attempted battery and unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. A divided court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court improperly denied Cartwright's Batson challenge to the State's peremptory strike of the sole African American prospective juror, as the State's proffered explanations for its peremptory strike were pretextual, resulting in purposeful discrimination in the selection of the jury in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court with respect to Cartwright's Batson claim, holding that Cartwright did not meet his burden of demonstrating that the State had pretextual reasons for striking the prospective juror. View "Cartwright v. State" on Justia Law

After a two-day jury trial, the trial court found Joey Addison guilty of murder but mentally ill and imposed the minimum sentence for murder. Addison appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in denying his Batson challenge to the State's peremptory strike of an African American prospective juror. The court of appeals rejected Addison's Batson claim. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and reversed the judgment of the trial court with respect to Addison's Batson claim, holding that the State's proffered explanation for striking the venireperson was a mere pretext based on race, making a fair trial impossible. Remanded for a new trial. View "Addison v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Antwon Abbott was convicted of possession of cocaine as a Class B felony for which he was sentenced to the maximum term of twenty years. The Supreme Court granted transfer and revised Abbott's sentence to twelve years, two years above the statutory advisory term for a Class B felony. Although Abbott's character did not necessarily justify a revision of his sentence, the Court held that the nature of Abbott's offense in this case rendered his twenty-year maximum sentence inappropriate. Remanded to the trial court with instructions to issue an amended sentencing order consistent with this opinion. View "Abbott v. State" on Justia Law

For his failure to pay child support for his two daughters, a jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of nonsupport of a dependent child, each a class D felony, plus two additional counts of nonsupport of a dependent child while owing over $15,000 in child support, each a class C felony. The trial court entered judgment only as to the two class C felonies. Defendant appealed, contending that the two class C felonies should have merged into one conviction under Indiana double jeopardy jurisprudence. The court of appeals vacated one of Defendant's class C felony convictions but affirmed the trial court in all other respects. The Supreme Court granted transfer and held that applicable law permitted a separate Class D felony conviction for nonsupport of each dependent child, but only one such offense could be enhanced to a class C felony where the unpaid support for one or more of such children is $15,000 or more. Remanded for the entry of judgment as follows: one class C felony as to the nonsupport applicable to one of the dependent children and one class D felony as to the nonsupport of the other dependent child. View "Sanjari v. State" on Justia Law

For over twenty-five years, the State required certain employees to work forty-hour weeks while requiring other employees to work only 37.5-hour weeks. Through the employees received the same biweekly paycheck, the effect of the State's policy was a disparity in actual hourly wage. The State ended the policy in 1993, but this class action was brought on behalf of those forty-hour employees. The court of appeals found (1) the merit employees were owed back pay on their statute-base claims from the day they filed their complaint or grievances until the day the State eliminated its split-pay system; and (2) the non-merit employees were owed back pay on their constitutional claims from the day the State eliminated its split-pay system and extending back approximately twenty years. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that, under the doctrine of laches, the back pay recovery of the non-merit employees should be limited in the same manner as the court of appeals set forth for that of the merit employees. View "Richmond State Hosp. v. Brattain" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of murder, rape, and criminal deviate conduct. The court of appeals affirmed. Defendant next sought post-conviction relief, asserting that his appellate counsel's failure to challenge the refusal of a tendered instruction constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the instruction on proof beyond a reasonable doubt rendered harmless any potential error in refusing the tendered instruction that "where proof of guilt is by circumstantial evidence only, it must be so conclusive...as to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence." The Supreme Court rejected Defendant's claim of post-conviction court error but granted transfer to provide clarification regarding the "reasonable theory of innocence" instruction, as the Court disagreed with the court of appeals that the giving of a conventional reasonable doubt instruction rendered unnecessary the giving of a reasonable theory of innocence instruction. View "Hampton v. State" on Justia Law

After pulling over a vehicle for speeding, a law enforcement officer arrested the driver and passenger and, upon searching the vehicle, discovered a jar of marijuana sitting on the floorboard of the passenger seat. The trial court found the passenger (Passenger) guilty of possessing marijuana. The trial judge also suspended Passenger's driver's license and registration under Ind. Code 35-48-4-15(a), believing that the driver's license suspension statute left her no discretion in the matter even though Passenger was not driving the vehicle. At issue on appeal was whether an automotible passenger riding down the highway with a jar of marijuana between his legs can be found to have "used the vehicle" in committing the offense of possessing marijuana pursuant to section 35-48-4-15(a). The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, holding (1) Passenger used the vehicle in committing the offense of possessing marijuana; and (2) the trial court properly ordered Passenger's driver's license, registration, and ability to register other vehicles suspended, as the statute left the court no discretion in the matter. View "Adams v. State" on Justia Law